













Preface

The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (China Foundation in short) was established in 1924 with the consensus of both the governments of the United States of America and Republic of China. It was after lengthy discussions and negotiations among educators, social leaders and government officials of the two countries to come to this conclusion. The purpose of the Foundation was to manage the so called second remission of the remaining Boxer Rebellion Indemnity owed to the United States for the promotion of education and culture in China. The total amount of the remaining Indemnity from October 1917 to December 1940 including principals and interests was about US$12 million. In 1925 the treasury of the U.S. government appropriated the cumulative payments of the Indemnity since October 1917 of the amount US$1,377,255 to the newly established Foundation. The rest of the remission would be paid in monthly installments in forthcoming years.

The Boxer Rebellion was a fanatical anti- foreigners' movement led by the Boxers which was encouraged, at least tolerated, by certain high-ranking Tsing government officials in the year of 1900. The Boxers threatened foreign lives, ruined churches, disrupted railways, attacked foreign legations in Peking and killed a German Minister to China. These caused the invasion of the Allied Expeditionary Force of the eight powers which defeated Tsing Imperial Army and captured Beijing. As a result of the defeat, the Boxer Protocol in 1901 provided the Boxer Rebellion

Indemnity of 450 million taels of silver calculated in term of gold payable in 39 year installments till 1940 at an annual interest rate of 4% to the eight nations. The total amount of the Indemnity including principals and interests was more than 980 million taels of silver.

The U.S. government decided to return to China the over claimed Boxer Rebellion Indemnity, principals and interests included of more than US$28 million in 1908 as a result of persistent negotiations of the Chinese Minister to the United States, Liang Cheng. Liang was one of the children sent to the U.S. in the 1870s to receive education. The above amount was the first remission of the Boxer Rebellion Indemnity owed to the United States. The fund was to be used for the sole purpose of sending students to study in the U.S. In 1911, some of the fund was used to establish the Tsing Hua School, a preparatory school for Chinese students to further study in America higher education institutes. The Tsing Hua School later became Tsing Hua College and then Tsing Hua University. The Board of Trustees of the Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund proposed in 1928 to entrust the Tsing Hua Fund to the China Foundation for permanent custody. The proposal was suggested by the U.S. Ambassador to China and was in agreement with the Chinese Minister of Education.

Also entrusted to the China Foundation under management were two smaller funds, the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology Endowment Fund (1928) and the Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library Endowment Fund (1931).

The Board of Trustees of the China Foundation consists of 15 members. The first 15 members of the Board was appointed by President Ts'ao Kun. Thereafter the Board of Trustees was at liberty to elect its own members. According to the constitution of the China Foundation, of the 15 members 10 should be Chinese citizens and 5 should be American citizens. The number of American trustees was reduced to 4 in 1983. Many historically known educators, scholars, diplomats and government officials from American and China had served on the Board, including Chiang Monlin, John Dewey, Fu Ssu-nien, Hu Shih, Wellington Koo, Paul Monroe, Frederick Seitz, Tsai Yuan-Pei, Wu Ta-you, George Yeh, Yen Chen-Hsing and Yu Kuo-hwa, to mention only a few.

As a result of the Japanese invasion beginning on July 7, 1937, the Chinese government fell into great financial difficulties and was unable to pay its monthly installments of the Boxer Indemnity since 1939. Thus the receipts of the China Foundation Endowment Fund as well as the Tsing Hua Endowment Fund from the U.S. ceased accordingly.

Thanks to the able guidance and prudent management of the Board of Trustees, the China Foundation had not only survived through difficult times, but also made tremendous contributions to the development of education and culture in China, especially in the areas of education and research in science. It also made the endowment grow until 1939. After the anti-Japanese war came the civil war between the national government and the communist. When the national government retreated to Taiwan after 1949, the

Foundation lost most of its assets and had to restart with its meager resources. And yet, the Foundation continued playing a crucial role in the development of higher education and scientific research in the early years of the Republic of China on Taiwan by providing grants and subsidies to universities and the Academia Sinica for their faculty members and researchers to study abroad and to do research at home.

In 1991 Dr. Yang Tsui-hua of the Academia Sinica published her research on the China Foundation entitled Patronage of Sciences: the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture. The book was written in Chinese in which she gave a firsthand historical account of the difficult and yet glorious days of the development of the Foundation and its role in the development of sciences and science education in modern China. So far as I know this is the only book on the China Foundation based on scholarly academic research.

I believe that many of our American friends would like to know the outcome of the contributions of the remissions of the Boxer Rebellion Indemnity of the United States had made to the development of education and culture of China. I am most glad to read the English translation of Dr. Yang's book on the China Foundation by Mr. Chen Chi-Chu and Ms. Su Yu-Wen. Mr. Chen has been on the Board of Trustees since 2004. He was also for a long time Director of the Foundation. Ms. Su is a senior officer on the staff. Both are my long time good friends.

The China Foundation is a unique foundation created by joint

efforts of the Republic of China and the Unites States of America. It is a private foundation with the longest history in Taiwan. This year is the 90th anniversary of the Foundation. I consider the publication of Mr. Chen and Ms. Su's English version of the Patronage of Sciences: the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture a most valuable gift to the Foundation. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Chen and Ms. Su for their achievement in translating Dr. Yang's book into English and thank both for their many contributions to the China Foundation in the past years.

Sun Chen

Chairman
August 22, 2014

Foreword

by Dr. Wu Ta-you, Chairman of the China Foundation

Dr. Yang Tsui-hua has asked me to write a foreword for her book Patronage of Sciences: The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture. The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (the China Foundation) was established through a process of negotiation between the Chinese and U.S. governments in 1924 to manage the repatriation by the U.S. government of the balance of the Boxer indemnity payable to the United States. The total amount in principal plus interest was more than US$12 million, and it was paid to the China Foundation in installments between October 1917 and December 1940. The two sides agreed that the remission should be used for scientific and educational purposes.

The China Foundation has been in existence for sixty-seven years. In the early years of the Nationalist government in China, the government tried to interfere with the personnel and operations of the Foundation. Then, during the Sino-Japanese War, the Foundation faced a crisis when the remission installments were halted. Therefore the total amount received by the Foundation was far lower than promised. After the end of the war, the then minister of education, Chen Li-Fu, threatened to abolish the Foundation along with other bodies administering the Boxer indemnity, while at the same time, the Foundation's domestic investments went up in smoke. These are some of the trials and tribulations in the history of the China Foundation. Before the war,

the Foundation subsidized academic institutions, sent scientists abroad for advanced research, and supported science education. Its contribution to education in China has been tremendous. In this book, Dr. Yang has analyzed the Foundation's history and its achievements, especially during the pre-war period. This book is an important reference work in the history of science and academic development in modern China.

Sixty years ago, I received a Class-B Research Fellowship from the Foundation to study in the United States, and twenty-nine years ago I was elected to the Foundation's board of trustees. So I have been closely connected with the Foundation my whole life long, although my knowledge of the Foundation is less than one percent of that of Dr. Yang. I have gained much insight into the Foundation from reading this book. Here I express my thanks and offer my congratulations to the author.

Although, with its limited resources, the China Foundation was far less influential after the war, during the 1950s and 1960s its almost pitifully small grants in foreign exchange were still of great benefit to National Taiwan University and the National Science Council in Taiwan. I hope that when the author publishes the revised edition of her book, she will describe the contributions made by the China Foundation during the most recent twenty years of its history, thus making it a complete history of the China Foundation.

October 1991

Prologue

The impact of the West has been a major factor in the development of culture and education in modern China. Some scholars take the view that Western academic values and modes of education were not as important as indigenous Chinese social dynamism in the "cultural modernization" of China. Through a process of constant absorption or borrowing from the West prior to 1949, China had "successfully" caught up with the tide of world culture while still maintaining its cultural independence and its own unique education system.1 However, very few people would deny that among the countries with which China has had cultural and educational relationships—especially in science education, scientific research, and medicine—including Britain, the United States, Japan, Germany, and France, the influence of the United States has been the most profound.

Previous research into Sino-American cultural and educational relations has mostly emphasized the activities of Christian missionaries and missionary schools. More recently, however, scholars have begun to explore the important roles played by associations of Chinese students studying in the United States and by American educators and philanthropists in the process of the "secularization" of Sino-American cultural and educational relations, as well as the implications of the "transplantation" of American ideals and systems into China.2 In 1908, the U.S. government used the remission of the first Boxer indemnity to fund Chinese students studying in the United States and later to fund

the establishment of the Tsing Hua School. These were the first fruits of the Sino-American cultural and educational relationship. In principle, 80 percent of the students supported in this way were supposed to study physics, chemistry, and the applied sciences, and the remaining 20 percent were supposed to study the social sciences. This became the major theme of Sino-American cultural and educational relations. Later, the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation deployed its vast resources to engage in cultural and educational work in China, emphasizing medicine and the pure sciences. Issues such as whether these efforts were successful, whether they were a form of "cultural imperialism," whether they were conducive to the "professionalization" of science and technology in China, and what kind of impact they had on the "localization" of Chinese scholarship and education have mostly been debated from an American standpoint by American philanthropists, educators, and missionaries engaged in examining and evaluating the significance of Sino-American cultural and educational exchanges.3 Basically, these observers ignore the ideas and actions of Chinese people in the field of culture and education. By studying the China Foundation, which was jointly established by Chinese and American political and educational figures, we are reevaluating these debates through the prism of this major nexus of culture and education between the two nations.

The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, or China Foundation, was established in September 1924. President Ts'ao Kun appointed the first board of fifteen trustees, one-third of whom were Americans and the rest Chinese. Subsequent trustees were elected by the board itself. The China

Foundation was entrusted with the task of holding and managing the U.S. government's second remission of the Boxer indemnity (referred to hereafter as the second remission). These funds were to be used for "the promotion of Chinese educational and cultural undertakings." By consensus, these undertakings were to be limited to science education, scientific research, applied science, and cultural undertakings of a permanent nature such as libraries. The China Foundation's policy orientation and the emphasis of its activities had a major impact on the development of science in China before the Sino-Japanese War. In 1939, the Chinese government suspended payments of the second remission, and in 1943, when a new Sino-American treaty was signed, payments stopped altogether. Nevertheless, the Foundation was able to use its own accumulated endowment and the funds under its care (i.e., the Tsing Hua University Fund, the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology Fund, and the Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library Fund) to continue with most of its routine work, albeit with some difficulty. In 1945, when the war ended, the office of the Foundation was moved back to Nanking from Chungking. Later, when the political situation worsened, it moved to Shanghai and then to Hong Kong. In 1949, the Foundation transferred cash and investment securities to New York, and from then on, its business and financial operations were managed from there. Its grants were also switched to academic and cultural institutions in Taiwan. The Foundation had a very positive impact on academic and scientific developments in Taiwan in the early years after the Republican government transferred to the island.

In September 1972, the office of the Foundation was moved back to Taiwan from New York and its head office was from that time located in King Hua Street, Taipei. Several boxes of archives were subsequently moved back to Taipei from New York, containing the minutes of the annual board meetings after 1950, financial data and audited reports, correspondence among trustees, and documents concerning grants-in-aid to educational and cultural institutions. Some of these files dated from before 1950 but they were mostly carbon copies or photocopies made by the Foundation's staff in the United States and private correspondence or related materials left by trustees, including a complete file of newspaper clippings, cables, and letters concerning the reorganization of the China Foundation collected by Hu Shih. These last told the whole story of the reorganization, including the behind-the-scenes maneuvers. There were two boxes of Roger S. Greene's personal files (more than forty folders) containing correspondence between the trustees in Chungking and the United States, and these are a useful source of information seeing that the Foundation suspended publication of its annual report in 1941.4 However, most of the pre-1950 records had not been removed to New York. Having been compiled by the Chinese government on the mainland, those records, a total of 1,641 folders, were kept in the Nanking 2nd Historical Archives. They included minutes of meetings, personnel and financial administration records, account books and documents, formal correspondence with government agencies and foreign and Chinese banks, and applications and reports from grant-receiving organizations. This archive provides valuable basic source material for studying the history of the Foundation.

This book, based on firsthand historical records from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, is primarily an attempt to reconstruct the development path of the China Foundation. At the same time, it endeavors to examine the impact the Foundation had on the advancement of science in modern China so that we may achieve a deeper understanding of the true nature of Sino-American cultural and educational exchanges. For this purpose, the book is divided into two parts. The first part, consisting of the first three chapters, is a chronological account of the history, policies, and organization of the Foundation. The main theme here is the Foundation' s relationship with the government of the time. Through its establishment and its later forced reorganization, to its near-death crisis at the end of the war, in matters of personnel, organization, and financial situation, the fortunes of the Foundation were inextricably linked to those of the Nationalist government as well as that government's diplomatic relations with the United States. How could an independent, self-governing, and self-perpetuating body such as the China Foundation maintain its ideals and beliefs while at the same time handling its intricate relations with political organizations, academics, and educational institutions? How did the American and Chinese trustees get on with one another? What kind of "chemical reaction" took place when the scope of business and the principles formulated through consensus by its board of trustees were put to the test in an environment of complex personal relationships and political instability? By answering these questions, we may be able to gauge the significance of China's first government-backed cultural and educational foundation.

The second part of the book, chapters 4-6, consists of an

analysis of the relationship between the China Foundation and the development of modern science in China. The focus here is on the major goals of the Foundation, i.e., science education, scientific research, and the application of scientific research. Because in its early years the Foundation directed its grants toward science education and scientific research, the application of that research was to some extent neglected. Grants toward the application of scientific research at that time came under the category of grants to educational institutions. Therefore, in this book, the chapter on the application of scientific research (chapter 5) comes before that on scientific research (chapter 6), as the former is more closely related to science education which is the subject of chapter 4. Questions such as what measures the Foundation adopted to improve science education and promote scientific research in China, whether improvements to science teaching could best be achieved through elementary and middle schools or through universities and research institutes, whether it should focus mainly on pure science or applied science, what were the characteristics and emphasis of its grants for scientific research, and what did they achieve should help us to analyze the role of the China Foundation, the patron of science in China, and its impact on the development of science in modern China. In the summary at the end of chapter 6, we point out that the China Foundation was not only a supporter but also an active promoter of science. The main focus of its grants reflected mainstream thinking among scientists of the time. I draw my conclusions in chapter 7 and indicate why the Foundation was able to play this dual role. I also point out the similarities and differences between the China Foundation and other foundations of a similar nature and the uniqueness of its activities. Finally

the Epilogue consists of a brief description of the activities of the Foundation since 1950 and its contributions to the development of science in Taiwan during the1950s and 1960s.

While writing this book, I received a one-year research project grant from the National Science Council and I was selected for the twenty-seventh tranche of researchers to carry out research abroad. This enabled me to collect material and conduct interviews in Taiwan and overseas. I extend my sincere thanks to the chairman of the Foundation, Dr. Wu Ta-you; its director, Mr. Su Han-ming; its financial secretary, Mr. Chi-Chu Chen; and Messrs. Lee Kan, Yang Shu-jen, and L. T. Yip (former trustees)for their assistance, and to members of staff, including Ms. Su Yu-wen, Ms. Lin Yah-ping, and Ms. Chang Chung-min, for their support. My special thanks go to Chairman Wu Ta-you, who has been inextricably linked with the China Foundation since he received one of its Class-B fellowships to study in the United States. Dr. Wu has the history and operations of the Foundation at his fingertips. When the author decided to undertake this research, Dr. Wu gave his full support and encouragement. He demonstrated his concern during the process of preparation and writing by frequently inquiring about its progress and he gave the project his wholehearted support. He made many invaluable suggestions, and when the book was finished, he was gracious enough to write a most complimentary foreword, for which I feel greatly honored. I am afraid that the time is not ripe for me to follow his suggestion that I continue the history of the Foundation up to the present day, but when circumstances permit, I may indeed try to do this as an expression of gratitude to this senior scholar. I would

also like to express my thanks to Mr. Thomas Rosenbaum of the Rockefeller Archives Center; Mr. Wan Zen-yuen, deputy curator of the Nanking 2nd Historical Archives; Ms. Chao Huei-chih of the Research Institute of the History of Natural Science, the Chinese Academy of Sciences; Chang Sien-wen, head of the Department of History, Nanking University, and his colleagues Chen Chien-ping, Chen Hong-min, and Shen Siau-yun; and my own colleagues at our Institute, Lu Bao-chien, Chang Min-yuan, Tao Ying-huei, Wei Shiu-mei, and Chang Li (for proof-reading), and Fu Bao-yu, Wu Feng-lien, Chiang Shu-ling, Pang Kwei-feng, Li Huei-ling, and Shen Huai-yu for their hard work. More than ten years have passed since I wrote my master's thesis and my teacher, Dr. Tao Ying-huei, has always provided me with guidance both in dealing with people and in carrying out my research. My gratitude to him is unlimited. Of course, my husband, Li Meng-shun, and other members of my family, including my two children, have always provided spiritual support and been the driving force behind my research. My gratitude to them is beyond words.

October 1991

Table of Contents

Tables

Chapter 1: The Establishment and Reorganization of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture

I. Negotiations Leading to the Second Remission of the Boxer Indemnity

The U.S. government made two remissions or repatriations of the Boxer indemnity (referred to hereafter as the indemnity). The first remission occurred in 1908 when the Chinese minister in the United States negotiated the return of the over-claimed indemnity—a total of over US$10 million—to the Chinese government by joint agreement between the U.S. president and the Congress.[1] The remission was to be repaid in monthly installments from 1909 to 1940, and to be used for sending Chinese students to study overseas and for establishing schools. Besides these guidelines for how the funds should be used, the U.S. government also stipulated that they should be "paid first and returned later," meaning that the Chinese government should first pay the monthly installments into the City Bank Farmers Trust Company, the predecessor of the present Citibank, in Shanghai, after which the U.S. consul at Shanghai would authorize the remission to be paid through the Shanghai customs office to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[2]

The first remission was mainly used for sending students to study in the United States and for setting up the Tsing Hua School. In 1909, the Office of Overseas Study in the U.S. came into operation. By 1911, 180 students had been selected and dispatched

to the United States in three tranches. Most of these young students came from missionary schools and provincial high schools. In 1911, the Tsing Hua School was formally established and it started to recruit students from junior and senior high schools. After graduation, they were sent to U.S. colleges for further study as sophomores or juniors. After the 1911 Revolution in China, the Office of Overseas Study in the U.S. was abolished and the Tsing Hua School was reorganized as Tsing Hua College, under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the college's budget and other important administrative matters were still under the influence of the U.S. minister (later ambassador) to China. In 1917, the Tsing Hua College Foundation was established, and under this foundation, the board of Tsing Hua College was put in charge of the remission funds. In spite of the political strife in China at that time, Tsing Hua College Foundation never strayed from its original purpose and focused solely on education. This was held up as a good example by the movement to promote a second remission of the indemnity.

In 1917, China declared war on Germany and seized the opportunity to negotiate with the foreign powers for suspension of indemnity payments. Public-minded people in both the United States and China began to campaign for a second remission. In 1921, the U.S. Senate passed a resolution, proposed by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, to return the remaining indemnity to China. However, the House worried that other countries might cite this example to justify refusing to repay debts incurred during World War I. As a result, the House tabled the resolution.[3] Nevertheless, campaigners in favor of a second remission persisted.

On the Chinese side, V. K. Wellington Koo, the minister of foreign affairs, and Sze Sao-ke (Alfred Sao-ke Sze), the Chinese minister to the United States, had exchanged views with overseas Chinese, American educators, and U.S. politicians lobbying for a second remission. Meanwhile, Chinese educational societies, such as the Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education, strongly urged the Peking government to push for a second remission. As a result, the Ministry of Education formed the Committee for Indemnity Remission for Education. The Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education also set up a Department for the Remission of the Indemnity with Chiang Monlin in charge. In his letter to Sze Sao-ke, Dr. Chiang proposed that the fund be used to set up a Sino-American Friendship Fund to finance the establishment of libraries, laboratories, museums, sports stadiums, and classrooms for thirteen national colleges.[4] Ms. M. E. Wood, a non-Chinese member of the association and the chief librarian of Boone University in Wuchang, was especially supportive. She visited V. K. Wellington Koo, C. T. Wang (then the chief of the Sino-Russian Conference), Prime Minister W. W. Yen, and President Li Yuan-hung to urge that a portion of the remission should be used for public libraries. During a six-month trip to the United States in 1923 she contacted eighty-two senators and more than four hundred members of the House of Representatives, lobbying for a second remission.[5]

On the American side, in addition to the lobbying efforts in Congress of Senator Cabot Lodge, Senator Stephen G. Porter, and Mr. J. V. A. MacMurray, chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Professor Paul Monroe of

Columbia University was the most enthusiastic promoter of remission outside the government. In 1921, Monroe conducted an education field trip to China during which he made many friends within Chinese educational and political circles. After returning home, Munroe worked hard on the second remission. Enlisted by Monroe, the then president of Columbia University wrote letters to people in various fields asking for their support for a second remission. After discussing the matter with people involved in education in the United States, Monroe proposed that the United States and China jointly establish a foundation to receive funds from the remission. He recommended that the foundation's board consist of seventeen trustees, one-third Americans and two-thirds Chinese. Monroe wrote about this to Huang Yen-pei, chairman of the Kiangsu Council of Education. The council duly passed a resolution agreeing to it, but people on the American side were less enthusiastic. Among the suggestions put forward by the Americans were (1) that there should be no missionaries among the American trustees, and no powerful politicians affiliated to any political party and no party officials among the Chinese; (2) that some trustees should have administrative duties in the foundation; and (3) that the Chinese side should agree to attach no strings to the use of the remission in order to free the foundation from constraints in the future.[6] In 1923, some professors from Harvard University and Wellesley College gathered at Columbia University to review the effectiveness of the Chinese students who had studied in the United States with the support of funds from the first remission. [7]

In December 1923, Senator Cabot Lodge once again proposed a second remission in the Senate, while a similar proposal was

put to the House of Representatives. As a result, from March 31 to April 2, 1924, the House held public hearings on the issue and heard testimony from eleven witnesses as follows:

Siong Che-chun, a Chinese studying in the United States
Professor Lucius C. Porter, Department of Chinese, Columbia University
Dr. A. L. Warnshuis, secretary, the International Missionary Council, New York
Dr. Edward Hume, president, Yali College (Yale in China), Changsha
Dr. William Hiram Foulkes, general secretary, General Council of the Presbyterian Church, New York
M. E. Wood, Boone University Library, Wuchang, China
Dwight W. Edwards, executive secretary, Princeton in Peking
Dr. Ralph A. Wood, secretary of the Eastern Asia Board of Foreign Mission, Methodist Episcopal Church
J. V. A. MacMurray, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, U.S. State Department
Robert McElory, Princeton University
Leonidas C. Dyer, Representative of the House

They all testified that the remaining indemnity should be returned to China. However, they had different ideas concerning how it should be spent, although most of them agreed that the funds should be used only for the purposes of education and culture.[8]

After the hearings, Monroe also presented a proposal

in which, in addition to stating the necessity of the remission, he proposed guidelines for the organization of a foundation to administer the funds. He said that Chinese leaders, American educators, religious leaders, and those engaged in social service had agreed that the best way to use the funds would be to set up a foundation modeled after the Carnegie Foundation or the Rockefeller Foundation, and that a portion of the foundation' s funds should be used to support research institutes for applied science. Munroe proposed that these institutes should be under the guidance of the foundation, and the grants should be treated as subsidies and not used to fund the establishment of independent institutes such as Tsing Hua College. He also proposed that the trustees should be composed of Americans and Chinese with a Chinese majority.[9]

He held that these guidelines should serve as a measure to prevent future plunder and waste of the funds by politicians, bureaucrats, warlords, and the like.

On May 7, 1924, the House of the Representatives passed the bill on a second remission, with the restriction that the funds should be used only for the purpose of education and culture. Once it had been passed by the Senate, it was signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge on May 21.[10] The total amount of the second remission, according to an audit report by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, amounted to US$6,137,552 in principal and US$6,407,885 in interest — a total payment of US$12,545,437, representing twenty annual installments from October 1917 to December 1940.[11]

II. Controversies over the Future Use of the Remission

Right from the start, there were debates about whether the remission funds should be used for education alone, or whether they could be used for industry as well. Despite the Chinese government's desire to see the funds used for large-scale industrial development, the first remission was used solely in education. After the U.S. Congress approved the second remission in 1924, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. embassy in China received repeated requests from organizations for grants. The United States had made it clear that as far as it was concerned, the fund was only to be used for cultural activities in China, but still there were pleas for subsidies for local development projects. For example, in 1923, the military governor of Kiangsu, Chi Sie-yuan, repeatedly cabled the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking for a grant to improve the Hwai River irrigation systems, and similar requests were received the following year from the Hwai River Irrigation Research Society and the Kiangsu and Anhwei irrigation bureaus. In spite of the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the remission was only to be used for education and culture, the Kiangsu-Chekiang Lake Tai Irrigation Bureau pleaded for US$2 million for a Lake Tai irrigation project. The Association for Highway Construction of China also asked for funds to finance highway construction.[12]

There were even more diverse opinions on the use and management of the funds among Chinese educational and cultural societies. A joint meeting of the Science Society of China, the Astronomical Society of China, the Far Eastern Society of Biology, the Archeological Society, the Geological Society of China, and

the Society of Meteorology in China on June 9 and 10, 1924, reached the following three conclusions:

1. Of all cultural activities, scientific research was the most eligible for support.
2. An endowment should be set up to receive the remission and ensure its long-term use. The trustees of the foundation should be charged with the custody and management of the funds.
3. The Chinese trustees should be educators and scholars who were knowledgeable and accomplished in their respective professions.[13]

The Science Society of China also issued a draft manifesto in both Chinese and English. This stressed that scientific research was the foundation of cultural and industrial development. On this basis, the scope of educational and cultural projects should be defined thus:

1. For pure research: to establish large-scale research institutes and to subsidize the purchase of research equipment by competent research institutes and universities, both public and private.
2. For the dissemination of knowledge: to set up libraries and museums, etc.
3. For international cultural exchange: to finance exchanges of teachers with other countries.[14]

The National Educational Association of China, the Chinese

National Association for the Advancement of Education, the eight national universities in Peking, the United Council of the Faculties of the Eight National Universities, Southeastern University, Kwangtung University, the Science Society of China, the Society of Geology in China, and the Committee on the Return of the Boxer Indemnity also convened a meeting on August 19 that year in Peking. They strongly opposed the use of the funds for highway construction. The monies must be used only for education.[15]

The opinions of these educational societies basically echoed the views of their American counterparts, as well as the politicians mentioned above in relation to the 1923 House public hearings. Monroe's proposals and the opinions expressed by the witnesses at the public hearings held by the House of Representatives have been detailed above. In 1923, Roger S. Greene,[16] director of the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, declared in a speech to the Chinese Social and Political Science Association that the returned funds should only be used for developing education and cultural affairs in China. Those in charge of them should "avoid using the funds to lessen the obligations which should be borne by the governmental and private institutions." In his view, educational and cultural projects should include the setting up of public libraries, the promotion of rural education, sending students to study abroad, and reinforcing the guidance and management of those students, etc. However, the most important thing was to promote the unification of the Chinese education system. Greene urged that to avoid the possible confusion and disorder that would result from the experimental adoption of a mélange of British, American, German, and Japanese educational practices, it was

necessary to use funds from the remission of the Boxer indemnity to establish a cooperative educational foundation.[17] The main purpose of this fund should not be to support foreigner-operated or missionary educational institutions, but to strengthen well-established Chinese universities, such as Southeastern University or National Peking University (Peking University or Peita). In order to attract grants from the Chinese government or non-government sources, a separate fund should be set up to improve the educational system in China. Through his local friends, Roger Greene negotiated with Japanese and British government officials and educational authorities to obtain their cooperation in this, and he told J. V. A. MacMurray, chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, about his findings.[18]

MacMurray's response to Greene's proposals was lukewarm. He believed that the commanding position held by U.S. educational and charitable organizations in China would enable Americans to secure leadership in Chinese education similar to the position held by the British in politics and commerce in China. International cooperation would present a lot of practical problems for the United States. Endless negotiations among countries would only delay the remission and would not be good for the development of education in China. In the meantime, Greene visited Sze Sao-ke in Washington, D.C., to express his wish that Monroe's visit to China should be postponed or even cancelled. Sze did not share his views, however.[19] MacMurray believed that negotiation should be limited to China and the United States. Nevertheless, Sze gave Monroe full authority to negotiate. Right from the beginning, Monroe believed that the remission should be

used solely for education, and it should be free from interference by political, commercial, or religious interests. The most important task in education was to establish a school of applied science. Even though he firmly believed that scientific education was paramount and that it should be founded in the middle schools, he recognized that the most urgent need in China at that time was for knowledge of applied sciences such as agriculture, engineering, and medicine. Advanced research in the pure sciences was too remote to solve current problems. In Munroe's opinion, it was necessary for China to train its own engineers and specialists in order to develop manufacturing, mining, and railway construction, etc., to free those sectors from foreign control. To his mind, the school of applied sciences should resemble Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with not only departments of mechanical engineering, civil engineering, electronics, and chemical engineering, but also departments of highway and sanitary engineering.[20]

Other Americans with an interest in education in China proposed different uses for the remission. For example, Ms. Wood continued to lobby on behalf of libraries in China. Some American educators proposed the establishment of a Sino-American university. John Leighton Stuart, the president of Yenching University, was strongly against such a school. The leaders of the Peking Union Medical College—Greene, H. S. Houghton, and others—were opposed to Monroe's idea of establishing a school of applied sciences in China. Henry F. Osborn, director of the American Museum of Natural History in New York, suggested using the remission to establish an institute in Peking similar to the Smithsonian Museum or the American Museum of Natural

History.[21]

These individuals had different ideas as to how the remission should be spent, but all of them were able in some way to influence the future guidelines for using the funds. More importantly, the educators had formed a preliminary consensus on how the funds should be managed—that is, through a foundation run by both Chinese and Americans.

III. Formation of the Board of Trustees of the China Foundation

In the United States, Minister Sze, when he learned that Congress had passed the remission of the indemnity immediately entered into discussions with Paul Monroe concerning the management and use of the funds. As soon as he received notification from the secretary of state, Charles E. Hughes, Sze replied,

> The first remission by the American Government in 1908 enabled the Chinese Government to devote the annual payments of the indemnity thus set free to educational purposes. The results of the experiment have convinced the Chinese Government of the wisdom of the step taken in this direction. It is the purpose of the Chinese Government to continue the policy with the further payments remitted by the present act of the American Government with such modifications as experience and the demands of the times may dictate. As the demand for scientific education has in recent years been increasingly urgent in China my Government now proposes to devote the funds thus made available by the generosity of the American Government to educational and cultural purposes, paying special attention to scientific requirements. Moreover, it is the intention of my Government to entrust the administration of the funds to a Board which shall be composed of Chinese and American citizens as members, and also to avail itself of the services of experts in working out the details along the lines indicated. Upon the formulation of some definite plan I shall take pleasure in laying it before you for consideration.[22]

The content of the above letter basically reflected the views of the American and Chinese educators. The twin principles of the establishment of a board of trustees and the use of the funds in the field of science had thus received the blessing of both governments.

One of the “experts” whose services were to be called on “in working out the details” was none other than Paul Monroe. In July 1924, Monroe drafted an ad hoc measure to elect the minister of foreign affairs as the honorary chairman of the trustees. Five members of the fourteen-strong board were to be American and nine Chinese. Of the nine Chinese, three were to be nominated by educational societies and six appointed by the Chinese government. Three of the government appointees were to be prestigious individuals in educational circles.[23] In relation to this matter, Monroe made a special trip to China in July, visiting many

important government officials and educators. After consulting with V. K. Wellington Koo, Monroe changed his mind and decided that there should be no nominations from the educational societies. All the Chinese trustees were to be appointed by the government so as to avoid potential disputes.[24]

After learning of the changes, the educational societies convened a special meeting in Peking on August 31, and on the following day, a meeting of the united council of educational societies across China was convened. This meeting decided to oppose the appointment of government officials as trustees, instead insisting that all the candidates should be nominated by educational societies. The meeting then nominated seven Americans (Monroe, Greene, John Dewey, J. E. Baker, C. R. Bennett, a Mr. Williams, and W. W. Willoughby) and fourteen Chinese (Tsai Yuan-pei, Fan Yuan-lien, Wang Ching-wei, Huang Yen-pei, Chiang Monlin, Shiung Hsi-ling, P. W. Kuo, Chang Po-ling, V. K. Ting, Yuan Hsi-tao, Li Yu-ying, Y. T. Tsur, Chen Kuang-fu, and Mu Siang-yue).[25]

The list was composed of prominent figures in political, educational, and industrial circles in both north and south China, but excluded diplomats such as V. K. Wellington Koo and Sze Sao-ke.

After consulting V. K. Wellington Koo and Chang Kuo-kan, the minister of education, Monroe drafted a constitution consisting of ten articles and officially named the body to be set up as the "China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture." The constitution stipulated that the board of trustees should

have fifteen members to be appointed in the first instance by the president. Thereafter, vacancies were to be filled by election by the board itself. After this had been passed by the Council of State Affairs, it was presented to President Ts'ao Kun for approval on September 11, 1924.[26] On September 16, Sze notified Secretary of State Hughes of the constitution,[27] and the next day, President Ts'ao appointed the following fourteen trustees:

W. W. Yen (1877-1950): Prime Minister, former Minister to Germany, Minister of Foreign Affairs

V. K. Wellington Koo (1887-1985): Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sze Sao-ke (1877-1958): Minister to the United States

Fan Yuan-lien (1876-1927): President, National Peking Normal University; former Minister of Education

Huang Yen-pei (1877-1965): President, Kiangsu Education Council; Trustee of Northeastern University; Trustee of the Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education

Chiang Monlin (1886-1964): Action President, National Peking University

Chang Po-ling (1876-1951): President, Nankai University

P. W. Kuo (1879-1967): President, Southeastern University

Y. T. Tsur (1883-1958): Chief Secretary, Committee for Financial Reconstruction; former President, Tsing Hua University

Paul Monroe (1869-1947): Dean of International Institute, Columbia University

John Dewey (1859-1952): Professor, Columbia University

J. E. Baker (1880-1957): Adviser to the Railway Bureau, Ministry of Communications

Roger S. Greene (1881-1947): Representative, China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation

Charles R. Bennett (1885-?): President of the International Banking Corporation in Peking

According to the draft constitution of the China Foundation, there were to be fifteen trustees in total. The State Council wrote to the Ministry of Education requesting that it consult with educators in order to find one more candidate.[28] The ministry in turn asked five of the trustees—Huang Yen-pei, Fan Yuan-lien, P. W. Kuo, Chiang Monlin, and Chang Po-ling—to recommend someone. Their unanimous opinion was as follows:

> The list of the candidates proposed by the educational societies last time included more than the five trustees who have been appointed. Therefore, the new trustee should come from that list. As the foundation will mostly devote itself to developing scientific education in China and one individual on the list, V. K. Ting, is a scientist, would it be possible to nominate him for the cabinet's approval? [29]

This proposal was accepted by the State Council and V. K. Ting (1887-1936) was formally appointed as a trustee of the China Foundation. Ting was the founding director of the National Geological Survey. He had made an outstanding contribution to the study of geology in China.

With the exception of the first three Chinese trustees on the list who were officials of the Peking government, the rest were not only from educational circles but were also among the candidates recommended by the national educational societies. Indeed, it was jokingly called "the board of university presidents." [30] As a whole, the Peking government did respect the opinions of educators concerning the make-up of the board of trustees. But the provincial educational societies were still not satisfied. They claimed that two-thirds of the appointees came from just one or two provinces and most of them were members of the National Association for the Advancement of Education. Considering that regionalism was rife in China, it was feared that the trustees might promote the interests of only one or two regions. In October 1924, the National Educational Association of China convened its tenth plenary meeting in Kaifeng, Henan. The meeting formulated the principles of a quota system for the usage of the remission and the organization of a Board for the National Boxer Indemnity Remission. According to what was decided at this meeting, the provincial councils, together with the national educational societies, were to form a board to manage all the Boxer indemnity funds returned by foreign powers. They refused to recognize the China Foundation as envisioned by the government and insisted that its name be changed to the "Sino-American Board of Remission." In their opinion, both the appointment of trustees and the way the U.S. remission was to be used should be decided by this board.[31] The board was officially established in December that year and an application was made to the Ministry of Education for registration. The application was rejected and this attempt to undermine the China Foundation failed. This confirmed the

wisdom of Koo and Monroe in insisting on the president having the sole power to appoint trustees. Noting the criticisms and attacks launched from all sides, Hu Shih made the following fair comment:

> In such a chaotic and confusing situation, how can we ever hope that Americans will carelessly and unconditionally throw away multi-million dollars' worth of cash? Throw the money to whom? Could it be entrusted to a Government that we have little faith in? Would there be no disagreements if the money were given to the Chinese National Association of Education or to the National Association for the Advancement of Education?[32]

Therefore, considering that educators in the north and south of the country were unwilling to abandon their own individual interests, it would have been much better to have the president of the United States exercise full authority over the remission from the beginning, and relinquish authority to the Foundation only after it was established with a board of trustees consisting of Chinese and Americans.

On September 18, 1924, V. K. Wellington Koo convened the first board meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peking, and the China Foundation was officially inaugurated. The first item on the agenda was to pass the constitution, which set out the purposes of the Foundation as follows:

1. To receive the funds remitted pursuant to the note of the Secretary of State of the United States of America to the Chinese Minister at Washington under date of June 14, 1924;
2. To deposit said funds as received in a bank or banks and to make investment at its discretion;
3. To receive at its discretion part of the funds as an endowment of which the income may be used for the purposes for which the board is established;
4. To apply its funds for the promotion of education and other cultural enterprises in China; and
5. To receive other funds for educational or cultural activities, and within the conditions of the gift, to have all authority concerning their disposition, as in the case of the original funds.

With these purposes in mind the board elected the following provisional officers: Fan Yuan-lien, chairman; Paul Monroe, vice-chairman; and Y. T. Tsur, secretary. The following five provisional committees were formed:

> Committee on By-laws: Fan Yen-lien, J. E. Baker, Y. T. Tsur
> Committee on the Recommendation of a Director and an Executive Secretary: Paul Monroe, W. W. Yen
> Committee on the Consideration of Grants: All trustees
> Committee on Finance: Charles R. Bennett, Y. T. Tsur
> Committee on Negotiations (responsible for arranging the handover of funds with the U.S. State Department): Sze Sao-ke, Roger S. Greene, Paul Monroe.[33]

Wellington Koo expressed his particular thanks to Monroe, saying, "In conclusion, I thank Dr. Monroe for his success in promoting the remission and his generosity in providing us with his experience gleaned from other charitable foundations. The establishment of the Foundation to a large extent is the work of Dr. Monroe."[34] Fan Yen-lien and Y. T. Tsur played particularly important roles in the early administration and financial management of the Foundation.

The U.S. government, still doubtful about how the remission would be used, took its time over releasing the promised funds. Secretary of State Hughes in his letter to President Coolidge made it clear that until the U.S. government received a clear statement concerning how the funds would be used, it should adopt a wait-and-see attitude.[35] He wrote, "I have felt that this Government might subject itself to criticism, were it not to require some such statement as I have indicated, in order that there may be an assurance that the funds will actually be expended in conformity with the intent of the congress." Faced with this problem, Monroe returned to China in January 1925 to discuss the matter with Huang Yen-pei and P. W. Kuo. He said:

> In the opinion of the U.S. Government, since the Board has the approval of both the U.S. and Chinese Governments, it should not be interfered with or forced to change by any third party. As for the usage, according to the opinion of the chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Department, the words "education and culture" are too vague. The U.S. Government is waiting for clearer guidelines from the Board when it makes the appropriate decisions.[36]

The chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs referred to above, J. V. A. MacMurray, was appointed U.S. minister at Peking later that year. His view reflected that of the U.S. government.

The China Foundation convened its first annual meeting in Tientsin on June 2-4, 1925, during which the acting chairman Fan Yuan-lien said:

> The Foundation is in charge of the second remission of the Boxer Indemnity. The first remission was realized through negotiation by the Chinese and American governments. But the second remission was mostly due to the efforts of private individuals with help from both governments. …Therefore, I firmly believe this remission will have a huge benefit in cementing Sino-American friendship.[37]

The trustees first of all approved the guidelines relating to the Foundation's support for educational and cultural enterprises. The main focus was on developing scientific knowledge and promoting cultural undertakings of a permanent nature. During the meeting, the draft by-laws and the principles governing the allocation of fund and grants were approved and Y. Y. Yen was appointed chairman, Chang Po-ling and Monroe were appointed vice-chairmen, Fan Yuan-lien was to be the director, V. K. Ting the secretary, and Bennett and Y. T. Tsur the joint treasurers.

Sze Sao-ke subsequently forwarded the minutes of the

first annual board meeting to U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and requested that, the guidelines having been approved, the accumulated funds of the second remission be released to the China Foundation, "as well as future payments that may be received from China from time to time."[38] On July 16, 1925, the U.S. president instructed the U.S. Treasury to do just that. The Treasury promptly released the funds accumulated since October 1, 1917, by endorsing a check to the China Foundation for US$1,377,255.02 through the U.S. minister at Shanghai and in turn through the U.S. minster at Peking to the China Foundation.[39] The Foundation rented premises at 42 Shih Fu Ma Boulevard, Peking, as its office and started operations on July 28, 1925.[40]

IV. Interference by the Nationalist Government and the Reorganization

The reason why the U.S. Government was unwilling to return the remission funds directly to the Chinese government and instead requested the Chinese to set up a foundation was, as H. C. Zen admitted, their "distrust of the then Chinese Government." [41] However, although the U.S. government and the Chinese educational societies had hoped that the China Foundation, as an independent legal entity, would not be subject to political interference, under the circumstances in China at the time, the Foundation could not escape the influence of political changes. The establishment of the China Foundation and the appointment of its trustees was a result of negotiations among private individuals, both Chinese and American, and the Peking government. The latter

showed its willingness to respect the wishes of the educational societies, but the fact that the board of trustees included officials associated with the government in Peking but excluded individuals connected with the Nationalist government in the south of the country made the future reorganization of the China Foundation inevitable.

Representing the Nationalist government in the south, Yang Chuen, secretary to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and commissar of the Kuomintang Shanghai Division, openly questioned the legitimacy of the way the trustees had been appointed by the government in Peking. He claimed that Monroe had not adhered to the position of the U.S. government, and that he did not understand "the thoughts of the Chinese majority" as he listened only to the voices of a minority. Monroe had also failed to recruit as trustees popular figures such as Tsai Yuan-pei and Wang Ching-wei. This "set a bad precedent of a board with trustees appointed by the government and some of the trustees being government officials." Yang put forward the following proposals to correct these initial mistakes:

1. The educational societies should be urged to demand that Tsai Yuan-pei and Wang Ching-wei be appointed as trustees.
2. Only Chinese scholars from the major academic fields should be appointed, on the recommendation of the educational societies, to form an American Remission Usage Review Committee to (a) truly reflect the consensus, and (b) provide expertise to the custodial committee.

3. The educational societies should be urged to request the American and Chinese governments to amend the constitution of the China Foundation so that one-third of the trustees would be appointed annually by the educational societies.[42]

However, Yang Chuen's proposals were ignored by the educational societies and the China Foundation operated as before.

In April 1927, the Nationalist government established its capital in Nanking. The China Foundation now had to map out strategies to deal with this new political situation. Monroe had to come to China to discuss policies toward the China Foundation with the Nationalist government's Commission for the Administration of Education. There is no record of these discussions, but Hu Shih recalled being present at a dinner party in the Great China Restaurant where he saw one of the commissioners for the administration of education hand a list of candidates to Monroe. Monroe said that it would be better to have more candidates on the list, so two commissioners, Chung Ying-kuan and King Cheng-chen, withdrew to another room for discussion and subsequently handed Monroe a new list with additional candidates. As a result of this negotiation between Monroe and the commissioners, in June 1927, at the third annual meeting of the China Foundation, Huang Yen-pei and V. K. Ting resigned and were replaced by Tsai Yuan-pei and Hu Shih.[43]

In 1928, the Nationalist Revolutionary Army closed in on Peking. Yang Chuen, now a vice-minister in the Nationalist

government's Ministry of University Education, had a score to settle with P. W. Kuo, a trustee of the China Foundation. He vented his displeasure by spearheading a movement calling for the reorganization of the Foundation. P. W. Kuo was the founder of Southeastern University in Kiangsu province. In order to maintain and develop the university, Kuo cultivated close relations with Chi Sie-yuen, the military governor of Kiangsu, and the local gentry. The board of Southeastern University was also under the control of members of the Educational Council of Kiangsu province, including Chang Chien and Huang Yen-pei. Their political views tended to coincide with those of the Research Clique. In 1925, Yang Chuen stirred up a campaign for Kuo to be replaced as president of Southeastern University.[44] The reason behind Yang's grudge against Kuo was that Yang's teaching positions in the university had been changed three times within one year. Furthermore, Kuo later closed down the engineering school, throwing Yang out of his job altogether and forcing him to take up a position as a commissar in the KMT party organization in Shanghai.[45] Fuel was added to the fire in 1928, when Wang Cheng-ting, the minister of foreign affairs, indicated that he was going to appoint Kuo director of the Foreign Affairs Office in Peking where he would be in charge of negotiating with foreign diplomats. Yang wrote an open letter to Wang Cheng-ting publicly opposing Kuo's appointment to any position in the fields of foreign or cultural affairs. He said:

> People such as Dr. P. W. Kuo, during the heyday of the Chihli warlords, organized the unholy triangular alliance of the Foreign Affairs Clique, Research Clique, and the educational

> bigwigs of Kiangsu Province. He praised former President Ts'ao Kun who was notorious for his vote-buying scandal. He supported Chi Sie-yuen, the military governor who has been ravaging Kiangsu Province. He furthermore relied on Monroe, a foreigner, to control the board of the China Foundation by using the remission from the United States as a personal instrument to monopolize the field of Chinese culture on behalf of a small group of people.[46]

In reply, Wang said that "even though not without a sense of humor, [Yang's comments] were not very convincing to anybody." He deemed Yang's remarks about Kuo's support for the military governor of Kiangsu who had allegedly ravaged the province to be rather exaggerated.[47] But Yang still insisted that Kuo should never be appointed to any job related to foreign affairs, and that it was necessary to completely reorganize the China Foundation. His response to Wang was harsh:

> In my whole life, I have not made any enemies but I have always treated any wrong doer like a mortal foe. I only know how to eradicate bad guys for our country without fear of stirring up bad feelings against me. Since I have already devoted my whole life to the Kuomintang and to our country, how can I be a hypocrite and shirk from animosities and troubles?[48]

Thanks to Yang's insistence on eradicating the "bad guys," Kuo was never appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the future reorganization of the China Foundation became almost

inevitable.

At the end of July 1928, at the request of the Ministry of University Education, the Nationalist government approved the abolition of the China Foundation which had been set up under the presidency of Ts'ao Kun, a politician tainted with the scandal of vote-buying. The government also focused its attention on Article 3 of the Foundation's constitution which states: "The direction and management of the Board shall be rested in a Board of fifteen (15) Trustees to be appointed in the first instance by the Chinese Government. Thereafter vacancies occurring in the membership of the Board shall be filled by the remaining Trustees. The name of any person so elected shall be forthwith reported to the Government." The government attempted to amend this article to read: "The direction and management of the Board shall be vested in a Board of fifteen Trustees appointed by the National Government. The term of office of the trustees is three years. On expiration, the Ministry of University Education, based on the consensus of people in educational circles across the nation, will recommend candidates to the National Government for approval." The fifteen trustees appointed by the National Government were: Hu Shih, Y. R. Chao, Sze Sao-ke, Wong Wen-hao, Tsai Yuan-pei, Wang Ching-wei, C. C. Wu, Chiang Monlin, Li Yu-ying, Sun Fo, Paul Monroe, John Earl Baker, Roger S. Greene, Charles R. Bennett, and John Leighton Stuart. Ousted from the board were V. K. Wellington Koo, W. W. Yen, Chang Po-ling, P. W. Kuo, Huang Yen-pei, and Y. T. Tsur.[49]

Hu Shih was one of the newly appointed trustees but he had

not participated in the reorganization plan. On August 13, when he learnt the news, Hu wrote a long letter of more than one thousand words to Tsai Yuan-pei, the minister of university education, focusing on two points:

1. To avoid political interference, Hu advised that the trustees be elected by the board itself. He said:

> The basic principle of the board of a cultural foundation is to be free from political entanglements. Therefore vacancies among the trustees should be filled by the board. …Now, all of a sudden, this has been changed to vacancies being filled by the government based on recommendations from the Ministry of University Education. This fundamentally overthrows the above basic principle. Does this imply that the former government was so bad that we need to guard against its political influence, whereas we no longer need to do this now that the National Government is holding the reins? This line of reasoning may sound plausible, but in fact nobody can guarantee that future political conditions will be stable and satisfactory.[50]

2. Concerning the appointment of the new trustees, Hu Shih pointed out that during the above-mentioned dinner party at the Great China Restaurant in 1927, the National Government's commissioner for the administration of education repeatedly asserted that his government approved of the constitution of the China Foundation and their only objection was to the election of V. K. Wellington Koo, Huang Yen-pei, V. K. Ting, and P. W. Kuo, not

the election of other members of the board. Now, the government was not only throwing out the Foundation's constitution but also firing trustees that they had not intended to fire previously. Furthermore, he said, the government "took pleasure in formally dismissing Huang Yen-pei who had already resigned and been replaced a year ago. This is very perplexing to outsiders." In Hu's opinion, Chang Po-ling, Y. T. Tsur, and W. W. Yen were the most diligent among the trustees and were most familiar with the administration of the Foundation. "Now these three have been fired. It is definitely not the best way to maintain continuity." Hu Shih insisted that Tsur and Chang stay in place. He suggested that if Tsur could not remain as a trustee, he could at least be appointed director. This would not go against the stipulation in the constitution that no trustee should hold a paid post in the Foundation, and it would avoid the appearance of the government going back on its word. As for Chang Po-ling, Hu Shih threatened to resign himself to allow Chang to keep his place. He said:

> Chang Po-ling was the treasurer for many years and he even refused to be chairman of the board at this year's annual meeting. He is trusted by both the Chinese and American trustees. He should stay on the board. After careful consideration, I think the only way is for me to resign and to be replaced by Chang. Please grant my request to resign no matter what happens.[51]

Hu Shih later said that the above criticisms were founded on objective facts. His motive was "on the one hand to protect the Foundation and on the other hand to salvage as much international

credibility for this nation as possible." Whatever happened, he was not willing to continue to serve on the board.

Tsai Yuan-pei replied to Hu two days later. He strongly urged him to abandon the idea of resignation. He said:

> As for [the clause in] the constitution concerning the election of trustees, it could be restored by the board if the original is better than the revised version. There are other reasons why Tsur and Chang were not reappointed. So you need not resign because of this. Furthermore, even if you do resign, these two gentlemen will not necessarily be reappointed.[52]

After learning about this, Fu Ssu-nien, a good friend of Hu Shih, also strongly urged him not to resign. He said:

> You can write letters expressing your views on the Foundation but you definitely should not resign. Because by resigning, you would be painting yourself into a corner and your standpoints could be used by out-and-out meddlers. For the sake of both the public welfare and our private friendship, I had to say this. …I am extremely disappointed about the new appointments. The retention of Sze Sao-ke and the resignation of Chang Po-ling were not very convincing. The appointment of Sun Fo and C. C. Wu was also a disappointment. However, Chao and Wong, these two scholars, are one hundred times better than those on Kuo or Monroe's lists of candidates. As for the appointment of you and Mr. Tsai, I think it is solely due to the achievements of the Revolutionary Army, rather than the original wishes of people like P. W. Kuo. Yang Chuen dared not exclude such people as Monroe from the board. This is also unsatisfactory.[53]

Even though Fu Ssu-nien was dissatisfied with some of the new trustees, he thought that "at a time of dynastic change, we should treat some facts in the light of such a transition." So he advised Hu Shih not to be a perfectionist in this matter.

The trustees did not put up any strong resistance to the government's order to reorganize the board. Their main concerns were about the technicalities of the reorganization. Director Tsur consulted with the three American trustees in China, Bennett, Greene, and Stuart. They were inclined to accept the government' s appointments. But they did not wish to express a definite opinion until the changes had been accepted by the U.S. ambassador. Consequently, to avoid diplomatic complications, Tsur presented a compromise proposal:

> Naturally there is no way that the government would rescind its order. But since the matter has come to this point, we do not have to actively follow it through. We may convene the existing board and allow five trustees to resign and replace them with five new trustees. Then we let the new board revise the constitution for presentation to the government for reference so that the new constitution is more or less similar to the old one. With this, the government's wishes will be fulfilled and furthermore there will be no ensuing diplomatic difficulties.[54]

This became the basis upon which Hu Shih and other trustees could negotiate with the government later on.

When Monroe, in the United States, heard the news in August 1928, he cabled Wang Cheng-ting and Tsai Yuan-pei twice, stressing that this unilateral action by the Chinese government would certainly damage Sino-American friendship.55 Again in September, he wrote two long letters to them, explaining the nature of the China Foundation from the American point of view. He repeatedly stressed that provided the principle of the China Foundation's permanent independence from political interference was maintained, the reorganization of the Foundation itself was not a problem. The sticking point was the process by which the government made the new appointments. Monroe discussed the matter in the United States with Sze Sao-ke and C. C. Wu, the special envoy for the New Sino-American Treaties, and they all agreed that Monroe had better return to China for the next annual meeting of the board to discuss a solution with other related parties.[56] In the meantime, editorials appeared in the *North China Leader* and the *North China Standard* complaining that the forced reorganization of the China Foundation by the Nationalist Government was a blatant contradiction of the original agreement with the United States. The China Foundation should present this matter to the U.S. embassy for approval, the editorials urged. Before such approval was obtained, all the grants made by the Foundation should be suspended. If the Nationalist Government abrogated the original presidential order, the remissions should be stopped.[57] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also received a cable from the Chinese embassy in the United States warning that if

the Chinese government unilaterally revised the constitution of the China Foundation, the U.S. government might stop future remission payments. Furthermore, one London newspaper warned that it would also affect remissions by United Kingdom, as although on the surface this was a small matter, it actually involved the Sino-American and Sino-British treaties.[58]

Faced with pressure from all sides, Yang Chuen, on behalf of Tsai Yuan-pei, asked Hu Shih and Chiang Monlin to correct Monroe's "misunderstanding" concerning the reasons for the reorganization and to tell him about the salvage plan involving the restoration of the old constitution by the new board with subsequent approval by the government.[59] Meanwhile, Yang briefed the press on the reasons for the reorganization and adamantly insisted that right from the beginning, the constitution and the trustees of the China Foundation were under the sole authority of the Chinese government, "without any need to ask the U.S. Government for prior approval."[60]

In August 1928, Tsai Yuan-pei resigned as minister for university education, and on October 23, his old ministry was officially re-designated the Ministry of Education,[61] and Chiang Monlin was appointed minister. Once he had been appointed, Chiang endeavored to find a solution to the problem. Based on the opinions of Monroe and H. C. Zen (1886-1961), the deputy director of the China Foundation, Chiang drafted the following three measures:

1. The Ministry of Education will write to the original

board of the China Foundation requesting that they convene a meeting to present a systematic report to the ministry of the Foundation's activities over the years.

2. At the end of the meeting, the board will accept the resignations of the five trustees and replace them with five new ones.
3. The new trustees will then participate in the formal meeting and deal with matters such as revision of the constitution.[62]

These measures were basically the same as those proposed to Zen by Secretary Tsur in August. On November 30, the Ministry of Education accordingly wrote to the China Foundation requesting it to convene a board meeting. The Foundation decided that the meeting would be held on January 4 and 5 the following year. Hu Shih thought that although it would be easy to ask some of the trustees to resign, it would be "too embarrassing to ask the old board to elect the five new trustees that had been nominated by the government." In an effort to save face on both sides, Hu wrote to Sun Fo asking him either to join with other new trustees such as C. C. Wu and Y. R. Chao in tendering their resignations to the government and asking the government to respect the principle that vacancies should be filled by the board itself, or to get the new trustees to ask the old board to elect them at its own discretion. Hu even drafted a letter of resignation and a letter from the new trustees to the old board for Sun Fo to use.[63] Sun Fo referred these two options to Tsai Yuan-pei and Chiang Monlin for discussion, and they agreed that the second option was the best.[64]

On December 19, 1928, Monroe arrived at Shanghai. Hu Shih had strong feelings about the necessity of Monroe making these arduous trips back and forth. He noted in his diary:

> His overseas trips back and forth were all because of matters related to the China Foundation. There should have been no problem about this. But then, just because of Yang Chuen, we are all topsy-turvy. This is really what the old saying refers to, "There would be peace under heaven if only we do not have useless fools stirring things up."[65]

Monroe had learnt in advance that the Ministry of Education was going to ask the board to call a meeting. In Monroe's opinion, a sheet of paper from the Ministry of Education could not legally rescind the order of the government in July to "abolish" the China Foundation; the Foundation was from that date legally no longer in existence. Monroe then wrote a memorandum reviewing the whole incident from the U.S. government's standpoint. Most crucial were points 7 and 8 of the memorandum. These stated that since the United States had acknowledged the National Government to be the legitimate government of China, the latter's orders were legally effective, and it was precisely because the government's orders were legally binding that the U.S. government could not continue to return the indemnity to the China Foundation as that foundation had already been abolished.[66] As soon as Sun Fo and Tsai Yuan-pei read the memorandum on December 22, they realized this crucial point. The following day, Monroe told Hu Shih that unless the government issued another order rescinding the first one, the China Foundation would lack any legal status. That night, Hu

Shih drafted a proposal for Chiang Monlin to the Executive Yuan informing that body that the ministry would be instructing the China Foundation to convene a board meeting. Hu explained the reasons thus:

> If the original board is to be disbanded, a new U.S. presidential order will be needed for future remissions. This takes time and will entail future red tape, while the educational and cultural operations of the foundation are bound to be suspended. Therefore the ministry intends to order the original board of the China Foundation to convene a board meeting to deal with the reorganization so that the normal flow of the remission is not impeded.[67]

On December 25, the Executive Yuan approved the proposal at its ninth Administrative Conference[68] and Sun Fo, together with C. C. Wu and Y. R. Chao, wrote a letter of resignation to the board asking it to elect new members at its discretion.[69]

> To Hu Shih, the whole thing was a disgrace. He noted in his diary:
>
> This solution was exactly what I drafted for Sun Fo last time and my original draft was based on much more solid reasons than the present one. Alas, they did not follow mine until a foreigner said to their faces, "no money without following my instructions." They did just what they were told to do. How shameful![70]

One way or another, the Nationalist Government's order of July 1928 was officially rescinded and the board held its third annual meeting on January 4, 1929. The day before the meeting, the trustees checked in to the Hsing-Hsing Hotel in Hangchow. They were somewhat embarrassed when they met, and Hu Shih complained about Yang Chuen, saying, "Yang Chuen rashly and effortlessly started a fire and we had to send a whole fire brigade to work hard to put it out."[71] The two main jobs for the "fire brigade" were to amend the constitution and to elect new trustees.

Chiang Monlin and Y. T. Tsur had intended to ask the original board to elect the new trustees and then get the new board to amend the constitution. However, according to the constitution, constitutional amendments had to be backed by a three-fourths majority. The new board, therefore, would be inquorate, as Wang Ching-wei, C. C. Wu, and Sun Fo were abroad and therefore unable to attend. The original board, on the other hand, made up of ten trustees plus proxy votes from Sze Sao-ke and P. W. Kuo, would be quorate. Therefore, the "fire brigade" of the original board was assigned the task of amending the constitution.

As far as Hu Shih was concerned, there were two difficulties with this solution. First, the American trustees were mostly opposed to the appointment of Wang Ching-wei, and second, even though the five trustees were supposed to be resigning voluntarily, it would be suspected that they were being forced out by the government. It would be too embarrassing if all the candidates nominated by the government were elected. For these two reasons, Monroe had cabled C. C. Wu, requesting that Sun Fo recommend

to the board that since C.C. Wu and Wang Ching-wei were abroad, Koo and Tsur should be retained until the next annual meeting. Monroe received no response to this. Hu Shih noted, "Now we just have to swallow our pride and elect the five trustees appointed by the government to safeguard the existence of the Foundation itself."[72]

On January 3, Y. T. Tsur collected some of the resignation letters. He personally delivered the list of candidates to all the trustees. The candidates were listed in the same order to avoid any mistakes leading to the lack of a quorum. At eleven o'clock that night, Hu Shih went to Monroe's room and heard Monroe comforting Tsur. Hu felt "stung in the heart" and was sorry for the trustees who had resigned:

> The reason they swallowed their pride and came from far away was to salvage the whole situation, to save the face of the government, and to cover the lies of that ignorant fool. People like Y. T. Tsur and W. W. Yen were long-time trustees of the Foundation and they worked hard and achieved a lot. Yet, instead, those do-nothings wanted their heads on a flimsy excuse. How can this be justified? I feel very sorry and sad.[73]

Hu Shih was full of resentment. He was ashamed to remain on the board and decided to resign and propose H. C. Zen as his replacement.

Hu thought long and hard about this matter and could not sleep that night. Then at 5 o'clock the next morning that he

suddenly came up with a "perfect solution":[74]

Resignation	Replacement	To serve until
P. W. Kuo	Wang Ching-wei	June 1929
W. W. Yen	C. C. Wu	June 1930
Chang Po-ling	Li Yu-Ying	June 1930
V. K. Wellington Koo	Sun-Fo	June 1931
Y. T. Tsur	H. C. Zen	June 1931
Hu Shih	Y. R. Chao	June 1932

The number of resignations would thus increase from five to six, and Hu thought this had the following benefits:

1. Wang Ching-wei's tenure would be only six months. He could be replaced by someone else if he was still abroad then.
2. Because Hu himself had been appointed by the government, his resignation and replacement by a new trustee elected by the board would accord with the stipulation in the constitution requiring vacancies to be filled by the board itself.
3. Since H. C. Zen was not a government nominee, the Foundation's independence would be genuinely restored if he was elected.
4. Six trustees would be elected rather than five as the government wanted.
5. Hu's own resignation might to some extent mollify Tsur and Yen and reduce their embarrassment.[75]

Having come up with this solution, Hu Shih was "overjoyed

and jumped out of bed; I turned on the light and reached for a pen and paper. Crouching on the pillow, I wrote down a list. I examined it carefully and found nothing wrong. I was pleased with myself so I went to bed and slept until 7 o'clock.[76] The meeting took place at nine o'clock in the morning on January 4 and the participants were Tsai Yuan-pei, Chiang Monlin, Hu Shih, Wong Wen-hao, W. W. Yen, Y. T. Tsur, Greene, Bennett, Stuart, and Monroe. They elected the vice-chairman of the board, Tsai Yuan-pei, as chairman of the meeting. They approved Hu Shih's proposal to change the wording of Article 5 of the constitution from "appointed in the first instance by the President of the Republic of China" to "appointed in the first instance by the Government of the Republic of China." Article 6, "The principal office of the board shall be in the city of Peking," was changed to "The principal office of the board shall be in the capital city of China." The remaining amendments were no more than minor changes in wording. As for the resignations and replacements, the board followed Hu Shih's list to the letter. Tsai Yuan-pei and Chiang Monlin were elected as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively. Receiving the resignations of V. K. Wellington Koo and Y. T. Tsur, Tsai disingenuously urged them not to resign and praised their accomplishments. Hu Shih felt as if he was "sitting on a carpet of needles," and he criticized Tsai harshly in private thus:

> Tsai did not understand how much personal loss he had suffered. Of course, his personal loss does not matter much, but China suffers a heavy loss due to his moral degeneracy.[77]

The newly elected trustees, Li Yu-ying and H. C. Zen, began

to participate in the meeting that very afternoon. There was no sign of a division between the "old" and "new" board members.

With wrenching twists and turns, the reorganization of the China Foundation finally came to a satisfactory conclusion. Under the headline, "The China Foundation regains its independence," Hu described the reorganization in several English-language newspapers. He wrote that the best thing about the Hangchow meeting was that "the principle of an educational foundation' s independence and freedom from political interference was reestablished with courtesy and good-will on every side."[78]

Did the China Foundation actually regain its independence from political interference as Hu Shih claimed? From what has been described here, we can see that it was impossible for educators and intellectuals to avoid the influence of political parties and factions. Some examples of this influence are Monroe' s negotiation with bureaucrats in Peking, the disputes between Monroe and the educational societies about how the remission should be used, the concessions Monroe made to the National Government's Commission for the Administration of Education before the reorganization, and the reorganization that was forced on the Foundation in 1928, largely due to personal grudges held by Yang Chuen and others. These are all evidence of the unending disputes among factions in educational circles and the way the Foundation became inextricably enmeshed in politics. The reorganization of the China Foundation was, after all, the result of political interference. But it is worth pointing out that in the process of reorganization, the trustees stood firmly by the principle

of academic independence. But crucially, if the U.S. government had not threatened to stop the remission, all the negotiations carried out by Hu Shih and others would probably have come to naught. Even though the Nationalist government frequently interfered in the investment and administrative policies of the China Foundation in future years,79 generally speaking the Foundation was able to maintain its budgetary and administrative independence and this made it easier for it to support the advancement of educational and cultural projects in China.

Chapter 2: Organization and Finance

I. Personnel and Organization before 1941

The administration of the China Foundation was based on the constitution passed in September 1924 by the board of trustees, supplemented by by-laws and other rules and regulations. The highest authority was vested in the board of trustees, consisting of ten Chinese and five Americans. Trustees were appointed in the first instance by the government of the Republic of China. Their terms of office were determined by drawing lots at the third annual meeting. Thereafter, the terms of office of three trustees expired each year, and new trustees were then elected by the board to replace them. The term of office was five years.[1] This system was a key feature of the reorganization of 1928 but it was not followed strictly after that. By the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, when the Foundation entered its “emergency” phase, twenty-two Chinese and seven Americans had served as trustees, and after John Leighton Stuart joined the board, there were few changes among the American trustees. Among the Chinese trustees, Sze Sao-ke, Y. T. Tsur, Hu Shih, Tsai Yuan-pei, Sun Fo, Li Yu-ying, and Soh-tsu G. King all served for more than ten years (see table 2-1).

The chairman, two vice-chairmen (one Chinese and one U.S. national), an honorary secretary, and two honorary treasurers (one Chinese and one American) were elected annually by the board. They all served without salary but were permitted to

claim expenses for attending board meetings (see table 2-2). The chairman presided at all meetings of the board at which he was present. He was also ex officio member of all standing or special committees and could vote in these. In his absence one of the vice-chairmen presided. Before the reorganization, the chairmen were Fan Yuan-lien, W. W. Yen, and Chang Po-ling; after the reorganization, Tsai Yuan-pei continued to serve as chairman until his death in 1940. The fact that Tsai was close to the Nationalist government naturally drew the Foundation itself closer to the government. Even though he had a major influence on the Foundation during his term of office, he did not have absolute authority over the direction of the Foundation. Monroe was a long-serving vice-chairman, but his influence was not as profound as it had been when he was involved in negotiating the second remission and establishing the Foundation. The Chinese vice-chairmen were relatively low profile. Y. T. Tsur held various positions, as secretary, treasurer, vice-chairman, and director.

Table 2-1: Trustees (1924-1940)

Year (a)

1924	W. Koo	S. Sze	W. Yen	P. Chang	Y. Fan	Y. Huang	P. Kuo	M. Chiang	Y. Tsur	V. Ting	Monroe	Greene	Dewey	Bennett	Baker
1925															
1926													Wil-loughby		
1927						Y. Tsai				S. Hu			Stuart		
1928					W. Wong										
1929 (b)	Sun F		C. Wu	Y. Li			C. Wong		H. Zen	Y. Chao					
1929							S. Hu								
1930					S. King										
1931															
1932								S. Hsu		Y. Tsur					
1933															
1934			V. Ting												
1935															
1936			W. Wong												
1937															
1938															
1939								H. Sun							
1940				M, Chi-ang		W. Yen									

(a) From the beginning of July to the end of June
(b) Reorganization in June 1929
Full Names of Trustees: W. Koo—V.K. Wellington Koo; S. Sze—Sze Sao-ke; W. Yen—W. W. Yen; P. Chang—Chang Po-ling; Y. Fan—Fan Yuan-lien; Y. Huang—Huang Yen-pei; P. Kuo—P. W. Kuo; M. Chiang—Chiang Monlin; Y. Tsur—Y.T. Tsur; V. Ting—V.K. Ting; Monroe—Paul Monroe; Greene—Roger S. Greene; Dewey—John Dewey; Bennett—Charles Bennett; Baker—John Earl Baker; Willoughby—Westel W. Willoughby; Y. Tsai—Tsai Yuan-pei; S. Hu—Hu Shih; Stuart—John Leighton Stuart; W. Wong—Wong Wen-hao; Sun F—Sun Fo; C. Wu—C.C. Wu; Y. Li—Li Yu-ying; C. Wong—Wong Ching-wei; H. Zen—H.C. Zen; Y. Chao—Y.R. Chao; S. King—Soh-tsu G. King; H. Hsu—Hsu Sing-loh; H. Sun—H.F. Sun

Table 2-2: Officers (1924-1941)

Year	Chairman	Vice-chairmen	Secretary	Treasurers
1924	Fan Yuan-lien	Monroe	Y. T. Tsur	
1925	W. W. Yen	Monroe; Chang Po-ling	V. K. Ting	Bennett; Y. T. Tsur
1926	W. W. Yen	Monroe; Chang Po-ling	Y. T. Tsur	Bennett; Y. T. Tsur
1927	W. W. Yen	Monroe; Chang Po-ling	Y. T. Tsur	Bennett; Y. T. Tsur
1928	Chang Po-ling	Monroe; Tsai Yuan-pei	Hu Shih	Bennett, Wong Wen-hao
1929	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Chiang Monlin	H. C. Zen	Bennett, Wong Wen-hao
1929	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Chiang Monlin	Hu Shih	Bennett, Wong Wen-hao
1930	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Chiang Monlin	Hu Shih	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1931	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Chiang Monlin	Hu Shih	Greene; King Soh-tsu
1932	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	Hu Shih	Greene; King Soh-tsu
1933	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	Hu Shih	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1934	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	Hu Shih	Bennett, King Soh-tsu

Year	Chairman	Vice-chairmen	Secretary	Treasurers
1935	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	Hu Shih	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1936	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	Hu Shih	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1937	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	Hu Shih	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1938	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	Hu Shih	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1939	Tsai Yuan-pei	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	H. F. Sun	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1940	W. W. Yen	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	H. F. Sun	Bennett, King Soh-tsu
1941	W. W. Yen	Monroe; Y. T. Tsur	H. F. Sun	Bennett, King Soh-tsu

Tsur worked very hard in all the various positions he held. The secretary was required to take the minutes at all meetings of the board and its executive committee. He had to issue notices of elections for board members and officers, send out notifications of all board meetings, and notify new members immediately upon their election. Both Y. T. Tsur and Hu Shih held that position. The two treasurers were jointly in charge of looking after the cash and investments. They issued payments on the authority of the board or the executive committee, executed the investment decisions made by the finance committee, and presented a written treasurers' report to the annual board meeting. It was stated in the by-laws that "their accounts shall be audited annually by an auditor or auditors not connected with the Board, who shall be named by the Board."[2] Bennett and Tsur set up the Foundation's accounting system. As a long-serving treasurer, Bennett made a significant contribution to the financial management of the China Foundation.

According to the by-laws and rules of the China Foundation, board meetings should have been held twice a year, in January and June, with the June meeting being the annual meeting. As time went on, the dates of the board meetings varied, and the non-annual meetings were skipped if they were unnecessary.[3] In addition, the

chairman, or any five board members, could call a meeting at not less than sixty days written notice. The agenda, date, and place of such a meeting had to be stated in the notice. According to the constitution, representatives of the Chinese minister of foreign affairs and minister of education, and the U.S. minister (later ambassador) to China had the right to attend board meetings as observers. Even though the head office of the Foundation was located in the Chinese capital, the board did not necessarily meet there, and the Foundation had offices elsewhere too. As the fifteen trustees came from all over China and from overseas, the meeting venues depended on their convenience (see table 2-3).

Table 2-3: Board Meetings of the China Foundation (1925-41)

Meetings	Dates	Venues
First Annual Meeting	May 1925	Imperial Hotel, Tientsin
First Board Meeting	February 1926	Hotel de Peking, Peking
Second Annual Meeting	June 1926	Western Returned Students' Club, Peking
Second Board Meeting	March 1927	Western Returned Students' Club, Peking
Third Annual Meeting	June 1927	Imperial Hotel, Tientsin
Fourth Annual Meeting	June 1928	Astor House, Tientsin
Third Board Meeting	January 1929	Hsing-Hsing Hotel, Hangchow
Fifth Annual Meeting	June 1929	Astor House, Tientsin
Fourth Board Meeting	February 1930	Astor House Hotel, Shanghai
Sixth Annual Meeting	July 1930	Ministry of Education, Nanking
Fifth Board Meeting	January 1931	Burlington Hotel, Shanghai
Seventh Annual Meeting	June 1931	China Foundation, Peking
Sixth Board Meeting	January 1932	Astor House Hotel, Shanghai
Eighth Annual Meeting	July 1932	China Foundation, Peking
Seventh Board Meeting	January 1933	Astor House Hotel, Shanghai
Ninth Annual Meeting	July 1933	Metropolis Hotel, Shanghai

Meetings	Dates	Venues
Eighth Board Meeting	February 1934	Academia Sinica, Nanking
Tenth Annual Meeting	June 1934	China Foundation, Peking
Eleventh Annual Meeting	April 1935	Park Hotel, Shanghai
Ninth Board Meeting	October 1935	Burlington Hotel, Shanghai
Twelfth Annual Meeting	April 1936	Burlington Hotel, Shanghai
Thirteenth Annual Meeting	April 1937	Academia Sinica, Shanghai
Fourteenth Annual Meeting	April 1938	The Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong
Fifteenth Annual Meeting	April 1939	The Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong
Sixteenth Annual Meeting	April 1940	The Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong
Seventeenth Annual Meeting	April 1941	The Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong

Under the board of trustees, there was an executive committee and a finance committee. The executive committee consisted of the chairman and three trustees elected by ballot. The chairman of the board was *ex officio* chairman of the executive committee, which carried out resolutions passed by the board not otherwise specifically provided for. Between board meetings, the executive committee had wide discretionary powers, but these were not unlimited. One of the original by-laws contained the following:

> With the approval of the Finance Committee, based on the guidelines provided by the resolutions of the Board, the Executive Committee may appropriate up to $10,000 per project. However, during the interim between two Annual Meetings, the total amount is limited to $30,000 for such appropriation.[4] [NB: according to the third report to the board, this by-law was amended and the limit was increased to $60,000]

This regulation was later amended so that appropriations for a specific each year could not exceed the amount of the executive committee's discretionary budget as approved by the board. The intention here was to limit the authority of the executive committee to make such appropriations without the board's prior approval. Greene was a member of the executive committee for many years, so his influence on the direction and policies of the Foundation gradually came to exceed that of Monroe.

The finance committee was composed of the two treasurers and three other members elected by the board. This committee was in charge of the Foundation's deposits and investments. The three members elected to the finance committee at the first annual meeting were Y. T. Tsur, Bennett, and Baker. This committee was also in charge of "drafting for the Foundation the rules of financial management; receipts and payments and the necessary forms for book-keeping."[5] Tsur and Bennett shouldered important responsibilities as treasurers and members of the finance committee. However, starting in November 1925, meetings of the finance committee were held jointly with the executive committee and the two committees made joint decisions on financial planning and appropriations. In order to improve the efficiency of the Foundation's financial management, a special financial advisory committee was set up in Shanghai at the beginning of 1932 with Hsu Sing-loh among its members. At the beginning of each meeting, the executive committee sought the opinion of the special financial advisory committee regarding the Foundation' s investments. Unfortunately for the Foundation, by 1932, the world economy was in deep depression. Furthermore, the Chinese government suspended payment of the indemnity. These factors

affected the Foundation's investments and the liquidity of its cash accounts. Discussion of financial matters at the joint committee meetings was quite lengthy. More problems were created by the overlap in responsibilities between the special financial advisory committee and the finance committee. At the board's ninth annual meeting in 1935 at Shanghai, the constitution and by-laws were amended so that, with the exception of the chairman and vice-chairmen, the officers of the Foundation did not have to be trustees. In addition to recruiting two assistant treasurers (also called assistant accountants), the board reorganized the three-member finance committee which was to be based in Shanghai. The special financial advisory committee was disbanded.[6] The following year, the executive committee held meetings in Peking and the finance committee met in Shanghai.

The director was elected by the board and was its chief executive officer. He did not have to be a trustee. The director and his staff were responsible for carrying out the board's decisions, and it was the director who had custody of the official seal. Along with the secretary, or one of the treasurers or a member of the board designated for such purpose by the board or its executive committee, the director had to sign all deeds, agreements, and formal instruments other than those expressly designated by the board or specified in the by-laws. The director had to "report on the activities of the Foundation, including reviewing the work and progress of the Foundation's projects, and the recipients of its grants; report on the numbers of applications for grants-in-aid and the results of investigations into the merits of applicants; report on the appropriations granted during the preceding year and the actual

payments to be made in the coming fiscal year as may be deemed necessary by the director."[7]

The director gradually began to take part in the meetings of the executive and finance committees, which gave him a better overall understanding of the operations of the Foundation. As result, his authority expanded. Under the director, there were executive secretaries, special secretaries, accounting secretaries, secretaries, Chinese document copyists, English typists, etc.

The Foundation's first director, Fan Yuan-lien, with the assistance of H. C. Zen, the special secretary (later known as the executive secretary), gradually defined the scope of the Foundation' s activities and the principles governing its grant decisions. After Fan died in December 1927, he was succeeded by Y. T. Tsur. After the reorganization, Tsur was succeeded by H. C. Zen. Zen had pioneered the promotion of scientific education in the early years of the Republic and he was the main organizer of the Science Society of China. As a long-term chairman of that society and as director of the China Foundation, Zen had influential institutions under his control and had a major influence on the Foundation's grants, giving him an important role in the development of science in the Republic of China.[8] Zen's ideas about how science should be developed also influenced the direction of the grants of the China Foundation, but he was widely criticized for his management style, especially by the American trustees. As Greene said, "We had lost all hopes of having a wise commander and leader. Zen is only fitted for small matters." V. K. Ting also criticized him, "Zen is too timid and he frequently goes through the motions without sincerity." In a

letter to Hu Shih, Ting further criticized Zen's behavior:

> This time, Sze gave him a harsh dressing down and Zen did not even respond to Sze's accusation and kept mum. This left a very bad impression on the meeting. Even Yong-ni [Wong Wen-hao] complained that Zen is too soft. I am afraid that his colleagues and subordinates will not give him the proper respect. Since you are Honorary Secretary, you should do something about it.[9]

Several years later, when, in the face of opposition from V. K. Ting, L. K. Tao, and others, Zen insisted that the Social Research Institute, which was managed by the Foundation, should be merged with the Institute of Social Science, Academia Sinica, Hu Shih again stepped in and played the role of mediator. As he wrote at the time,

> What the Foundation precisely needs are independent-minded trustees. …An organization like ours can never please everybody. Impartiality by definition will never win approval from all sides. But if we are confident that we are doing our best for the organization, we are in fact acting unselfishly and we do not have either to care about or listen to all kinds of small talk. …In a collective decision-making organization, there has to be an attitude of compromise and flexibility. Even if a decision is not satisfactory to ourselves, we sometimes have to abandon our own cherished opinion for the benefit of the organization as a whole. Even a majority decision supported by eight or nine trustees out of fifteen can sometimes be criticized as skewed and partial, so how can we expect everyone under the heaven to agree that there is transparent justification for any decision?[10]

In an organization like the China Foundation in which decisions were made collectively there were bound to be differences of opinion about any decision. But in general, there was no serious conflict or controversy among the trustees. For example, Wong Wen-hao said of Greene, "This gentleman is devoted to the Foundation and he is very experienced in what he is entrusted with. Even though some of his ideas do not necessarily appeal to one or two of the trustees, most of his ideas are in fact feasible. Occasionally, if some of his ideas are questionable, they can be satisfactorily dealt with. Besides, the Foundation needs trustees like Greene who has many good ideas."[11] This kind of frank exchange of ideas and attitude of compromise and accommodation among the trustees may be the main reason why the China Foundation was so successful in its operations. Indeed, Hu Shih concluded, "With my unbiased eyes, I can vouch for the fact that it is extremely difficult to find fifteen trustees as lacking in egotism as ours. The China Foundation may not be perfect, but the majority of its trustees are truly respectable and trustworthy."[12] This comment rings true in the case of the China Foundation.

II. The Crisis of Survival: Improvisation during the Emergency and Post-War Periods

In February 1936, in order to improve the Foundation's

financial management, the finance committee moved from the Foundation's original headquarters at 22 Nanchang Street, Peking, to Kiukiang Road, Shanghai. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Foundation's headquarters were also relocated to Shanghai. The Foundation set up a liaison office in Hong Kong in July 1938. During the first few years of the Sino-Japanese War, the annual meetings also took place in Hong Kong. At the seventeenth annual meeting in April 1941, the trustees expressed the fear that if the United States entered the war, the majority of the board would find it difficult to attend meetings, so they resolved to establish an emergency committee to deal with this situation. The emergency measures included the following:

1. An emergency is considered to exist when airplane communication between the coast and the interior is interrupted or suspended or when American mail liners cease to call at Far Eastern ports.
2. In the event of an emergency, trustees in China will constitute an emergency committee. Five trustees will be considered a quorum for passing business. (It is suggested that the chairman or a vice-chairman, the secretary, the director, and one of the treasurers be included in that number.) Other trustees may be reached by mail or cable.
3. When communications between China and the United States are no longer possible, the business of the finance committee in the United States shall be performed by trustees in the United States in conjunction with the special advisory committee in the United States, with Mr. C. R. Bennett being authorized to convene the meeting.
4. If, due to the emergency situation, the upcoming annual meeting cannot be held, all the existing trustees and staff should serve until the next annual meeting.
5. John E. Baker and the director of the Chungking office are authorized to sign checks and monthly borrowing receipts on behalf of the treasurers.[13]

At the end of 1941 when the Japanese launched their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, precipitating the Pacific War, the trustees in the unoccupied areas of China held the first meeting of the emergency committee. Wong Wen-hao was elected chairman; Y. T. Tsur, secretary; Arthur N. Young, treasurer; H. C. Zen, director and treasurer; and Sun Fo, Chiang Monlin, and Arthur N. Young, members of the executive committee. In the same month, a special committee was organized in New York, with Paul Monroe as chairman; Hu Shih, secretary; Sze Sao-ke and C. R. Bennett, treasurers; and Roger Greene, associate director. Monroe resigned in 1943 for health reasons, and Hu Shih succeeded him as chairman of this committee, with Meng Chih taking Hu's place as secretary. In addition to protecting the China Foundation' s interests in the United States, the special committee took major responsibility for the safekeeping of its securities, making investment decisions, preparing budgets and exercising treasury functions, supporting Chinese researchers in the United States out of endowment income, and purchasing books and subscribing to magazines on behalf of libraries and educational institutes in China. These last were stored in the United States until it was possible to ship them back to China. The emergency committee in

Chungking was in charge of grants and other administrative work. During this period (1942-45) the emergency committee held five meetings and the special committee in America held twelve. Both committees operated independently although they coordinated their activities. From the frequent correspondence between Zen and Greene, we can gain an idea of how the decision-making process for administrative and financial matters worked during this period.

Although payment of the remission had been stopped in 1939, the Foundation was able, by drawing on its investment income and loans from the government, to continue with its routine work during the emergency period. However, the Foundation suddenly found itself in a life-and-death crisis when the Chinese government began considering the possibility of abolishing all the Boxer indemnity administrations (BIAs). In January 1943, the Chinese and American governments signed the Sino-American Treaty for the Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights in China and the Regulation of Related Matters. Under this treaty, the U.S. government abandoned its claim to future indemnity payments. As a consequence, certain officials in the Chinese government proposed that all the BIAs be abolished and that their operations be taken over by the Ministry of Education (MOE) or another organization created for the purpose under the supervision of the MOE. The minister of education, Chen Li-fu, was in the vanguard of this movement. During a discussion in the Executive Yuan, Premier H. H. Kung ordered the MOE, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to work together to find a solution to this matter.[14]

In January 1943, after hearing the bad news, the Foundation' s trustees convened the third meeting of the emergency committee in Chungking. At this meeting, the trustees discussed the legal status of the Foundation and its future. They asked Director Zen to submit a detailed report to the MOFA and MOF that would allow the government to appreciate the true value of the Foundation and its symbolic value in Sino-American diplomatic relations. In his report, Zen detailed the history of the establishment of the China Foundation, its organization and the scope of its authority, its work, including its war time work, and its plans for the future. The report concluded,

> Once the Sino-Japanese War is over, the China Foundation should initiate a substantial fundraising drive in both China and America in order to continue the work begun by our American friends eighteen years ago with the remission of the indemnity. The accomplishment of this project will not only benefit the development of this country, but it will also become a permanent monument to Sino-American friendship.[15]

In a letter to Greene, Zen envisioned three possible fates for the Foundation: (1) the government would appreciate its past achievements and continue to support it; (2) the Foundation would have to depend solely on its own resources and would be disbanded after its funds were exhausted; or (3) it would be abolished immediately. From the point of view of the Foundation itself, the third scenario was the worst one, and although the trustees would be happy to see the first scenario realized, they

reckoned that it had a very slim chance of coming to pass. In the event of the second scenario, the trustees would have to bear an extremely heavy responsibility. No matter what happened, the future was grim.[16]

After the meeting of the emergency committee, Wong Wen-hao and H.C. Zen cabled Hu Shih and Sze Sao-ke in the United States, briefing them on the crisis faced by the Foundation and the reactions from all sides. In a separate letter to Hu, Zen analyzed the attitude of government officials thus:

> Apparently, it can be divided into two camps: one camp wants to take this opportunity to eradicate anything which is tinged with the national disgrace; and the other camp is willing to retain this Sino-American cooperative cultural heritage as a basis for further cooperation. In reality, they also would like to take this opportunity to eliminate their opponents and to expand their own influence. …The trustees of the Foundation of course belong to the second camp. Some people in the government belong to the first camp and it is said that the MOE and MOF are in this camp. However some of them are straddling on the fence. For example, T. V. Soong proposed that the BIAs should keep their existing funds.[17]

Zen hoped that Hu and Sze would consult the American trustees about this.

In their cabled reply, Hu and Sze recalled that during the remission negotiations, both the Chinese and American

governments intended that the China Foundation would be a permanent organization. That was "the reason why they made it a foundation rather than a management committee." They said that the American trustees believed that "the American people also felt that the China Foundation should continue to exist and therefore the Foundation's basic organizational set-up and constitution should not be changed. In particular, the original conditions negotiated by the Chinese and American governments for the remission should be adhered to, so that legal continuity could be maintained and the Sino-American educational and cultural heritage could be preserved."[18] At the same time, Wong Wen-hao lobbied H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, trying to persuade them that the Chinese government still had a moral responsibility to continue paying the outstanding installments of the indemnity despite the fact that it would be terminated by the new Sino-American Treaty. What is more, the funds in the custody of the Foundation were not limited to its own funds. The Foundation had the option of receiving funding from both the Chinese and American sides to continue its operations.[19] Clarence Gauss, the U.S. ambassador to China, also expressed his concerns about this matter. He hoped that the Chinese government would support the continuing existence of the China Foundation. In his October 18, 1943, memorandum to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said:

> When the Board of the China Foundation was first established, the American Government understood that the Board was an independent self-perpetuating organization not to be interfered with by either American or Chinese Governments. From then on, the American Government had

always taken care not to interfere with or influence the Board of the China Foundation's legal authority and its independent management of the funds in its custody. We believe that the Chinese Government will also give it the same necessary freedom so that the Foundation can independently manage the funds under its custody and exercise its authority based on the stipulations of its constitution.[20]

People like Wong and Zen lobbied the MOFA and MOF in an effort to bring them over to the Foundation's side and counter the MOE's determined efforts to abolish the BIAs. But in the end, the government's special financial committee (of which Minister of Education Chen Li-fu was a member) made the decision to abolish all the BIAs, and this was approved by the Supreme National Defense Council in August 1944. The following month the Office of the Secretary General of the Executive Yuan ordered all BIAs to close down at the end of that year. The operations of the China Foundation were to be taken over by the MOE. Wong and Zen cabled H. H. Kung for help. They also asked Hu Shih to persuade Kung, who was attending a meeting of the International Monetary Fund, to urge the Chinese government to reconsider. Lobbied from all sides, Kung cabled Wang Chong-hwei, the secretary of the Supreme National Defense Council; Chang Li-Sen, the secretary general of the Executive Yuan; and Wong Wen-hao, suggesting that the government should allow the BIAs to continue to operate at least until the end of the war, at which time other arrangements could be made. Wong felt that Kung's proposal would only delay the inevitable and that after the war the problem would raise its ugly head again. To solve it once and for all, Wong decided to

write to Chiang Kai-shek. In his memo to Chiang, Wong stressed the serious impact abolition would have on China's foreign relations, "Whether the government can unilaterally abolish the BIAs is a serious matter and we have to consider it very carefully in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding by other nations." He emphasized the reasons for maintaining the permanent status of the China Foundation, saying, "Since in its constitution, the China Foundation does not claim that it depends solely on the remission of the indemnity, and since it is especially respectful of the rights of China, it should be preserved to avoid further complications." However the memo was returned by the Chiang's aides. Wong said: "There were very few precedents for memos being rejected out of hand. This shows that there are lots of people who are hostile to the China Foundation."[21]

With the fate of the Foundation hanging in the balance, the trustees were uncertain what they should do. In his letter to Greene, Zen was perplexed. Should the China Foundation proactively expand its business, stabilize its position and organization, and boost its financial resources? Or should it use up its funds within two or three years by giving out as many grants as possible and close down its operations once the funds were exhausted?[22] When he received the notice from the government that the BIAs would be abolished on September 15, Zen had already begun to draft plans for winding up the Foundation's business and accounts. However, the trustees in the United States, both Chinese and American, believed that the government's order was legally untenable. Unless the government issued an official order for the Foundation to be abolished, it should operate as usual. They drafted a memorandum

in which they asked the Chinese government to reconsider its decision. At the same time, they asked the trustees in Chungking to continue their negotiations with the government. Hu Shih wrote to Wong Wen-hao asking him to appeal directly to the supreme commander, Chiang Kai-shek, in order to convince him of the impropriety of abolishing the Foundation and the legal difficulties associated with the transfer of its funds.[23]

In the midst of this uncertainty, T. V. Soong was appointed premier while Chen Li-fu was replaced as minister of education. At that point, the Foundation's prospects became somewhat brighter. The attitude of the new minister of education, Chu Chia-hua, was unknown, but at the very least it would be different from that of Chen Li-fu. Chu was willing to allow the Foundation to continue its existence, and even to see it improved At the end of 1944, the secretary general of the Executive Yuan, Chang Li-sen, informed the BIAs that they were to be allowed to maintain their current status.[24] The threat to the Foundation's existence was temporarily lifted, to the great relief of the trustees.

However, there were questions concerning the future status and destiny of the Foundation, and how it would maintain its operations without recourse to government loans. Aware of the Foundation's intractable problems, Fu Ssu-nien stepped forward once again as an intermediary. To assuage the hostility of certain important KMT and government officials toward the Foundation, Fu put forward three proposals: (1) that new trustees should be elected to replace those who were living under Japanese occupation and therefore unable to fulfill their duties; (2) that

the minister of education, the president of Academia Sinica, and the president of Tsing Hua University should be appointed as *ex-officio* members of the board; and (3) that funds be raised from public and private sources to boost the Foundation's resources and to distance it from the indemnity. Minister Chu naturally agreed to these proposals, but Wong Wen-hao felt that the appointment of *ex-officio* board members would entail amendments to the constitution and a change in the Foundation's current status. He presented the ideas of the trustees in Chungking for strengthening the functions of the present board, which were to amend the constitution and elect new trustees, namely, Tsiang Ting-fu, Fan Zue, Fu Ssu-nien, and Arthur Young. H. C. Zen pointed out that the Foundation was merely making a gesture of compromise in the current political climate and it should by no means be construed as the result of political interference. The China Foundation should at all costs avoid involvement with politics or identification with influential politicians.[25] The trustees in the United States agreed to the proposed new trustees but were against any amendment of the constitution. They did not think it was necessary to add any new ex-officio members to the board. The minister of education could be invited to observe board meetings but should not be elected a trustee.[26]

After lengthy negotiations, the trustees decided to hold a special election meeting in the United States on June 2, 1945. Those trustees in China who were unable to attend the meeting appointed trustees in the United States to act as their proxies. The meeting was attended by Hu Shih, Chiang Monlin, Sze Sao-ke, Greene, Bennett, and Donald M. Brodie.[27] The board duly elected

the abovementioned four individuals to replace those trustees living under Japanese occupation. The board also elected Chiang Monlin as chairman, Wong Wen-hao and Greene as vice-chairmen, Y. T. Tsur as secretary, and Bennett and Sze Sao-ke as treasurers.

The war ended in September 1945, and the China Foundation held its eighteenth annual meeting on December 1 that year. The emergency committee and the special committee were abolished and plans were made for the Foundation's postwar operations. In 1946, the China Foundation reestablished its office in Shanghai, in the same building as the directorate and the department of funds. The following year, Bennett, Baker, and Young resigned and Greene died. They were replaced at the nineteenth and twentieth meetings in March and December by John Leighton Stuart, C. B. Hutchison, J. T. S. Reed, and Paul S. Hopkins. After the death of Fan Zue and the resignation of Sze Sao-ke, they were replaced by Lee Ming and Ho Pao-hsu. Chiang Monlin remained as chairman, Wong Wen-hao as vice-chairman, and H. C. Zen as director.[28] Due to the deteriorating political situation, in 1949 the Foundation moved from Shanghai to Hong Kong. It also moved its securities and cash from the First National City Bank, Hong Kong, to its New York office. After this transfer of assets, Zen returned to mainland China and Hu Shih took over his duties in the United States.

III. The Second Remission and the Foundation's Assets

According to the auditor's report on the Boxer indemnity carried out on behalf of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in 1924, the second remission amounted to US$6,137,552 in principal payments and US$6,407,885 in interest, to be repaid over twenty years. In reality, the China Foundation did not receive the promised full payment and the payment period was less than fourteen years.

According to the original arrangement, the Chinese government's Maritime Customs Service remitted the payment by check to the U.S. Legation (later the U.S. Embassy). The Legation forwarded the payment to the Foundation by endorsement on the check with vouchers.[29] A lump sum of US$1,377,255 was received by the Foundation in 1925 from the U.S. Treasury, representing the accumulated balance of the indemnity payments from October 1917. Over the next few years, the Foundation received the monthly installments as scheduled. The Chinese government suspended payments of the indemnity to the U.S. Embassy for one year from March 1932 due to shortage of funds resulting from the Japanese invasion the year before. In 1937, when the Sino-Japanese War broke out, the Chinese government's finances became even more constrained. In January 1939 the payments were stopped indefinitely. In 1943, when the New Sino-American Treaty was signed, the payments stopped altogether. In all, the Foundation received an amount that was less than the total of fourteen annual installments (see table 2-4).

Table 2-4: Annual Income of the China Foundation

Year	Payment of Indemnity S$	Payment of Indemnity US$	Other Income[a] S$	Other Income[a] US$	Other Income[a] £	Total S$	Total US$	Total £
1925	982,295	1,377,255	171,267			1,153,562	1,377,255	
1926	1,329,191		299,402			1,628,593		
1927	1,155,337		406,563			1,561,900		
1928	1,171,903		416,599			1,588,502		
1929	1,432,809		486,903			1,919,712		
1930	2,153,112		628,194			2,781,306		
1931[b]	1,518,057		77,197	121,486		1,595,254	121,486	
1932[c]	744,524		102,013	84,260		846,537	84,260	
1933[d]	1,655,378		213,785	39,748	4,829	1,869,163	39,748	4,829
1934	1,446,107		282,322	43,846	3,533	1,728,429	43,846	3,533
1935	1,336,698		334,597	47,362	3,020	1,671,295	47,362	3,020
1936	1,778,402		359,727	55,306	2,322	2,138,129	55,306	2,322
1937		530,471	262,245	48,243	1,202	262,245	578,714	1,202
1938[e]		262,730	425,718	51,202	1,764	425,718	313,932	1,764
Total	16,703,813	2,170,456	4,466,532	491,453	16,670	21,170,345	2,661,909	16,670

(a) Other income includes interest, dividends, foreign exchange gains, and miscellaneous income.
(b) From this year, gold and silver dollars (S$) were recorded separately. From March 1932, indemnity payments stopped. Only eight monthly payments were received from July 1931 to February 1932.
(c) Payments started again in March 1933, and four monthly payments were received that year (March-June).
(d) Due to unstable foreign exchange rates, from this year, U.S. dollars, pounds sterling and silver dollars were recorded separately.
(e) Payments stopped in January 1939, and only six monthly payments were received (July-December 1938).

In addition to the lump sum payment in 1925, the China Foundation received on average 1.4 million silver dollars (S$) per month before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. The large increase in revenue in 1930 was due to the rapid rise in the gold price which meant that when gold dollars were converted into silver dollars the foreign exchange gains were far higher than those of other years.[30] The large drop in revenue in 1932 was due to the government delaying payment which was to be made up in 1946. To cover the shortfall and allow the Foundation to continue its routine operations, the MOF lent it S$1 million in eight monthly installments of S$125,000 from July 1932 to February 1933.[31] This government loan was recorded by the Foundation as a liability to be repaid once it had received the delayed payment.[32] In reality, however, this loan was treated as revenue from the remission. The budgets appropriated for the institutions run by the Foundation and those in receipt of its grants were executed as usual that year. For all these years, the total income of the Foundation included revenue from the remissions, interest income, dividends, and miscellaneous income amounting to approximately S$21 million, plus US$2.6 million and £10,000.[33] There was a shortfall between the actual amount of the remissions and the amount of twelve million U.S. dollars which originally promised.

Table 2-5: Annual Expenditure of the China Foundation

Unit S$ (CN$)

Year	Administrative Expenses	Grants-in-Aid	Other[a]	Total
1925	51,307	82,682	5,264	139,253
1926	56,449	646,450	143,697	846,596
1927	50,834	477,107	19,998	547,939
1928	76,303	737,708	13,715	827,726
1929	66,052	1,931,948	3,849	2,001,849
1930	83,852	1,740,701	4,206	1,828,759
1931[b]	89,621	2,064,215	6,690	2,160,526
1932[c]	89,446	1,681,832	19,205	1,790,483

Year	Administrative Expenses	Grants-in-Aid	Other[a]	Total
1933[d]	81,456	1,586,029	2,673	1,670,158
1934	96,697	1,288,163	3,249	1,388,109
1935	93,783	1,180,628	190,438[e]	1,464,849
1936	104,764	1,314,872	154,686[f]	1,574,322
1937[g]	144,211	1,250,628	102,705[h]	1,497,544
1938[i]	199,228	1,536,875	52	1,736,155
Total	1,284,003	17,519,838	670,427	19,474,268

(a) "Other" includes interest on bank overdrafts and loans, losses on sales of securities, currency exchange losses, and miscellaneous expenses.
(b) From this year, silver dollars (S$) and gold dollars (US$) were recorded separately. US$ were converted at a rate of US$ 1 = CN$4.80.
(c) The exchange rate for this year was US$1 = CN$3.60.
(d) The exchange rate for this year was US$1 = CN$2.87.
(e) Included payment of CN$150,000 to MOE as contribution to the compulsory education programs.
(f) –ditto-
(g) The exchange rate for this year was unstable. It varied from US$1 = CN$.3.40 to = CN$5.30 and the medium rate of CN$4.35 was used.
(h) This included payment of CN$100,000 to MOE as contribution to the compulsory education programs.
(i) The exchange rates for this year varied from US$1 = 5.50 – 7.69 and the average rate of 6.60 was used

Over 90 percent of the Foundation's income was used to subsidize educational and cultural projects, with only 6.6 percent being used for office administration (see table 2-5). The business of the Foundation expanded rapidly after it was reorganized in 1929. The annual amount paid out in grants increased from CN$737,708 to CN$1,931,948, a 2.6 times increase. After that, the annual value of its grants remained in excess of CN$1 million. But in 1931, when for domestic political reasons payment of the indemnity was suspended for one year and the global recession resulted in loss of income from foreign securities, the Foundation started finding it difficult to make ends meet. Deficits were recorded in

1931 and 1932. In order to cope with these financial difficulties, the Foundation arranged overdraft facilities with its banks and also drew on money that should have been ploughed back into the endowment funds. However, in general, before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Foundation enjoyed annual surpluses.

It was clear that one way or another, payment of the remissions would come to an end eventually, and for this reason, when the China Foundation was established, the trustees planned to set up an endowment fund to provide future income. At the first annual meeting, Y. T. Tsur and Bennett proposed that the first lump sum payment of US$1,377,255 (equal to $2,470,000 in local currency at an exchange rate of US$1 = CN$1.7934) plus one-third of future annual payments (about US$180,000 per year) should to be paid into an endowment fund, which after twenty years would be worth US$6,578,393. With this amount in the endowment account, the Foundation would be able to generate an estimated annual income of US$500,000 (CN$1,000,000), given an interest rate of 7 percent per annum.[34] Tsur's proposal was approved by the board and it ensured the preservation of the funds. This became a major factor in the Foundation's financial stability in the coming years.

In July 1925 the China Foundation transferred the first lump sum payment plus the monthly installment payment to the National City Bank of New York, London, to purchase Chinese Reorganization Bonds.[35] From then on, the Foundation ploughed back one-third of each annual installment into the endowment fund for deposit or investment. The annual deposits up to June 1931

were follows (all values in CN$):

1925-26	348,712
1926-27	390,000
1927-28	402,229
1928-29	450,000
1929-30	560,000
1930-31	760,000

After the government delayed payment of the remission in 1932, however, the Foundation had to stop this ploughing back of funds in order to maintain its existing grant payments.

In 1929, as the Foundation's assets began to increase, the finance committee decided to change to a policy of diversified investments. In 1930, the accumulated balance in the endowment account increased significantly along with the steep rise in the price of gold. The annual balances were as follows (all values in CN$):

1925 (yearend)	2,479,059
1925-26	2,827,771
1926-27	3,217,771
1927-28	3,620,000
1928-29	4,070,000
1929-30	4,630,000
1930-31	9,450,883
1931-32	9,661,689
1932-33	7,270,624

1933-34	7,440,749
1934-35	7,682,723
1935-36	9,193,353
1936-37	9,839,964
1937-38	13,003,471
1938-39	16,676,195
1939-40	27,282,747

There were two reasons for the drop in value of the balance in fiscal 1932. First, due to the global recession, certain U.S. currency bonds stopped paying interest and sterling was devalued. Second, once the government had suspended payment, the Foundation could only increase its principal by using the existing endowment plus income from its investments. Consequently, at the sixth board meeting on January 8, 1932, Director Zen proposed that the policy of ploughing income back into the endowment account be amended. If necessary, the amount ploughed back could be flexible. At the eighth annual meeting on July 1, 1932, the board decided to delay the plough-back of US$248,864.[36] During 1933, the value of the U.S. dollar continued to decline, thus reducing the growth of the Foundation's investments. In 1935, the Foundation moved its finance committee and endowment funds department to Shanghai to make it easier to manage the funds, and the endowment and income accounts were separated. In that year the U.S. dollar and the pound sterling both rose rapidly in value and this caused the large increase in assets valued in the local currency.[37] On the eve of the Sino-Japanese War, the total book value of the assets reached CN$9,839,964 while the market value was CN$11,076,835. During the early stages of the war, the trend

toward growth in asset value was maintained.

The major source of the Foundation's revenue was income from investments in securities. While the finance committee laid down the guidelines for investment, the Foundation relied on banks and investment trusts with expertise in investment management to carry out the actual transactions and other detailed work. In October 1930, at a joint meeting of the executive and finance committees, it was decided to entrust the management of investments to the City Bank Farmers Trust Company and its London office. In June 1931, the board appointed Greene, King Soh-tsu, and H. C. Zen to form an *ad hoc* committee to draft a plan for increasing the efficiency of investment and financial management.[38]

The investment policy of the Foundation emphasized diversification in order to reduce risk. Its investment portfolio included central and local government bonds, as well as bonds and shares in public utilities, commercial and industrial enterprises, banks, and transportation companies. For the convenience of book-keeping, investments in different currencies were booked separately. These included Chinese Reorganization Bonds in pounds sterling, other bonds in U.S. dollars, and Chinese government bonds in silver dollars.[39] From the beginning, the investment policy favored foreign currency securities as the finance committee felt it was rather difficult to select securities valued in silver dollars. However, the exchange rate of silver to gold fluctuated widely, leading to both gains and losses. Besides, due to the global recession, the market values of foreign currency

denominated securities sometimes dropped precipitously and payments of interest and dividends sometimes stopped altogether. To counter the violent fluctuations in the value of its foreign investments, and in an effort to balance its gold and silver dollar investments, from 1930 onwards the Foundation gradually switched to investment in silver dollar bonds. In 1931, the trustees appointed City Bank in Shanghai as the transfer agent for the Foundation's silver dollar securities.[40] In 1932, the U.S. dollar weakened but at the beginning of that year, the special financial advisory committee had taken advantage of what was then a good exchange rate to sell large amounts of U.S. dollar securities and convert the proceeds into silver dollars at a rate of US$1 = S$4.60. This boosted the Foundation's silver dollar investments while reducing its gold dollar (US$) investments.[41] In this new situation, the Foundation was forced to adjust its investment policy. In February 1934, the board not only confirmed the actions of the special financial advisory committee but also fully authorized that committee to decide on the balance between gold and silver dollar investments in line with world markets.[42] In 1936, the board disbanded the special financial advisory committee in Shanghai and enhanced the functions of the finance committee. This latter drafted a plan for the allocation of domestic and foreign currency investments.[43] In addition, the Foundation was under pressure from the Chinese government to invest more in Chinese enterprises. For example, in 1926 at the fourth joint conference of the Boxer indemnity administrations, the government asked the Foundation to purchase more Railway Construction Bonds, shares in a sulfuric acid factory, and other domestic securities, all of which were issued by state-owned companies.[44] The finance committee

was forced to comply to a certain extent at least. The member who attended the conference reported to the board that he had commented that "according to our finance committee, the purchase of bonds issued by newly organized companies is against our existing investment policy."[45] For these two reasons, the proportion of the Foundation's investments denominated in Chinese currency increased rapidly from less than 10 percent to 30 percent and then to 60 percent. Later, when the U.S. dollar exchange rate stabilized and the value of silver dropped, the Foundation sought to reduce its foreign exchange losses by increasing the proportion of its foreign currency denominated investments and requested that payments of the remission be made by the Customs Service in U.S. dollars. Table 2-6 shows the changes in foreign currency and domestic currency denominated investments.

The main part of the Foundation's investment was in bonds, but its assets also included bank deposits and the interest accruing from them, real estate and equipment, and deferred assets (special deposits, prepaid expenses, donations, and other miscellaneous income). Its total assets were valued at CN$12,874,902 in June 1937. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, interest payments on domestic bonds stopped almost completely, but due to a rise in the value of the U.S. dollar, the total assets of the Foundation continued to grow year on year (see table 2-7).

When remission payments stopped in 1939, the Foundation became short of revenue to pay its expenses. However, its constitution barred the trustees from using the endowment fund for this purpose. In addition to making use of income from

investments, the Foundation was forced to resort to borrowing from the Chinese government. Each year, the Ministry of Finance used the remission payments owed by the government as collateral for bank loans, with 35 percent of these loans coming from the Central Bank of China, 35 percent from the Bank of China, 25 percent from the Bank of Communications, and 10 percent from the Farmers Bank of China.[46] The annual amounts borrowed (denominated in CN$) are listed below.[47]

1939	1,540,000
1940	660,000
1941	1,800,000
1942	3,000,000
1943	4,050,000
1944	5,265,000
Total	CN$16, 315,000

Table 2-6: Investment in Securities by the China Foundation

Year	Silver Dollar Securities	%	Foreign Currency Securities	%	Total
1925[a]			2,565,063	100	2,565,063
1925	?		?		3,247,676
1926	284,286	7.4	3,555,514	92.6	3,839,800
1927	416,575	8.2	4,652,546	91.8	5,069,121
1928	514,641	8.4	5,585,737	91.6	6,100,378
1929	603,019	7.5	7,460,124	92.5	8,063,143
1930	835,238	7.7	10,013,369	92.3	10,848,607
1931	909,230	9.7	8,427,270	90.3	9,336,500
1932	2,220,854	34.4	4,233,367	65.6	6,454,221
1933	2,442,722	46.1	2,854,645	53.9	5,297,367
1934	3,759,953	60.5	2,458,205	39.5	6,218,158

Year	Silver Dollar Securities	%	Foreign Currency Securities	%	Total
1935	4,033,994	50.3	3,978,071	49.7	8,012,065
1936	4,131,406	49.6	4,202,248	50.4	8,333,654
1937	5,219,046	43.0	6,930,486	57.0	12,149,532
1938	5,829,610	36.7	10,046,673	63.3	15,876,283
1939	5,781,442	21.8	20,738,116	78.2	26,519,558

(a)Year end

Table 2-7: Assets of the China Foundation

Unit: Silver $ (CN$)

Year	Securities	Other Assets	Payments Owed by Government	Total
1925	3,247,674	478,950		3,726,624
1926	3,839,800	1,176,618		5,016,418
1927	5,069,121	601,876		5,670,997
1928	6,100,378	685,311		6,785,689
1929	8,063,143	445,909		8,509,052
1930	10,848,607	1,103,296		11,951,903
1931	9,336,500	787,160		10,123,660
1932	6,454,221	2,170,491	2,944,462	11,569,174
1933	5,297,367	2,264,189	2,549,984	10,111,540
1934	6,218,158	1,629,916	2,442,209	10,290,283
1935	8,012,065	1,277,712	2,880,042	12,169,819
1936	8,333,654	1,727,528	2,813,720	12,874,902
1937	12,149,532	1,631,678	3,616,407	17,397,617
1938	15,867,283	1,106,539	3,616,407	20,590,229
1939	26,519,558	2,418,774	3,616,407	32,554,739

By the end of the Sino-Japanese War, although the Foundation's investments were still intact, their value had plummeted due to hyper-inflation.[48] As a result, it was financially in an even worse situation than it had been during the hostilities. After the loss of mainland China, all its investments denominated in the domestic currency became worthless. At the end of 1949, the Foundation could only manage to transfer from Hong Kong to New York securities denominated in U.S. dollars, and a much smaller amount in pounds sterling, totaling US$1,166,582 in book value and US$1,276,078 in market value.[49]

IV. The Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund and other Funds in the Permanent Custody of the China Foundation

The original purpose of the China Foundation was to receive and manage the second remission of the Boxer indemnity from the United States. Having proved itself a capable manager, it was entrusted with the management of other endowments, such as the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology Endowment Fund and the Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library Endowment Fund. The largest of these was the Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund, or Tsing Hua Fund.

1. The Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund

The source of the Tsing Hua Fund was the first remission by the U.S. government of the overpaid Boxer indemnity, a sum of more than US$28 million, to be repaid in monthly installments over thirty-two years, from 1909 to 1940. The major purposes of the fund were to establish Tsing Hua School and to send students to study in the United States. At first, the fund had neither a budget nor a specific management office. It was not until 1917 that the U.S.

minister to China, together with the Chinese minister and vice-minister of foreign affairs, formed the three-man Tsing Hua Fund Committee to organize a board for the endowment fund, appoint its members, and draft its constitution. The board's job was to keep an eye on how the funds were used in order to safeguard the assets of the endowment.[50] In 1928, the U.S. ambassador to Peking instructed the U.S. consul in Nanking to convene a meeting with the board of trustees of the Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund along with the ministers of education and foreign affairs of the Nanking government. The board decided to place the Tsing Hua Fund in the custody of the China Foundation on a permanent basis. Later, Chiang Monlin, the minister of education, wrote to the China Foundation formally proposing this course of action. At its fifth meeting in 1929, the board of the China Foundation agreed to this proposal and consented to be the custodian of the Tsing Hua Fund.

In August 1929, the China Foundation drew up the "Rules Governing Custody of the Monthly Remissions for Tsing Hua University" and the "Rules Relating to the Permanent Custody of the Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund." These stipulated that the income and the endowment should be placed into separate accounts. The former was to be used to manage payments of the remission. The China Foundation made monthly payments according to the budget of Tsing Hua University as approved by the MOE to cover the university's expenditures and the expenses of students sent to study in the United States. From 1929 to 1931, the monthly remission payments were used to support students in the United States, while the balance was paid to Tsing Hua University.

From 1932 to 1940, after paying out CN$1,200,000 for the upkeep of the students plus the budget of Tsing Hua University, the remainder of the remission payments was used to pay the principal and interest owed by Tsing Hua University to the Tsing Hua Fund, with the residue being ploughed back into the endowment.[51] The annual income for the years before the payments stopped in 1939 is listed in table 2-8. The average annual income was CN$3.8 million and the payments to Tsing Hua University and students in the United States amounted to between one and three million dollars in local currency (see table 2-9). Any balance remaining was used to repay the university's loan from the Tsing Hua Fund. The loan was repaid in the period 1933-34, and from then on, a surplus of about one million dollars was added to the endowment every year.

The major difference between the Tsing Hua Fund and the China Foundation Fund was the stipulation that the principal and income of the former could not be used during the period of the indemnity payments.[52] At the expiration of the said payments, income was only available for the maintenance of National Tsing Hua University. With the investment income ploughed back into the endowment, more money could be used for investment. When the China Foundation formally accepted custody of the Tsing Hua Fund in August 1929, its assets were classified into three categories:

1. Available funds, including fixed deposits with banks and marketable securities
2. Receivable funds, i.e. the loans made to Tsing Hua

University by the board of trustees of the Tsing Hua Endowment Fund, to be repaid in the future

3. Reserve funds of indeterminate value, including all fixed deposits which were overdue and not repaid, and securities having no market value.

The amounts were:[53]

	Book Value	Estimated Value
1.	6,177,621.61	5,899,735.05
2.	-	1,847,962.97
3.	1,043,233.13	858,664.70
Total		8,606,362.72

Table 2-8: Regular Income of the Tsing Hua Endowment Fund

Unit: Silver Dollars (CN$)

Year	Income from the Remission	Other Income[a]	Total
1929	1,984,940	49,501	2,034,441
1930	3,176,517	6,582	3,183,099
1931	2,957,258	195,241	3,152,499
1932	553,302[b]	140,876	694,179
1933	5,289,271	67,376	5,356,647
1934	3,806.972	192,466	3,999,438
1935	4,613,952	15,310	4,629,261
1936	4,634,327	20,085	4,654,412
1937[c]	6,004,644	699	6,005,343
1938[d]	4,555,247	280	4,555,527
Total	37,576,430	688,416	38,264,846

(a) Includes surplus from past years, income from interest, foreign exchange gains, and miscellaneous income.
(b) Payment of the remission was delayed for one year in 1932.
(c) Silver dollars and U.S. dollars were booked separately. Income from the payment of the remission was US$1,380,378, converted into silver dollars at the average rate for the year (US$1 = CN$4.35). This amounted to about CN$6,004,644.
(d) Payment of the remission was stopped in January 1938. Only six monthly installments were made of US$690,189. The average rate of 6.60 was used for conversion. The converted amount was CN$4,555,247.

Table 2-9: Major Regular Expenditure of Tsing Hua University

Year	Tsing Hua Budget	Students in U.S. Budget[a]	Payment of Tsing Hua Loan	Ploughed Back to Endowment	Total
1929	909,072	1,120,176			2,029,252
1930	1,654,800	1,335,904			2,990,704
1931	1,843,737	1,171,575			3,015,312
1932	1,065,134[b]	573,096			1,683,230
1933	2,888,578[c]	502,065	1,775,128		5,165,771
1934	1,594,360[d]	248,505	911,887	1,232,069	3,986,321
1935	1,300,000	616,224		2,511,095	4,427,319
1936	1,200,000	580,800		2,856,527	4,637,327
1937 [e]	1,200,000	516,080		3,803,945	5,520,025
1938 [f]	600,000	400,396		3,797,996	4,798,392

(a) Before 1932, payments for students in the U.S. were given to the Supervising Department for Students Studying in the U.S. From 1933 this budget included remittances to the China Institute in America for supporting students in the U.S. as well as the travel and living expenses of Tsing Hua professors on sabbatical leave.
(b) Payment of the remission was delayed this year and the government made a loan of CN$1 million.
(c) This represented the total regular budget of CN$2,322,478 and delayed payment of $566,100 for the previous year.
(d) This represented the total of current budget $1,300,000 and delayed payment of $294,360 for the previous year.
(e) CN$ and US$ were booked separately. Budget for students in U.S. was US$118,639 (US$1=CN$4.35), Tsing Hua University budget was US$330,644 (indicated in the book as CN$1,200,000). The plough-back to the endowment was US$874,470 at an average exchange rate of US$1 = CN$4.35.
(f) Budget for Tsing Hua University was US$99,719, budget for students in the U.S. was US$60,666, and plough-back was US$575,454. The latter two items were converted at an average rate of US$1 = CN$6.60.

Table 2-10: Main Assets of the Tsing Hua Endowment Fund

Unit: Silver Dollars (CN$)

Year	Securities	Deposit & Others [a]	Loans to Tsing Hua University	Assets of Undetermined Value
1929	3,837,487	2,611,459	1,995,433	858,665
1930	6,072,657	1,903,281	2,155,068	7,000
1931	6,689,663	1,466,777	2,327,437	7,000
1932	6,000,901	1,755,087	2,513,671	7,000
1933	7,572,942	2,016,216	889,194	7,000
1934	8,990,514	3,498,264		5,000
1935	13,467,000	3,172,131		7
1936	17,215,308	3,712,703		2,007
1937	28,240,266	3,144,766		2,007
1938	42,299,157	2,738,089		7
1939	73,663,800	5,452,844		7

(a) Included bank deposits and cash, real estate trust deposits, mortgaged loans, loans to Tsing Hua University and the China Foundation.

Fixed term bank deposits accounted for the largest share, 68 percent, of the available funds. The China Foundation did not consider this a prudent arrangement. When they matured, the Foundation converted half of the deposits into domestic and international blue-chip securities, those denominated in gold dollars, i.e., U.S. dollars, in particular. The Foundation negotiated better interest rates for the rest. As a consequence, the value of the Tsing Hua Fund's assets increased over the years (see table 2-10). In June 1940, the total assets reached CN$79,116,651, a nine-fold increase over the value at the time when the fund was placed in the care of the China Foundation in 1929.

In its early years, the Tsing Hua Fund adopted a "three silver, one gold" diversified investment strategy. As a result, its losses were not as great as those of the China Foundation when the value of the U.S. dollar fell in 1932-33.[54] But as the domestic situation became more unstable, the Tsing Hua Fund gradually increased its U.S. dollar investments again. In June 1940, its foreign investments amounted to over 80 percent of its total investments (see table 2-11), and investment in securities was ten times greater than that in bank deposits. As for the receivable funds, i.e., loans to Tsing Hua University, the China Foundation adroitly used the surplus from payments of the remission to pay off the outstanding loans.

Finally, in 1934, the China Foundation cleared all of Tsing Hua University's outstanding loans. The assets of undetermined value were also sorted out. This proves that the diversified investment policy adopted by the China Foundation for the Tsing Hua Fund was an improvement on the concentrated investment policy adopted by the Tsing Hua Endowment's own board.

The upward trend in assets was interrupted during the latter stages of the Sino-Japanese War when remission payments stopped and domestic investments lost their value. By the end of 1947, the remaining assets were as follows:[55]

	CN$	US$	Pounds Sterling
Securities	19,127,091	4,030,286	5,938-14-6
Loan to Tsing Hua	2,981,978	243,705	
Bank Deposits	5,780,985	50,095	380-16-8
Undetermined Value	5		
Total	27,890,059	4,324,086	6,319-11-2

At the end of 1949 when the Nationalist government was forced to withdraw from the mainland, the assets had a book value of US$4,098,646 and a market value of US$4,553,868.[56]

Table 2-11: Major Investments of the Tsing Hua Endowment Fund

Unit: Silver $ (CN$)

Year	Local Currency Securities	%	Foreign Currency Securities	%	Total
1929	1,886,909	49.2%	1,950,578	50.8%	3,837,487
1930	2,625,747	43.2%	3,446,910	56.8%	6,072,657
1931	3,637,989	54.4%	3,051,674	45.6%	6,689,663
1932	3,944,039	65.7%	2,056,862	34.3%	6,000,901
1933	5,972,930	78.9%	1,600,012	21.1%	7,572,942
1934	7,166,597	79.7%	1,823,917	20.3%	8,990,514
1935	8,039,350	59.7%	5,427,650	40.3%	13,467,000
1936	8,562,831	49.7%	8,652,477	50.3%	17,215,308
1937	10,832,803	38.4%	17,407,463	61.6%	28,240,266
1938	13,051,922	30.9%	29,247,235	69.1%	42,299,157
1939	13,562,680	18.4%	60,101,120	81.6%	73,663,800

2. The Fan Memorial Institute of Biology Endowment Fund

Fan Yuan-lien, also called Fan Ching-sen, was born in Hsiang-yin, Hunan Province. After returning to China from Japan, where he studied biology, he was appointed deputy administrator of the Tsing Hua School. He later became minister of education and president of the National Normal University, Peking. Fan was

the first director and a trustee of the China Foundation. He was also a member of the Hsiang-chih Research Society. In his spare time, he carried out research in the natural sciences. When he died in December 1927, Fan left a collection of books and plant specimens, and his friends provided CN$150,000 from the Hsiang-chih Research Society, proposing that this be entrusted to the China Foundation to fund the establishment of a Fan Memorial Institute of Biology. This proposal was accepted by the Foundation's board at its fourth annual meeting in June 1928, and the Institute was established on October 1 with Ping Chih as director and six researcher fellows, including H. H. Hu and Shou Cheng-huan.[57]

The Fan Memorial Institute of Biology Endowment Fund (referred to hereafter as the Fan Memorial Fund) chiefly consisted of silver dollar denominated securities, mostly China Unification Bonds. It later invested in some foreign currency securities. The investment income was used to pay interest on the sum put forward by the Hsiang-chih Research Society, which amounted to CN$15,500 in the first four years, and to pay investment fees, commission, and other miscellaneous expenses such as foreign exchange losses.[58] The surplus was ploughed back into the fund. When the China Foundation first accepted responsibility for the Fan Memorial Fund, it was stipulated that the running costs of the Fan Memorial Institute would be borne fully by the China Foundation only until the accumulated surplus reached CN$300,000.[59] The income and expenditure of the fund before the war (denominated in CN$) was as follows:[60]

Year	Income	Expenditure	Assets
1929	25,408	13,773	180,374
1930	25,431	13,741	192,048
1931	14,651	13,787	202,745
1932	15,078	231	212,204
1933	16,422	280	230,455
1934	18,354	380	250,550
1935	19,965	361	270,845
1936	21,260	352	284,499

Because the fund's annual income varied between ten and twenty thousand dollars, the endowment never reached the stipulated CN$300,000, so the China Foundation remained responsible for the Institute's entire budget (denominated in CN$) as follows:

1930	30,000
1931	40,000
1932	54,000
1933	54,000
1934	66,000
1935	82,000
1936	89,000
1937	94,000

These sums do not include the cost of running the Lushan Botanical Garden and Arboretum, which was jointly operated by the Fan Memorial Institute and Kiangsi Agricultural College, or other miscellaneous research grants. It was difficult to keep the Institute going with such paltry funds.

After the end of the war, the China Foundation was still responsible for maintaining the Institute, but the value of the endowment's silver dollar investments increased significantly due to inflation. At the end of 1947, the assets were as follows:[61]

	US$	Silver $
Securities	22,935	132,109
Fixed Deposits		20,000
Bank Deposits	692	1,454,447
Total	23,627	1,606,556

After the loss of mainland China, all the local currency investments disappeared into thin air, and by the end of 1949, only the U.S. dollar investments with a market value of US$24,539 remained.[62]

3. The Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library Endowment Fund

The Chinese Social and Political Science Association was founded in 1916. Its purposes were: (1) the encouragement of the scientific study of law, politics, sociology, economics, and administration; and (2) the promotion of fellowship among people with similar interests. The association's honorary chairman, Lu Cheng-hsiang, a former minister of foreign affairs, proposed to the then U.S. minister to China, Paul S. Reinsch, that 100,000 taels of silver from the Boxer indemnity be used to set up a fund to finance

a library. With Reinsch's approval, the fund was established on June 17, 1918.[63]

In 1931, the association proposed to hand over management of the fund to the China Foundation. At its seventh annual meeting, the China Foundation accepted this proposal and drew up a cooperation plan specifying that, "the proceeds from investment of the said Endowment Fund, viz., the original sum of Tls.100,000 and the accrued balance as per statement of account attached, which Fund shall remain the permanent property of the Library, shall be used entirely for the benefit of the Library, the Association and its publications." It further specified that "the annual budget of expenses must not exceed the annual income of the Endowment."[64]

After the endowment was handed over to the China Foundation, the value of its mostly foreign currency investments plummeted as a result of the global recession. For example, in 1931, the book value of its U.S. dollar investments was US$53,468, while their market value was US$42,899, a drop of 10 percent, while the value of its local currency investments dropped 11 percent, from a book value of CN$82,854 to a market value of CN$71,762.[65] The annual income from the investments was paid in full to the association and therefore there was no plough-back into the endowment. Annual changes in the income, expenses, and asset values were not significant. The following is a brief list:

Year	Income		Expenses		Assets
	US$	CN$	US$	CN$	CN$
1931	2,240	7,627	1,854	6,940	368,251
1932	4,512	6,926	3,700	8,140	304,099
1933	4,320	6,654	3,066	6,465	263,157
1934	5,205	7,284	3,904	6,994	250,074
1935	4,168	6,898	2,987	5,730	303,253
1936	7,154	11,780	5,037	8,847	312,016

There is no information concerning the operations of the fund during the war. At the end of 1947, its total assets amounted to US$76,463, CN$3,066,150 and £78, with a market value of US$80,325 which was higher than the book value.[66] The market value of its U.S. dollar investments was US$83,275 at the end of 1949.[67]

4. Mrs. Fan Biological Fellowship Endowment Fund and the Ting Ven Kiang Memorial Endowment Fund

In 1929, Ray Fan, a brother of Fan Yuan-lien, entrusted the China Foundation with the management of the Mrs. Fan Biological Fellowship Endowment Fund, consisting of CN$10,000 worth of shares in the King Chen Bank. The fund's annual income of approximately $900 was used for two prizes, the candidates for which were nominated by the Science Society of China and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology. After the fall of mainland China the fund ceased to generate income.

After the death of V. K. Ting in January 1936, his friends contributed to a memorial fund which in 1937, when it was handed over to the China Foundation, totaled $45,745, with $43,935 in principal and $1,810 in interest. The terms of the agreement were

that from July 1, 1938, onward, the fund's net income should be paid to the Geological Society of China.[68] In 1946, with inflation having been rampant during the war and the China Foundation struggling for its own survival, management of these assets was handed back to the Geological Society.

From an overall perspective, the funds entrusted to the China Foundation were well managed. The Foundation's conservative investment policies ensured that the assets grew steadily. Indeed, some of the funds still yielded a small amount of income that was used to support educational institutions in Taiwan. For example, income from the Fan Memorial Fund was used to subsidize the Institute of Botany, Academia Sinica, while income from the endowment of the Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library has been used to support the publications and other research activities of the Institute of the International Relations. Among these funds, the Tsing Hua Fund has been particularly successful, and its assets and income are far larger than those of the China Foundation itself. Even taking into account the heavy losses suffered in 1949, the remaining income-producing U.S. dollar assets are worth about three times as much as those of the China Foundation endowment fund. The successful reestablishment of Tsing Hua University in Taiwan was due mostly to the efficient management of the Tsing Hua Fund by the China Foundation.

Chapter 3: The Policies and Activities of the China Foundation

I. Policies and Guidelines

The guiding principle for the use of the first remission of the Boxer indemnity from the United States was to support one or two projects rather than spread the funds thinly over a wide area of activities. Therefore, the funds were used solely for setting up the Tsing Hua School and for sending students to study in the United States. The question was, what should be done with the second remission? Should the grants be concentrated on a few projects or spread over many? What should be included as "cultural activities"? Should there be a "bottom-up" approach to promoting education (i.e., support for middle schools and rural education) or a "top-down" one (support for universities and research institutes)? Should the emphasis be on "pure science" or "applied sciences"? These questions were repeatedly raised in discussions among the Chinese and American trustees in the early years of the Foundation.

On September 18, 1924, when the Foundation held its inaugural meeting, the trustees asked Monroe for his opinion. Monroe first of all stressed that the administrative policies and the way the funds from the second remission were to be used should be decided solely by the board, and there were no strings attached as far as the U.S. government was concerned. Since the funds of the second remission had come from the Chinese people,

it should be used for the Chinese people. There were four things he thought that the funds should not be used for: (1) maintaining educational activities presently being handled by the government; (2) subsidizing short-lived organizations with no prospects of long-term survival; (3) establishing educational institutes in competition with existing ones; and (4) expanding existing schools. Faced with China's urgent need for rapid industrialization, the Foundation should not, as a priority, pour cash into abstract research into pure science. It was more important to promote applied knowledge of agriculture, industry, and health that would be unique to China than to study Einstein's theory of relativity or the structure of atoms. Therefore, Munroe proposed that the second remission be used for promoting the following activities: (1) experiments in rural education; (2) developing the capacity of teachers as a way of indirectly improving science education in middle schools; and (3) establishing a first-rate institute of technology as a role model for science education across the nation.[1]

The trustees agreed with Monroe's ideas on what the Foundation should not undertake, but his opinions concerning what it should do were the subject of much disagreement. Although the American trustees fully supported the need for rural education, they had different ideas on how to approach it. For example, Greene believed that it could only be done on a small scale based on existing schools. Any large undertaking by the Foundation would quickly exhaust its resources. Baker, Bennett, and Dewey believed that vocational or craft education was as important as rural education.[2] As for improving science education, they had no doubt about its importance but disagreed on the question of

whether pure or applied science should be given priority.

Dewey adopted a fairly "moderate" view. He had no objection to innovative bottom-up approaches such as rural and vocational education, but he did not support the promotion of either pure or applied sciences, nor did he support the promotion of science education or scientific research in Chinese universities. Greene was especially opposed to Monroe's proposal to establish an institute of technology. He had personally asked for information relating to expenditure and administrative matters from such institutions as MIT, the engineering schools at Washington and Cornell universities, and the engineering department of Pennsylvania State University. His conclusion was that the funds needed for a high-quality institute of technology were far beyond the resources of the China Foundation. He agreed with Monroe as to the importance of reforming science education, but he believed that in addition to science teaching, attention should be paid to scientific research. He acknowledged that China was not ready for research institutes, but at least its professors should be encouraged to carry out research alongside teaching. His reasons were twofold: (1) unless faculties developed the spirit of research, the development of science would not be dynamic; and (2) before China could efficiently utilize universal knowledge, it must first research its own unique knowledge.[3]

The Chinese trustees seemed to pay no attention to Monroe's proposals. At the request of Monroe, Secretary Tsur wrote to all the trustees asking for their advice. Disappointingly, only the five American trustees produced written reports. However, before the

establishment of the Foundation, V. K. Ting had written to Hu Shih, Chiang Monlin, and Greene expressing his views about how the remission should be used. He believed that the money should be used to support scientific research as well as science education, as research would also have the effect of enhancing science education. In order to economize, the funds should not be used to establish new institutes but should be employed to tide over the difficulties of existing institutes, and since the Geological Society of China was engaged in both theoretical and practical research, it was precisely the sort of institution that should be supported.[4]

The China Foundation was a pioneer in its field in China, so there were no other similar educational endowments that it could emulate. The experience of similar foundations in the United States was not necessarily applicable to China. Consequently the trustees were reluctant to lay down rigid rules at this early stage which might prevent them from making future adjustments through experience. Therefore, at the first annual meeting in June 1925 there were not much discussion of detailed grant policies. Instead, the mission of the China Foundation was spelt out in general terms as follows:

> [It is] resolved that the funds from remitted portion of the Indemnity due to the U.S.A. to be entrusted to the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture should be devoted to the development of scientific knowledge and to the application of such knowledge to the conditions in China, through the promotion of technical training, of scientific research, experimentation and demonstration and training in science teaching, and to the advancement of cultural enterprises of a permanent character, such as libraries and the like.[5]

At this meeting a set of six principles for distributing grants was approved. No distinction was to be drawn between government and private institutions, and priority was to be given to institutes that admitted students from all over China, or which contributed to knowledge that would benefit the entire Chinese people. Apart from that, the most important principles were the first and second ones as follows:

1. That in general the board will grant to existing institutions with a record of efficient service and administration rather than to newly founded institutions which base their applications solely on future projects.
2. That preference will be given to those enterprises which may be stimulated to additional efforts by grants from the board, and which may be helped to secure additional support from other sources.[6]

It is clear from these principles that the Foundation's overarching policy was to develop scientific knowledge and its application, and to promote lasting cultural enterprises, such as libraries. Also, the emphasis was to be on "subsidizing," not "fully supporting," educational and cultural enterprises.

Even before the China Foundation was established, requests for grants had been pouring in from all sides. From the time of its establishment up to February 1926, the Foundation received 107

requests for grants. These requests came from universities, middle schools, research societies, and permanent cultural institutions such as museums and libraries. They included academic research institutes of all kinds, and educational institutions in the fields of agriculture, industry, commerce, medicine, religion, and art. These were located in ten different cities and provinces, including Peking, Kiangsu, and Hunan. There was even one application from overseas. The total amount requested, excluding those applications that did not mention a specific amount, came to $21,700,201. One applicant even asked for the total amount of the indemnity fund.[7] After it received the requests, the Foundation sent out a team of experts accompanied by a staff member of the secretariat to carry out on-the-spot investigations of all applicants. These experts then submitted reports that were presented to the board for discussion.

After Fan Yuan-lien became the first director of the Foundation, he appointed H. C. Zen as special secretary to assist him in handling the grant applications and formulating the funding plans. Twenty-seven experts were hired as follows[8]:

Chemistry: W. H. Adolph, Professor of Chemistry, Shantung Christian University, Tientsin
C. L. Wu, Professor, Technical University, Peking
S. D. Wilson, Professor of Chemistry, Yenching University, Peking

Physics: John Y. Lee, former Instructor, University of Chicago
Y. C. Mei, Professor of Physics, Tsing Hua College, Peking
C. T. Kwei, Professor of Physics, Hsiang-Ya Medical College

Biology: N. Gist Gee, Advisor, Pre-medical Education, China Medical Board, Peking
Alice M. Boring, Professor of Biology, Yenching University, Peking
C. S. Chien, Professor, Tsing Hua College, Peking

Geology: George Barbour, Professor of Geology, Yenching University, Peking

Engineering: H. H. Arnold, General Manager, Arnold-White Corporation, former Chief Engineer, Anderson, Meyer & Co.
Roy L. Creighton, Mission Architects Bureau
W. T. Cheng, Chief Engineer, Lung Yen Iron Mining Administration, Peking

Agriculture: H. H. Love, Professor, College of Agriculture, Cornell University
R. Feng, former Professor of Agriculture, National Southeastern University, Nanking

Medicine: R. S. Greene, Director, China Medical Board, the Rockefeller Foundation
K. S. Lim, Head of Department of Physiology, Peking Union Medical College, Peking

Fine Arts: C. Cheng, former President, Fine Arts College, Peking.

Vocational Education: S. M. Dean, former Head of Manual Training Department, Higher Normal School, Peking

Psychology: Y. Tang, former Professor, National University of Peking.

Education: King Chu, former Professor of History and Education, National University of Peking
C. H. Li, former President, Higher Normal School, Peking
L. C. Cha, Professor of Education, National Normal University, Peking
Ling Ping, former Dean, Nankai University, Tientsin
C. P. Chen, Professor of Education, Southeastern University
C. E. Liu, Educational Secretary, YMCA National Committee, Shanghai
Chu Mao Chen, Educational Secretary, YMCA National Committee, Shanghai

These experts travelled throughout China visiting schools and other organizations which had requested grants. Due to a shortage of personnel and the communications difficulties caused by the general political unrest, their inspections were limited to

only seventy-eight institutions in twelve cities, including Peking, Shanghai, Changsha, Tientsin, and Nanking. Some major cities, such as Canton, Chengdu, and Shenyang, were bypassed. Faced with such a large number of requests from such a wide variety of institutions, the Foundation found that the principles decided at the June 1925 board meeting were too vague. The office of the director, in addition to presenting the experts' assessment reports, had to draft specific grant principles and plans.

The fields of education and culture covered a wide spectrum. Even if the grants had been limited to science, the scope was still too wide. In an effort to narrow the scope of the Foundation's activities, the director and the secretariat drafted six supplementary principles:

1. Scientific research: This was to cover physics, chemistry, biology, geology, astronomy, and meteorology
2. Applied sciences: To include agriculture, engineering, and medicine
3. Scientific education: To cover science teaching and the scientific study of education

As for cultural enterprises, for the time being these would be confined to libraries, although projects of national significance having both educational and cultural value might be included. For all applicants, "the ability of that institution to secure a part of total funds required for the proposed improvement will be regarded as a factor of prime importance, in addition to its past accomplishment and its ability to maintain its present working conditions." Each

grant was limited to three years. No consideration was to be given to applicants seeking to use the grant to establish an endowment.[9] With these explicit guidelines, the office of the director was able to map out a plan of operation.

As for science education, the Foundation's science education advisory committee reported that "according to our investigation, we firmly believe that the development of science teachers should be the major focus for the plans to promote science education." [10] With this emphasis in mind, the secretariat drafted a plan to establish science professorships in normal colleges designated by the Ministry of Education. The Foundation recruited thirty-five professors and paid their salaries. These professors were to teach physics, chemistry, zoology, biology, and educational psychology in universities with departments training high school teachers and normal colleges in Peking, Nanking, Canton, Chengtu, Wuchang, and Liaoyang. The schools in which these professorships were established were to use the funds saved by the grants to purchase apparatus and improve their equipment. In addition, these schools were to take responsibility for improving science teaching in high schools and middle and primary schools affiliated to normal colleges in their school districts. The China Foundation also intended to subsidize the summer research seminars for science teachers run by, among others, the Science Society of China to encourage science teachers to improve their knowledge. In addition to measures for improving teaching techniques in middle schools, the Foundation intended to improve middle school science teaching by subsidizing the upgrading of scientific apparatus in selected well-run middle schools.

To promote scientific research, the Foundation intended to establish professorships in science in well-equipped and well-staffed universities. The Foundation was to recruit prominent scientists as chair professors to plan and guide research projects, and was to provide grants for the acquisition of equipment. To train and encourage researchers, the Foundation intended to provide annual research grants and prizes for college graduates with research potential. The grants were to be given annually to help them carry out further research under the guidance of the research professors. The prizes were awarded to graduate students who had made outstanding research contributions. The Foundation also considered extending its support to well-established and sizeable scientific organizations with a promising future.

Due to the subject's wide scope and need for large resources, grants for the applied sciences were limited to agriculture, engineering, and medicine, to avoid spreading funds too thinly. The Foundation also emphasized grants for on-the-job training. As well as subsidizing Chinese engineering students receiving practical training in U.S. factories, the Foundation promoted apprenticeships in Shanghai and supported the establishment of extension schools for apprentices.

In terms of cultural organizations, the board decided at its first annual meeting to start by establishing libraries. The trustees believed that Peking, as the nation's capital with large population of students and academics, was in need of a large-scale library for the efficient dissemination of knowledge. The Metropolitan Library operated by the Ministry of Education (MOE) had a large

collection of Chinese books, especially precious out-of-print ones, but it was located too far from the city center and the building was dilapidated. If the MOE and the China Foundation could manage the library jointly, they could improve its attractiveness. The proposed cooperation plan was approved by the executive committee of the China Foundation in September 1925. The Metropolitan Library was to become the National Library of Peiping, under the joint management of the MOE and the China Foundation. The agreement between the two parties stipulated that a library management committee be set up, composed of people from the ministry and the Foundation. The committee was to nominate a chief librarian and deputy chief librarian and these appointments were to be approved by the MOE. The China Foundation was to provide a total of one million dollars for construction, equipment, and books, to be paid over four years. Payment of the library's monthly maintenance expenses of five thousand dollars was to be shared equally between the MOE and the China Foundation. However, due to the vicissitudes of the political situation, the ministry was unable to fulfill its obligations, so the Foundation approached the MOE with a view to taking over the project completely. A site of about 6.6 acres was selected at the racecourse west of Pei-hai Park, and all the library's running expenses were borne by the Foundation. The Foundation intended to establish a professorship in library studies at the Boone Library School, Boone University, Wuchang. This was the only school of its kind in China and it was headed by none other than the Ms. M. E. Wood mentioned above. The Foundation also recruited specialists to teach the cataloguing of Chinese books. The Foundation's directorate entrusted Boone University with the task of training

librarians for the whole of China, and it provided grants to support Chinese students of library studies across the nation.

When the Foundation's grant policies and the list of grant recipients were announced, there was an unexpected storm of criticism from those in educational circles. In April 1926, the joint committee of the national education societies set up to monitor the usage of the remission wrote to the China Foundation harshly criticizing the "so-called inspections by experts from the China Foundation, the so-called selection of outstanding [institutions], so-called closed-door meetings in order to avoid undue influence, and so-called limited resources to be distributed among countless applicants." "These are nothing but excuses," the letter maintained, "it doesn't smell right!" The letter raised many questions concerning the nature of the grant recipients, compliance with the Foundation's grant policies, and the regional distribution of the grants. The chief accusations were as follows:

> The board made decisions concerning which schools and bodies to subsidize that went against your own requirements. You gave grants to some schools that do not fully meet your policies, while rejecting others that were similar. Therefore, there were rumors outside that all the grant recipients are related directly or indirectly to your trustees. For example, Chiang Monlin has connections with Peking University; Chang Po-ling with Nankai University and Nankai Middle Schools; Fan Yuan-lien has links with Hsiang-Ya Medical College, Minteh Middle School, and Tso Yee School; Hu Dun-fu has links with Datung University and Datung Women's

> University; V. K. Ting is connected with the Science Society of China and the Geological Research Institute; and Huang Yen-pei has links with Futan University, Southeastern University and the Vocational Education Society of China. … Are these rumors true or not? With the above in mind, how do the trustees of your Foundation intend to dispel these suspicions?[11]

The Foundation's grant policies were also criticized by the Boxer Indemnity Remission Board of the Joint National Committee of the Educational Societies of China. This body thought that the China Foundation had tailored its rules to suit its preferred candidates. Furthermore, it said:

> Regarding the principles, what the so-called achievements and effectiveness were based on is not clear to us. Despite being called the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, you have only supported well-developed regions rather than the whole nation. Furthermore, the grants are based merely on the trustees' whims. This is only a flimsy excuse for the trustees or members of staff of the Foundation to exercise power over the grants at will. This is not justified. …You care only about particular regions, not national needs. You use only empty excuses to hide your selfish wishes. This fact cannot be covered up.[12]

Faced with such doubts and criticisms, the Foundation responded with letters explaining its policies and standards for issuing grants. To those organizations that did not receive support

in the first round, the Foundation promised that since it was a permanent fund, they would be taken into consideration for future grants, "Given time, they will have a chance to receive grants." As to outside criticism of conflicts of interest between the trustees and the grant recipients, the Foundation replied as follows:

> The grants given by the Foundation are unprecedented. Therefore, before the truth is revealed, baseless rumors are unavoidable. But so-called indirect relationships are easy to identify subjectively. As for applicants that have direct connections with our trustees, according to our regulations those trustees have to withdraw from the meeting when such applications are being discussed and voted upon. The decisions were based purely on the evaluation of the organizations. This Foundation neither gives special favors to organizations directly connected with our trustees, nor does it reject their requests solely because of such a connection.[13]

Anyhow, the Foundation asserted that because of restrictions imposed by its constitution and on account of other practical considerations, its status was different from that of the ordinary educational societies. It was only to be expected that it would not be able to please everybody. As China's national territory was so vast and its regions so diverse, while academic study in the country was still in its infancy, the way forward was to "determine the policy first and allow progress to percolate downwards gradually."

On the insistence of the board, the above policies and principles were laid down for the Foundation to follow in the

future. But the actual scope of the Foundation's activities gradually widened. For example, the cultural institutions it supported were not limited to libraries as was originally intended, but came to include the Institute of Social Research, the China Institute in America, the Palace Museum, etc. Policies were adjusted and supplemented from time to time as requirements demanded. For example at the fourth annual meeting in June 1928, the acting director, Y. T. Tsur, proposed that the Foundation's resources should be focused on a limited number of institutions in order to gain better results. He proposed the following three principles:

1. Subsidies to be granted only to educational institutions above middle-school level
2. A grant for a specific purpose made to any given institution shall not preclude the same institution from being considered for a grant for another purpose even before the expiration of the term of the first grant
3. For the present, no subsidies to be granted for construction purposes[14]

In 1932, when payment of the remission was suspended and revenue was reduced, Director Zen drafted the following three supplementary grant principles:

1. No new grant applications should be accepted
2. Grant renewals should not exceed the original amount
3. All grants should be made for one year only[15]

In 1933 the board asked the executive committee to look into

its grant activities with a view to achieving a more efficient use of funds. As a result of this, it was suggested that "if there were other organizations engaging in the same activities, the Foundation should work with them to bring about better cooperation and co-relation to avoid duplication."[16] The executive committee therefore invited prominent educators and scientists in China to take part in a series of meetings to discuss the Foundation's current activities and how they could be improved. In addition to prominent individuals closely associated with the Foundation, such as Chiang Monlin, Wong Wen-hao, and V. K. Ting, these experts included Fu Ssu-nien, head of the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica; Wu Sien and Lin Ko-shen, professors at the Peking Union Medical School; Ping Chi and H. H. Hu, both leading biologists; and S.T. Leo, Cheng Chao-lun, Chang Ching-yue, Y. T. Yao, Ku Yu-hsiu, Ny Tsi-ze, and Chang Chun, all of whom were science or engineering professors at either Peking or Tsinghua universities. Altogether, seventeen experts were invited to take part. Based on their suggestions, the executive committee reevaluated its activities and proposed the following principles which were approved at tenth annual meeting in 1934[17]:

1. Concerning the activities of the Foundation (self-conducted projects):
   i. The scope of the activities of the Foundation should be limited, as far as possible, to scientific research, applications of science and scientific education, the terms "science" and "scientific" being herein understood in their broader senses so as not to exclude the social and historical sciences.

ii. Whenever possible, the Foundation should concentrate its limited resources on the development of only a few projects.

2. Concerning appropriations to other institutions (grants and subsidies):
   i. Grants to educational institutions should be limited to well-planned cooperative programs capable of raising the standards of the recipients. Grants towards ordinary equipment and maintenance are to be gradually stopped.
   ii. For specific projects, preference should be given to those capable of producing practical results and requiring continued support on a comparatively large scale. Sundry grants frittering away the Foundation's funds should be avoided.
   iii. For special institutions, preference should be given to a few deserving ones for which a program of support for a comparatively long period should be adopted. Grants to the less deserving ones should be gradually stopped.

It should be noted that the China Foundation's support of science was on the whole limited to the natural sciences. It rarely ventured into the social sciences. The only exception was the acceptance of a grant from the Institute of Social and Religious Research of New York to set up the Social Research Department (later known as the Institute of Social Research). It is not clear why the Foundation, with its limited resources, decided in 1934 to expand its area of operation to include the social sciences and

history. However, from the Foundation's editing and translation projects and from the director's correspondence, we may assume that the change of the policy was due to the following two factors[18]:

1. In 1930, under the influence of Hu Shih and Fu Ssu-nien, the Foundation reorganized its science education advisory committee into the committee on editing and translation with Hu Shih as chairman. Under Hu' s leadership, committee members were recruited from both the humanities and the sciences. The major focus of the committee was switched from the translation of science textbooks toward the translation of books on history and philosophy.[19] Sze Sao-ke was of the opinion that the Foundation should not get involved in translation work related to the humanities,[20] but he was ignored. Fu Ssu-nien, though not a trustee of the China Foundation himself, had close relations with trustees such as Hu Shih, Tsai Yuan-pei, Chiang Monlin, and Greene. Whether at the time of the reorganization of the Foundation (he had attended board meetings as a representative of the Ministry of Education), in recruiting members of the committee on editing and translation, or hiring experts to improve the Foundation's operations, Fu always played a role, either in public or behind the scenes. It is clear that the Foundation's expansion into the humanities must have had some connection with the influence of Hu and Fu.
2. In 1930, the Rockefeller Foundation changed its grant

policies. In 1931, its vice chairman, Selskar Gunn, visited China to inspect that foundation's work in the country. Gunn was unhappy with the Rockefeller Foundation's focus on pure research and on the cultivation of a few elite scholars. On his return to New York, he proposed that the Rockefeller Foundation in China should henceforth pay more attention to that country's overall socioeconomic problems, and it should work with scholars involved in the movements to promote public health and rural reconstruction. Gunn's proposals formed the backbone of the Rockefeller Foundation's future China Program.[21] When in January 1934 Gunn wrote to H. C. Zen asking about the China Foundation's policy on grants for the social sciences,[22] Zen replied that the Foundation's grants were limited to the natural sciences. It is possible that the China Foundation's expansion into the humanities was a response to this change of policy by the Rockefeller Foundation.

The principles outlined above became the guiding principles of the Foundation, although there were many exceptions. For example, at the fifth annual meeting after the reorganization, the board resolved to grant $500,000 to Academia Sinica to fund the construction of its institute of physics, chemistry and engineering.[23] This decision was possibly influenced by the Foundation's chairman, Tsai Yuan-pei, who was also president of Academia Sinica. Anyhow, the supplementary principle forbidding grants for construction projects approved at the fourth annual meeting was breached. Pressure from the MOE might also have been a factor in

this decision.

In 1931, the MOE wrote to the Foundation requesting that it fund the purchase of antiques and rare books. Since this would have been in breach of the grant policy, the board asked Director Zen to turn down the request and to explain to the ministry how much the China Foundation had done to support the cause of culture in China over the years.[24] At the second joint meeting of the Boxer Indemnity Administrations (BIAs) in March 1934, the Executive Yuan asked these institutions to contribute to the establishment of two vocational schools. To enhance the efficiency of higher education for women, it also asked the BIAs to provide $300,000 in installments to construct and equip institutions of higher education for women in the capital. In the meantime, with the purpose of "raising academic standards and promoting academic independence and development," the Executive Yuan selected a number of well-established national universities in which it intended to set up research institutes funded by the BIAs.[25] When V. K. Ting and H. C. Zen, who had participated in this meeting, reported its proceedings to the board, it resolved at its annual meeting in June to reply to the Executive Yuan as follows:

The China Foundation takes this opportunity to express its full support of the projects referred to it by the Second Joint Conference of the Boxer Indemnity Administrations concerning the establishment of a Mausoleum Museum, the founding of a Women's University in Nanking and the establishment of graduate schools at some of the national universities; but, owing to the greatly reduced income of

> the Foundation in recent years, the Board much regrets its inability to render financial aid to all new applications including the above proposals. They will be given due consideration when the Foundation's finances are materially improved.[26]

Despite the rejection of these requests by the Foundation, the Executive Yuan fixed a quota for each of the BIAs at the third joint meeting in December that year. Furthermore, it was decided at this meeting that the Sino-American, Sino-British, Sino-French, and Sino-Belgian Boxer indemnity administrations should share the annual cost of $1,100,000 over three years to pay for a program of compulsory education and the establishment of vocational schools and graduate schools. The China Foundation alone was to provide $400,000 per year out of its income to fund the compulsory education program.[27] The trustees differed in their views on this. Some felt that it went against the basic principles of the Foundation. Bennett, for example, objected strongly, saying, "We must face the fact that the Ministry is obviously trying through these means to wrest control of our funds from our Board and dictate the spending. We shall have to take a firm stand if we are to protect our direct enterprises and the integrity of the Board in general."[28] Tsai Yuan-pei, V. K. Ting, and others, on the other hand, wanted to cooperate with the government and expedite payments in support of these educational plans. At the April 1935 annual meeting, the board, while not rejecting the requests out of hand, resorted to delaying tactics by politely replying, "The Board authorizes the Executive Committee to meet with the Ministry of Education and the BIAs to form a concrete plan. If necessary, the

Board may convene a special Board Meeting to deal with this."[29] Hu Shih, in a letter to Tsai Yuan-pei, explained their reasons as follows:

> The compulsory education program is a huge long-term project and we cannot treat it as an emergency. We, as trustees, have a duty of trust which should not be slightly modified by any stimulation of a particular time. …Therefore; the resolution of the April meeting in its basic policy of not spending the Endowment Fund was only to reaffirm our duties of the trusteeship. In this reaffirmation, there is also self-guard against any possible similar approaches and a fundamental desire to preserve the notion of a few useful enterprises to the future. …Therefore, when the state undertakes the huge projects, it cannot depend on these independent funds. Such independent funds should be allowed to flourish for the purpose of supporting or maintaining useful and necessary undertaking which the state may not be able to take care of. In the past ten years a number of scientific institutions would have never been able to carry on their work if there had not been aid from the China Foundation.[30]

However, faced with mounting pressure from the government, the executive committee was forced to abandon its insistence on abiding by the Foundation's principles. The details are uncertain, but at the ninth annual meeting on September 10, the board approved the executive committee's proposal. They authorized a payment of CN$300,000 over a two-year period to subsidize the government's compulsory education program.[31] This made it

harder for the Foundation to stick to its principles when faced with future requests from the MOE and the joint meeting of the BIAs.

Nevertheless, these were only exceptional cases in which the China Foundation agreed to compromise after lengthy discussion among board members. In most cases it stood firm on its basic principles. Upon his resignation as director in 1935 after he was appointed president of Szechuan University, H. C. Zen said that the principle of the Foundation was "doing without owning." Its purpose was to achieve the best results with its limited resources, and the only way it could attain this purpose was to support already well-established bodies. He explained his reasoning as follows:

> This principle in a negative sense is to keep off those speculators seeking for only the money. In a positive sense, the principle can help those well established and reputable organizations to have better opportunities for development. Strictly speaking, this is like icing on the cake. But generally speaking, it can be thought of as favoring only the capable ones. The Foundation is not a charitable organization and this principle is not only necessary but also justified.[32]

Generally speaking, before the war, the Foundation' s educational and cultural activities were based on the above principles. But during the war, the Foundation had to adapt to difficult circumstances.

II. The Educational and Cultural Activities of the China Foundation

The China Foundation generally abided by the following guidelines that reflected the policies and principles outlined above: (1) grants were given to established organizations whose activities were in line with the principles of the Foundation; (2) it cooperated with institutions, both government and private, in organizing new projects for the purpose of accomplishing certain objects which the Foundation deemed important; and (3) when no appropriate agency was available to cooperate with, the Foundation initiated new projects itself.[33] Following these guidelines, the Foundation engaged in the three types of activities:

1. Self-conducted projects (or direct enterprises). These included the establishment of science professorships in normal colleges, scientific research prizes and the fellowship programs, scientific research professorships, the committee on editing and translation (formerly the science education advisory committee), the Institute of Social Research, and the Soil Survey.
2. Projects run in cooperation with other institutions and organizations (cooperative enterprises). These included the National Library of Peiping, the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, and the research fund established in cooperation with National Peking University.
3. Grants and other miscellaneous subsidies to educational and cultural institutions.

In the years before the war, the China Foundation spent a total of CN$15,630,663 on these activities, an average of CN$1,302,555 per year. Grants and subsidies accounted for the lion's share (41 percent of the total). Cooperative projects ranked second, with 36.8 percent and self-conducted projects accounted for 22.2 percent of the total (see table 3-1).

Table 3-1: Expenditure of the China Foundation by Category of Activity

Unit: CN$

Year	Self-conducte Projects	Cooperative Projects	Subsidized Institutions	Subtotal
1925		72,600	10,082	82,682
1926	116,044	313,993	489,406	919,443
1927	98,757	290,000	338,350	727,107
1928	162,758	324,000	495,950	982,708
1929	338,832	622,090	971,025	1,931,947
1930	447,096	706,070	587,534	1,740,700
1931	503,414	720,100	838,700	2,062,214
1932	540,712	632,200	596,450	1,769,362
1933	402,088	635,900	558,600	1,596,588
1934	262,049	483,781	561,583	1,307,413
1935	284,223	466,177	445,229	1,195,629
1936	321,436	477,584	515,850	1,314,870
Total	3,477,409	5,744,495	6,408,759	15,630,663

The proportion of expenditure allotted to each of the three categories was not fixed. In the early years, the largest proportion (about 45 percent) was devoted to grants. But as a result of political upheavals, eleven of the twenty-six subsidized institutions were closed between 1926 and 1928. For this reason,

after the Foundation was reorganized its grants policies were reevaluated. After the establishment of the national government, educational and cultural institutions gradually resumed normal operations and more financial resources were available for the national universities, allowing the Foundation's funding to be directed to other projects. Besides, projects such as the supply of science textbooks and equipment, as well as the science research fellowships and prizes, etc., "were promoted [by the Foundation] rather than being directly set up by it." In the new environment the Foundation prepared to increase the proportion of its self-conducted projects. If grants and subsidies could be limited to 25 percent of total expenditure, an additional $200,000 per year could be used to support these projects.[34] However, this plan was never fully implemented, and grants and subsidies always accounted for 35-45 percent of total expenditure. Besides, there was no clear demarcation between the three categories of expenditure. For example, the National Library of Peiping and the China Institute in America were initially classified as self-conducted projects. But after the reorganization, they were reclassified as cooperative projects.

The focus for self-conducted projects was on science education and scientific research. Expenditure on the scientific research professorship and the science education advisory committee (which later became the committee on editing and translation) amounted to over 40 percent of the Foundation's spending on self-conducted projects, while the scientific research prizes and the fellowship program shared another 30 percent (see table 3-2). As for other grants to individuals and institutions such as the Soil Survey, all of

these were related to scientific research and they will be described in detail in the later chapters.

One particular case worthy of mention here is the Institute of Social Research. In February 1926, the China Foundation received a grant of about US$90,000 to be paid over three years by the Institute of Social and Religious Research of New York. The purpose of the grant was to set up and fund a department to conduct social and economic surveys covering the following seven areas: handicraft workers in Peking, family budgets, family budgets of elementary school teachers in Peking, family budgets of Shanghai factory workers, factory workers in Tangku, the marketing of agricultural products, and a survey of rural life.[35]

Over a brief period, the department published a number of reports, including, “An Introduction to Social Survey Methods,” “The Position of Women in Chinese Law,” “Life in Peiping,” “Survey of Tangku Workers,” “The Marketing of Cotton in Chihli,” and “Village Families in Suburban Peiping,” as well as the China Labor Yearbook, the Monthly Bulletin of Social Research, and an English-language “An Index of the Cost of Living in Peiping.” The three-year project was so successful that the China Foundation decided to continue with it. In June 1929 the department was reorganized and it became the Institute of Social Research. The Foundation spent over CN$200,000 on constructing an office building near the National Library of Peiping to be shared by the Institute of Social Research and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology. The Institute of Social Research was entirely funded by the China Foundation. An organizing committee was set up in

July 1929. L.K. Tao was appointed president, and the committee consisted of H. C. Zen, (chairman), Ho Lien, Fan Zue, Liu Hong-sen, Chen Dah, V. K. Ting, Dai Lo-zen, and Chang Yuan-shan. They developed a work plan and established cooperative relations with the Institute of Social Science, Academia Sinica, and the library committee of the Chinese Social and Political Science Association. They planned to conduct surveys and carry out research covering the fields of economics, economic history, agricultural economics, population, industry and labor, wages, and taxation, as well as compiling such works as an index of abstracts of research papers on Chinese agricultural economics, a study of international labor organizations, an index of Chinese population problems, a study of Sino-Japanese trade over the past thirty years, a study of fluctuations in the silver price over the previous century, and a survey of drugstores in certain cities or villages. The Institute also published periodicals *such as Social Science Magazine*, *Research on Ching Dynasty Economic History, and Monthly Index of Living Costs in Peiping*.

As the work of the Institute of Social Research was roughly similar to that of the Institute of Social Science, Academia Sinica, and as the China Foundation was not supposed to focus on the social sciences, the executive committee proposed in 1934 that the Institute be merged with its counterpart at Academia Sinica. The reasons were given as follows:

> When we accepted the grant to establish the Institute of Social Research from the Institute of Social and Religious Research of New York, the work of social surveys had only

just begun in China. Therefore, the establishment of the Institute was a pioneering project. Circumstances are now somewhat changed. In addition to the economic survey departments run by various provinces and banks, there are institutes specifically for researching social issues. In the south, there is the Institute of Social Research, Academia Sinica, and in the north, there is the Economics Department at Nankai University. These two institutions, together with our Institute of Social Research, form a solid tripod of social research. Even though they all have different specialties and none of them could be easily replaced, it might be a good way to reduce overlapping and increase efficiency if we could combine them into one institute in the north and another in the south that could cooperate with the economic survey departments of the provincial finance bureaus.[36]

Despite strong opposition from L.K. Tao and friction between him and Zen, the need to "reduce overlapping and increase efficiency" brought about the takeover of the Institute by Academia Sinica, although a portion of the former's expenditure continued to be defrayed by the China Foundation. Over an eight-year period, the Institute published forty research monographs in Chinese and English. It also produced many research papers that were published in its own periodicals or other journals, providing valuable reference material on social and economic issues in China. The China Foundation itself acknowledged that the Institute's achievements were "very gratifying indeed."[37]

The most important cooperative project undertaken by the

China Foundation was the National Library of Peiping which accounted for almost three quarters of the Foundation's total spending on cooperative projects. The library's annual budget, excluding construction costs, was between two and three hundred thousand dollars (see table 3-3). As early as the first annual meeting, the board of the China Foundation decided that the cultural side of its operations would start with libraries. Therefore, in September 1928, construction was started on the Peihai Library, on a site near Peihai Park, and the work of purchasing books and periodicals began. After the Foundation was reorganized, it was decided that the Peihai Library and the old Metropolitan Library should be merged into one large research library, as the latter had a large collection of Chinese books, while the former had the largest collection of scientific books and periodicals in China. To this end, the Foundation approached the MOE with a view to jointly establishing the National Library of Peiping. Subsequently, the books and equipment of both the Metropolitan Library and the Peihai Library were transferred to the committee of the new National Library of Peiping. The nine-member committee consisted of two ex-officio members, Tsai Yuan-pei (library director) and Yuan Tong-li (deputy director), plus H.C. Zen, H. F. Sun, Ma Shu-lun, Chen Yuan, Liu Fu, Y.T. Tsur, and Fu Ssu-nien.

Table 3-2: Expenditure of Projects Run Independently by the China Foundation

Unit: CN$

Year	Science Prof. in Normal Colleges	CET[a]	Science Research Fellow-ship & Prizes	Science Research Professor-ships	Inst of Social Re-search	Soil Survey	Misc.	Grants to Individu-als	Subtotal
1926	52,200				60,000		3,844		116,044
1927	68,300	12,943	2,809				908	13,797	98,757
1928	99,917	16,327	46,514						162,758
1929	150,859	10,471	61,942		107,418			8,142	338,832
1930	172,678	17,672	96,245	18,200	96,000	20,000		26,301	447,096
1931	149,307	40,798	135,549	28,200	65,000	50,000		34,560	503,414
1932	217,969	49,146	137,197	24,200	65,000	47,200			540,712
1933	88,114	50,380	91,552	18,600	80,000	50,000	11,682	11,760	402,088
1934	27,290	46,000	96,084	30,200		50,000		12,475	262,049
1935	40,821	42,000	111,959	30,000		50,000		9,443	284,223
1936	60,230	42,000	111,689	32,000		50,000	15,400	10,117	321,436
Total	1,127,685	327,737	891,540	181,400	473,418	317,200	31,834	126,595	3,477,409

a CET—Committee on Editing and Translation

Table 3-3: Expenditure on Projects Run in Cooperation with other Organizations

Unit: CN$

Year	National Library of Peiping	Fan Memorial Institute of Biology	Research Fund with Peking University	Subtotal
1925	72,600			72,600
1926	313,993			313,993
1927	290,000			290,000
1928	300,000	24,000		324,000
1929	589,390	32,700		622,090
1930	665,544	40,526		706,070
1931	465,900	54,200	200,000	720,100
1932	378,000	54,200	200,000	632,200
1933	366,900	69,000	200,000	635,900
1934	301,781	82,000	100,000	483,781
1935	279,177	87,000	100,000	466,177
1936	286,584	91,000	100,000	477,584
Total	4,309,869	534,626	900,000	5,744,495

The Foundation met all the running costs of the new library. Apart from the usual library activities, such as purchasing books for the collection, cataloguing and indexing, and reader services, the library was also involved in compilation and publishing.[38] In May 1930, the library building was completed at a cost of CN$1,374,000. Under the management of Yuan Tong-li, everything had gone to schedule. Both in terms of its architecture and its collection, the new library was one of the most magnificent institutions of its kind in China.

As much as 39.8 percent of the Foundation's total expenditure on grants and subsidies went to schools, while grants to research institutes accounted for 36.6 percent. Cultural institutions received only 23.6 percent of the total (see table 3-4). Over five hundred grants to institutions were made by the Foundation in the years before 1946 (see table 3-5), although because some of these institutions were the recipients of ongoing grants, the total number of institutional recipients was less than one hundred. More than twenty cultural institutions received grants and subsidies. These included the National Anti-Opium Association, the Institute of Chinese Architecture, the Association for Unification of the National Language (*kuo-yu*), the Chinese Association of Marine Biology, and the Geological Society. However, the lion's share of the grants and subsidies went to the Palace Museum and the China Institute in America.

The first grant to the Palace Museum was worth CN$30,000. At its sixth meeting in July 1930, the board granted the museum CN$150,000 payable in three annual installments to finance the

construction of a fire-proof strong room. Between 1927 and 1933, the Foundation provided a total of CN$320,000 in grants to the Palace Museum, accounting for one-fifth of its grants to cultural institutions in this period.

The China Institute in America, which was set up in New York in April 1925 to promote Sino-American understanding through education and culture, was run independently by the Foundation. Its director was P. W. Kuo. The Institute was chiefly engaged in the exchange of information on education and culture, exchanges of personnel, guidance to Chinese students in the United States, and encouraging interest in Chinese studies among American scholars. P. W. Kuo intended that the institute should become an independent entity, but this plan did not receive the approval of the China Foundation's board. At the end of 1929, after the reorganization of the China Foundation, the institute was closed down. Not long after, however, the institute reestablished itself with a board and advisory committee consisting of both Americans and Chinese. Paul Monroe was elected chairman, Wu Chao-chu was honorary president, P. W. Kuo was honorary director, and Meng Chih was Kuo's deputy. Recognizing the institute's importance, the China Foundation decided at a meeting in July 1930 to continue to support it, and from then on, annual payments ranged from ten to thirty thousand dollars.[39] During the Sino-Japanese War, the institute made an important contribution by disseminating news about China and taking care of Chinese students in the United States. A building in the center of New York City was donated to the institute by the Henry Luce Foundation and named China House. The institute actively raised funds in the

United States with a view to becoming an independent body like the China Foundation that could promote Sino-American cultural exchange.

The policy of the China Foundation on grants to educational institutions was to give priority to institutions "established on a sound basis with solid accomplishments." The National Association for the Advancement of Education, the National Association of Vocational Education, and the Chinese National Association for the Mass Education Movement were the main recipients. These three associations devoted their attention to the education of the masses and to rural education. The National Association for the Advancement of Education was established in December 1921 through the merger of the Practical Educational Research Society, the New Education Magazine Society, and the Chinese New Education Advancement Society. Its mission was to "investigate educational conditions, to study educational science, and to strive for educational advancement."[40] After it began receiving subsidies from the Foundation, this association focused its attention on rural education. In March 1927, it set up the Normal School for Rural Education in Hsiao-chuang, near Nanking, as a centre for experimenting in various methods of education. This was followed by the establishment of kindergartens, primary schools, public night schools, community tea houses, a carpentry shop and lithograph printing press, a cooperative store, a village hospital, fire brigades, an information bureau for the improvement of agriculture, etc. Led by Tao Hsing-chih, the association's proactive members sought to instill a spirit of social change in the villages, using education to revive agriculture. But in April 1930, after

students from the Hsiao-chuang Normal School of Rural Education had joined protests organized by workers in foreign-owned trading companies and anti-imperialist rallies, the association was closed down by the Nationalist government.[41] After that, the China Foundation diverted its support to the Normal School for Kindergarten Teachers at Hsiang-shan (Fragrant Hill) in suburban Peking.

Table 3-4: Expenditure on Grants to Institutions by the China Foundation

Unit: CN$

Year	Schools	Research Institutes	Educational and Cultural Organizations	Subtotal
1925		500	9,582	10,082
1926	288,250	59,000	142,156	489,406
1927	136,000	50,000	152,350	338,350
1928	262,750	50,000	183,200	495,950
1929	180,500	610,000	180,525	971,025
1930	237,088	130,000	220,446	587,534
1931	396,600	222,200	219,900	838,700
1932	267,350	156,000	173,100	596,450
1933	255,000	207,000	96,600	558,600
1934	199,000	308,000	54,583	561,583
1935	126,000	274,000	45,229	445,229
1936	199,250	281,350	35,250	515,850
Total	2,547,788	2,348,050	1,512,921	6,408,759

Table 3-5: Institutional Recipients of Grants from the China Foundation

Year	Universities & Junior Colleges	Research Institutes	Cultural & Educational Organizations	Others	Subtotal
1926	13	3	5	1	22
1927	6	2	6	1	15
1928	11	5	6	1	23
1929	7	4	7	1	19
1930	14	7	7	0	28
1931	21	11	7	1	40
1932	12	8	6	0	26
1933	11	9	7	1	28
1934	9	9	3	1	22
1935	11	7	4	2	24
1936	12	9	3	3	27
1937	24	11	7	6	48
1938	15	6	6	6	33
1939	15	9	6	6	36
1940	11	8	4	1	24
1941	15	9	7	1	32
1943a	10	9	6	2	27
1944	10	7	5	2	24
1945	6	6	7	2	21
Total	233	139	109	38	519

a Accounting year changed to calendar year (January 1- December 31)

The National Association of Vocational Education, headed by Huang Yen-pei, was established in May 1917 by a group of educators and industrialists. The association's main areas of activity included conducting occupational surveys in various provinces, carrying out research into communications, and vocational guidance and placements. It also established the China

Vocational School in Shanghai. After it became the recipient of grants from the China Foundation, the association began recruiting experts to study the theory and practice of vocational education and conduct experiments in vocational counseling. It also engaged in rural education, setting up an agricultural improvement project at Hsu-kung Chiao in Kunshan County, Kiangsu Province, promoting rural cooperatives, and conducting surveys of farmers' livelihoods, and offering education for mechanics. At the China Vocational School, the association experimented with a new method of vocational education consisting of "practical experience before theoretical study."[42]

The Chinese National Association of the Mass Education Movement was established in August 1923 to promote knowledge and civic education among the uneducated population as quickly and economically as possible. Most of its members also belonged to the Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education. It carried out the bulk of its work in Ting-hsien, a suburb of Peking. For the first three years, its grants from the China Foundation were devoted to producing literature for the masses, mainly textbooks and reading material. Later it expanded into research into the livelihood of rural dwellers and mass education, paying special attention to agricultural economy, the training of farmers, and rural handicrafts. The association had a ten-year plan which it intended to carry out in three stages. However, the Japanese invasion of 1932 forced the association to accelerate its work, and the plan was shortened to six years. The association devoted itself to the theory and practice of county-level infrastructure. At school, community, and family level, its

members conducted experiments in rural arts, livelihood, public health, and civic education.[43]

Generally speaking, only the National Library of Peiping of all the educational and cultural projects discussed above was fully supported by the Foundation throughout these years. The other institutions were not the main focus of the Foundation's work. Therefore, the merger of the Institute of Social Research with its counterpart at Academia Sinica, the ending of the Foundation's relationship with the China Institute in America, and the meager amounts of funding granted to educational institutions, all serve to illustrate the Foundation's policy of only providing partial support to projects of this kind. The grant policy of the China Foundation since its establishment was focused on supporting science education, scientific research, and the application of scientific knowledge.

III. Changes before and after the War

Under the double whammy of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the cancellation of the remission payments several years later, the trustees were forced to reorient the future activities of the China Foundation. In May 1936, the board resolved that the director should be able on his own initiative to draft grant proposals, even if no request for a grant had been received, as long as the recipient's activities fell within the scope of the Foundation.[44]

At a meeting the following year, Director H. F. Sun[45] explained to the board that although over the past ten years or more the Foundation had offered grants in support of applied sciences such as agriculture, engineering, and medicine, funding both teaching and equipment, its major focus was still on pure scientific research. Now that the nation was undergoing rapid industrialization, there was a serious shortage of raw materials and machinery, and in particular there was a shortage of technicians with a good knowledge of science. Since people within and outside the government were eager that the nation's demand for metals and fuel be satisfied, he said, the China Foundation had to provide funding for research in those fields. Therefore, he proposed that the Foundation begin setting up centers for the study of indigenous engineering materials. These centers could also train young students in these fields. Sun citied a number of different projects which he considered worthwhile, including the domestic production of alloys, the design and production of internal combustion engines suitable for burning domestic fuel, well-salt production in Szechuan Province, and sugar production in Kwangtung Province. As for permanent cultural institutions, Sun proposed that since Changsha had become a center for national defense, the China Foundation should set up a library in that city specializing in reference works on the natural sciences and engineering. If necessary, he said, the Foundation could go on to establish similar libraries in other industrial or political centers in China. Having taken note of Sun's proposals, the board appointed Hu Shih, H. C. Zen, Y. T. Tsur, Leighton Stuart, and H. F. Sun to a special committee chaired by Hu to study the possibilities of closing down some of the Foundation's independently run projects

and launching some new ones.[47]

The question which was more important—pure science or the applied sciences—had been hotly debated by the Foundation' s trustees and educators in China since the time of the Foundation' s inception. This issue became even more urgent with the outbreak of war. The different points of view are reflected in the correspondence between Wong Wen-hao and Hu Shih. Wong thought that China's industries were suffering from a serious skills shortage, and in particular, there was a lack of specialists in steel and copper production. He said:

> If educational organizations cannot provide what the nation needs, these organizations are rather useless. It is even more regrettable if they furthermore create a number of worthless students who are led astray and become a threat to public security. The China Foundation should be held partly responsible for this and it should tailor its policy on grants to students studying in the United States to guide them along the right path.[48]

Hu Shih, on the other hand, thought that "what the nation needs" should not be defined too narrowly. Educational institutions should consider the long-term basic needs of the nation, not just the pressing needs of the present:

> What we should promote is the development of pure science and leadership which are not deemed important by society at large at present. …Although we have made some

> progress in the pure sciences, we haven't even got enough talented personnel, let alone being able to make any notable achievements. So I think institutions such as Academia Sinica, Peita (National Peking University), and the China Foundation should continue to satisfy our nation's basic needs for talented individuals, rather than pursue the merely practical. Few people recognize the real value of the "useless." If we do not plan well beforehand, our nation will be bound to suffer. [49]

These two opposing ideas in education were frequently debated in China in the 1930s and 1940s. These were the ideas that inspired Hu's blueprint for the development of science in Taiwan in later years.

The work of the above-mentioned special committee was interrupted when the outbreak of war caused the suspension of all board meetings. Sun's proposal was therefore held in abeyance. In his memorandum to the fourteenth annual meeting in 1938, which was held in Hong Kong, H. C. Zen stated that the China Foundation had a choice. It could either adopt a wait-and-see policy, that is, it could stop engaging actively in any projects and hoard its resources for the future, or it could be proactive and push forward projects that could be of assistance to the nation regardless of what was happening. The former was safe, as it involved no financial risk, but in Zen's opinion it was too passive. The latter was venturesome and aggressive, but in the long-run it might be beneficial to the nation's development. Zen was in favor of the latter policy. As for funding, he suggested that the Foundation should follow the Sino-British fund's policy of "killing three geese

with one arrow." That fund was planning to provide loans for the purchase of materials from the United Kingdom to help develop China's transportation infrastructure and industry. This was also a safe way to invest funds. Therefore, Zen proposed using some of the funds currently invested to purchase equipment that could be used to develop new industries in the southwestern provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan. This equipment could be considered as being on loan to the provincial and local governments or to private companies. As for the Foundation's policy toward educational institutions, Zen thought that its work had previously been focused only on the north of the country, and that it should in the future concentrate its efforts on the southwest. In addition, he advocated a "proactive policy toward grants," meaning that the Foundation should not only provide grants to institutional and individual applicants based on the nature of the institutions and the fields in which the individuals were working, but should also train and cultivate those who were most needed by the nation. The annual meeting that year did not act on Zen's memorandum, but the board did convene a five-man special committee on educational needs and projects consisting of Wong Wen-hao (chairman), Hu Shih, H. C. Zen, Y. T. Tsur, and H. F. Sun. The committee was directed to "evaluate and make plans for educational activities to meet the new situations during the national calamity of the war." They were also asked to amend the research fellowship grant policy.[51]

However, in 1939, the government's financial problems led them to cease payment of the remission, causing funding difficulties for the Foundation. In addition to using investment income to cover current expenditure, the Foundation had to resort

to taking out bank loans using the arrears of remission payments as collateral. Under such tight conditions, Zen's proposed "proactive policy" naturally fell by the wayside. Even existing projects could only be maintained at a minimum level. At the sixteenth annual meeting the following year, Chairman Wong of the five-man special committee proposed a new direction for the Foundation's activities. This reaffirmed the principle of focusing on more established lines of activity in the fields of science education, scientific research, and applied science. According to this principle, grants to the compulsory education program and to middle schools, etc., would be stopped, as would grants to the humanities, including the funding of literary translation work. Wong's proposal emphasized firstly that the application of science and scientific research should be treated as being of equal importance. Even though this was a long-standing principle of the Foundation, it had not been strictly followed in the past, and grants were concentrated on theoretical research into the pure sciences. From then on, anything which could aid national reconstruction should be given priority. Therefore, Wong said, the applied sciences should account for 50-60 percent of the Foundation's budget. Wong's second point was that grants to specific subject fields should have a fixed time period. Once that period expired, grants should be directed toward other fields. Concentrating grants in this way, he said, would make them more efficient. Wong also pushed for a number of improvements, such as supporting university education, subsidizing important scientific publications, and encouraging scientific research and the training of specialists. He proposed changing the rules governing applications for the Foundation's research prizes and fellowships, adding technical

training to the research fellowships, increasing the funding for domestic research fellowships, and cooperating with schools, research institutes, and companies within China to allow grant recipients to receive on-the-job training. Most of his proposals were both specific and feasible,52 although some of them were controversial. For example, it was difficult during the war to recruit American professors to teach and supervise research in China. As it turned out, Wong's ideas did not meet with full agreement and his proposals were not accepted by the meeting. Instead, the board resolved to forward his proposals to those trustees who could not attend the meeting and postpone action until the next annual meeting.[53]

At the April 1941 annual meeting, H. C. Zen presented his opinions on Wong's proposals. If the Foundation were to do as Wong suggested, he said, it would first of all have to close some of its existing projects, as "the annual income of the Foundation had already been allocated to those projects and there was no room for new ones." For practical reasons, Zen wished to maintain the status quo and he was unwilling to make any bold moves at that time. He felt that especially after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the national emergency should be taken into consideration where the Foundation's promotion of educational and cultural activities was concerned. Even though Wong's proposal was important, it was, in Zen's opinion, only feasible in peacetime. Instead, he proposed the following:

> Due to the difficulties of transportation, books and equipment are impossible to import. This makes research and teaching

almost impossible. If the Foundation could shoulder either by itself or in cooperation with other institutions the responsibility of overcoming these difficulties, it would be a great help to the current situation. For example, the Foundation could establish a special convoy for transporting educational and cultural books and equipment. For another example, the Foundation could provide a small sum of monies to establish printing shops and equipment manufacturers at suitable sites for the replenishment of publications and equipment. This would definitely encourage greatly scientists and scientific development.[54]

After discussion, the board adopted this proposal which became the guiding principle of the Foundation during the wartime emergency period.

Because of the war, the trustees were spread far and wide, and it was hard to maintain the organization's cohesiveness. The Foundation "could have little contact with the educational institutions. If anything came up, it had to report to the Shanghai office for approval. As a result, Academia Sinica and the Ministry of Education complained quite a lot about it." In his letter to Hu Shih, Wong Wen-hao emphasized that "It is vitally important for this organization to have new blood. Otherwise, it will regrettably drift downward."[55] In January 1942, a war-time emergency committee was established and the directorate was moved to Chungking, allowing the Foundation to function more normally. In principle, all grants were kept to a minimum during this period. Except for independently run and jointly operated projects which

the Foundation was obliged to maintain, other institutional applicants were only to be given limited support depending on the Foundation's financial situation. For expenditure on activities of various kinds during 1942-44 see table 3-6.[56]

Table 3-6: The China Foundation's Expenditure on Various Areas of Activity, 1942-44

Items	Currency	1942[a]	1943	1944	Subtotal[b]
Independently Run Projects	CN$	377,397	785,216	1,299,800	2,462,413
	US$	900	900	900	2,700
Cooperative Projects	CN$	495,000	712,000	978,000	2,185,000
	US$	3,000	5,000		8,000
Subsidized Projects	CN$	1,599,000	1,380,000	1,680,000	4,659,000
Administrative and Temporary Expenses	CN$	861,945	743,503	1,307,000	2,912,448
Total	CN$	3,333,342	3,620,719	5,264,800	12,218,861
	US$	3,900	5,900	900	10,700

Source: "The Activities of the China Foundation in the Last Three Years," pp. 3-8.
(a) Some expenditure in Shanghai is not included here.
(b) Only includes U.S. dollar expenditure within China (e.g., expenditure in the U.S. on books for Chinese libraries is excluded).

With the tightening of the purse-strings, the committee on editing and translation was disbanded in 1943. The remaining independently run projects were the scientific research professorships, the fellowship program, and the Soil Survey. The Foundation continued to support those sections of projects run in cooperation with other organizations, such as the National Library of Peiping and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, which had been moved out of Peking. The only new cooperative project set up during this period was the Sino-American Cultural Service.

With international cultural exchanges curtailed by the enemy blockade, the Foundation was the first to suggest that microfilm copies of newly published foreign books and periodicals for research use be imported into China. This proposal received the nod from the Ministry of Education and the Science College at Nanking University. The Foundation set up a committee in the United States to take charge of selecting books and newspapers for microfilming. At the same time, the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Foreign Cultural Affairs was also exporting microfilms and books to China. So in 1942, the Foundation, together with the Ministry of Education and the U.S. Embassy, set up the Sino-American Cultural Service, tasked with importing microfilms and books donated by the U.S. Embassy and producing microfilm readers for distribution in cities such as Kunming, Chungking, and Chengdu. Three years later, more than thirty reading rooms had been opened, more than eighty readers had been produced, and in excess of two thousand rolls of microfilm had been received. Later on, the Sino-British Center for Scientific Cooperation also joined the committee and donated a number of periodicals on microfilm. These were mainly new publications in the natural sciences and engineering which did much to aid communication between academics in China and those in the outside world during the war.[57]

As for grants to institutions, during the emergency period, the China Foundation still maintained grants to between ten and twenty research institutes and universities. Even though these grants were worth more in total than the Foundation's expenditure on independently run and cooperative projects, their impact was not as big as it had been because the funds were spread more widely

and the grants were too small. In 1944, the China Foundation received funds from the United China Relief organization in the United States to set up a committee to award research and teaching grants to support the work of key scholars in universities and research institutes. United China Relief provided a million dollars to be distributed by the Foundation to universities and research institutes in Kunming. Eighty scholars were nominated for grants of CN$12,000 each. In 1945, the program was expanded and 70 million dollars was distributed to 936 individuals. The country was divided into ten regions, each with an advisory committee in charge of nominating grant recipients.[58] By 1946, the fund was worth 100 million dollars which was distributed to 1,082 individuals. During the war, with high inflation and the depreciation of the currency, this support provided some material and spiritual encouragement to scholars in the government-controlled regions.[59] After the war, these institutions returned to their home provinces and the grants were stopped.

In 1943, when the survival of the China Foundation hung in the balance, it considered gradually closing down some of its projects. But after a process of negotiation with all sides, the Foundation was allowed to continue its operations. During these negotiations, the Foundation enlisted help from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance. The Foundation itself emphasized that after the Japanese had been defeated, "exchanges in science and technology between our nation and America will be needed more than ever. As a result, there is even more need to expand the Foundation's activities."

The Foundation's proposals concerning it future activities included: (1) that it should continue to maintain those of its projects that were well established and had made solid achievements; (2) that those institutions it subsidized should be provided with reasonable amounts of funding as long as they had made solid achievements and really needed the grants; (3) that the scientific research professorship program should be expanded to include the recruitment of prominent U.S. scholars to teach in China and U.S. technical specialists to assist in the development of science, national defense, and industry; (4) that the Foundation should continue to send specialists to the United States to carry out advanced academic research and technological training to promote national development; (5) that in order to expedite scientific and technological development, more books and equipment should be imported from the United States; and (6) Chinese specialists should be sent to the United States to deliver speeches on current conditions in China, and Chinese history and culture so as to increase understanding of China among the American people.[60]

These proposals were obviously too optimistic and ambitious. Even though the Foundation managed to survive the war, its resources were much depleted, as its only source of revenue was income from the endowment. Its local currency investments produced next to no income, while those in U.S. dollars yielded just over 40,000 dollars a year. This was only equal to one-tenth of the Foundation's expenditure before the war.[61] Furthermore, out of this meager income only 60 percent could be spent on projects. With full-scale inflation, it became more and more difficult for the Foundation to maintain its usual operations, and

it was forced to narrow its scope. For example, the microfilms service was stopped, the Ministry of Education was asked to take over the management of the National Library of Peiping, the Ministry of Economic Affairs was asked to take over the Soil Survey, and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology was merged with the Science Society of China's Institute of Biology.[62] By this time, the Foundation could only provide a few scientific research professorships and fellowships.

In an effort to raise funds, H. C. Zen made a special trip to the United States in September 1946. As well as asking the American trustees to enlist the help of the U.S. government in pressuring the Chinese government to pay the arrears of the remission, Zen tried to have the Foundation appointed an agent of the Fulbright Bill and asked the U.S. Surplus Property Fund to make the Foundation an agent of the Sino-American Cultural Special Fund. But the American trustees showed little interest in these proposals, and were even downright hostile. In their correspondence, Greene and Bennett criticized Zen and remarked that his personality was "not appealing." Besides, they claimed, Zen always tried to dodge the issues. Especially when dealing with the Chinese government, he always resorted to using the Americans as a shield. Greene felt that Zen had become even more difficult to understand than before. It had taken quite an effort several years ago to get rid of him as director, and it was a pity that the Chinese trustees still had to put up with him.[63] The mass resignation of the American trustees the following year is an indication of their attitude toward Zen's visit. Due to lack of support from the American trustees, Zen's efforts to push for the payment of the remission and to raise more funds fell

flat. In Zen's opinion, "If there is no way of increasing the budget for the Foundation's projects, the only thing that the Foundation can do is to stay dormant and hoard its existing funds. This was definitely not the original purpose of the Foundation." He therefore suggested that as a last resort, the Foundation should use its endowment to cover its expenditure on projects. The Foundation would then be closed down once the endowment was exhausted. He claimed that this proposal was supported by the majority of the American trustees, although it would require the Foundation' s constitution to be amended.[64] At this stage, the trustees were prepared for the worst. They were ready to use up all their funds to assist China's universities in making good the losses they had suffered during the war and in promoting scientific development in a final act of self-immolation.

Therefore, at its twentieth annual meeting in December 1947, the Foundation resolved to use up to US$250,000 from its endowment account to make loans to no more than four national universities for the purpose of purchasing equipment for research and teaching in their natural science departments. Consequently, the finance committee requested the City Bank Farmers Trust Company to liquidate the Foundation's investments. The office of the director also contacted the universities concerned, asking them to draw up plans to purchase equipment and to sign the loan agreements. At the twenty-first annual meeting, the board approved a loan of US$100,000 to National Peking University, and loans of US$50,000 each to National Central University, National Chekiang University, and National Wuhan University.[65]

The loans were to be repaid over fifteen years with an initial grace period of five years, making the total length of the loan period twenty years. The Ministry of Education acted as guarantor. After the fall of mainland China, although the loan to National Peking University was repaid in full, the remaining US$150,000 was never recovered.[66]

Since the war, the Foundation's educational and cultural activities had been shrinking rapidly. After the war, the Foundation even contemplated the unthinkable—closing down completely. The Chinese government also expressed a wish to take over the Boxer Indemnity Administrations. On January 20, 1948, the Executive Yuan decided that, after the closure of the organizations in receipt of the remission, the government would take over the projects they supported if it considered that their continued existence was necessary. The Ministry of Finance passed a six-point document to the Foundation which detailed how the various projects run or financially supported by the BIAs would be dealt with.[67] The China Foundation complied with the government's wishes and handed over the bulk of its projects to the government. Left with only a few projects under its wing, the China Foundation had lost its previous influence and importance.

Chapter 4: Science Education

China began to develop a modern education system at the end of the nineteenth century. Since the establishment of the Republic, China had begun to emulate the Japanese education system. Modern science courses were taught in schools at various levels, but their quality was extremely poor.[1] Educators were highly critical of the content of science education, and they also criticized the poor quality of the teachers, the lack of sophisticated equipment, and the unsuitability of the science textbooks.[2] In the 1920s, students returning from study in the United States began to introduce American pedagogical theory and practice into Chinese schools. They also asked U.S. specialists to diagnose the problems afflicting Chinese education and offer guidance. In 1921, Paul Monroe conducted a field trip to China. He pointed out that the most serious problem lay with science education in middle schools. At that level, teachers depended too much on textbooks and preferred to deliver lectures rather than inspiring students and encouraging discussion. He also found that the laboratory equipment available for students was inadequate. As a result, they merely learned the terms and theorems by rote, and were unable to grasp the true nature of science.[3]

The Chinese educators took Monroe's suggestions to heart and they began discussing how to improve science teaching methods in middle schools.[4] Through the National Association for the Advancement of Education, an American specialist, Professor George R. Twiss of Ohio State University, was appointed to

carry out a survey of Chinese education. From 1922 to 1924, Twiss visited 190 schools and came up with a list of problems in science education. The items on the list generally coincided with the criticisms already voiced by Chinese and foreign scholars. In 1923, Twiss taught a course on the principles of science teaching at the summer seminar for middle school science teachers at Southeastern University. In addition, whenever he visited a school, he discussed science education with local teachers and educational societies. Afterwards, he would offer his proposals to the school free of charge. In these proposals, Twiss enumerated a number of necessary improvements in pedagogy, teacher training, science courses, classrooms, laboratory equipment, furniture, etc. His general conclusion was that in order to secure the advancement of science in China it was necessary to start by upgrading the quality of science teachers.[5] Twiss's report received an enthusiastic response from Chinese scientists.[6] Most importantly, his proposals became the blueprint for the China Foundation's strategies for improving science education in China.

I. Raising the Quality of Science Teachers in Order to Improve Science Education

Soon after its establishment, the China Foundation recruited specialists to visit the organizations that had made applications for grants and to carry out an inspection of science education throughout China. The specialists' reports further confirmed what Monroe and Twiss had already found. However, due to the huge

number of middle schools in China it would have been impossible for the Foundation to set about improving them one by one. The best way of achieving improvement at the grass roots was to raise the quality of the teaching staff. The Foundation's executive secretary, Tao Hsing-chih, suggested as a general principle that the Foundation should subsidize universities and normal colleges that could train science teachers rather than subsidize middle schools directly.[7]

1. Science Professorship in Normal Colleges

The China Foundation decided to establish thirty-five science professorships for a period of seven years in normal colleges and women's universities designated by the Ministry of Education in Peking, Nanking, Shenyang, Canton, Chengtu, and Wuchang. The purpose of this was to raise the quality of science teachers, improve science teaching methods, and upgrade school science education in these regions. Due to tenure and the renewal of the agreements, some of these professorships lasted more than seven years. The professorships and their locations over ten years are listed as follows:

Year	Peiping Normal University	Central University	Northeastern University	Chung Shan University	Szechuan University	Wuhan University	Sub-total
1926	4	4	3	3	3		17
1927	5	4	3	4	3		19
1928	3	5	3	4	3		18
1929	4	5	4	4	4	3	24
1930	5	5	5	4	5	4	28
1931	5	5	3	4	5	4	26
1932	2	1		2	3	4	12
1933	1	1		1	2	4	9
1934					2	4	6
1935					1	1	2
Total	29	30	21	26	31	24	161

Only twenty-eight professorships were established, fewer than the thirty-five originally planned. The reason for this was that although the China Foundation, in order to encourage women's education, originally included Peking Women's University and the National Peking Women's Normal University on the list, these two universities subsequently abolished their schools of science. Each university on the list received funding for between three and five professorships annually. In addition to paying the professors' salaries (about CN$3,000 per year for each professor), the Foundation also gave each school between $10,000 and $30,000 to purchase equipment. According to the China Foundation's regulations governing the professorships, the grant recipients had three responsibilities: (1) to use the monies saved on the professors' salaries to purchase additional scientific apparatus; (2) to ensure that their science departments and education departments cooperated in promoting science education and improving science teaching in the schools under their auspices; and (3) to take responsibility for improving science education in secondary schools within their districts.[8] Therefore, the establishment of the

science professorships enabled these universities to save money on salaries and use it to purchase equipment instead. This was indeed a shot in the arm for institutions that were suffering from a shortage of funds.

The tenure of the professorships lasted from one to three years with the option of renewal. After six years' service, the professors were to be given a year's sabbatical on full pay plus travel expenses in order to carry out research or conduct surveys abroad. The professors were highly qualified academically. Over the ten-year period, a total of forty-four individuals held 161 professorships. More than half (twenty-three) held PhDs, and ten held master's degrees. All but three are known to have studied abroad, more than half in the United States.[9] This illustrates the importance of the American education system in the development of science education in China at this time.

The major task of the science professors was to "raise the quality of science teachers in their own fields." They needed to "cooperate with each other to find ways to improve science education. For example, they had to participate in and help run the summer institute for science teachers operated by the China Foundation on a voluntary basis, and they were not allowed to take other paid jobs." Their duties included teaching, research, supervising teaching practice, leading surveys, and collecting specimens, although these duties varied across schools. For example, the professor of educational psychology at Northeastern University had additional responsibilities as the administrator of the affiliated middle school, so his duties were focused

on supervising teaching practice. His counterpart at Central University, on the other hand, devoted his time to testing the understanding of middle school students in Chinese language and literature, and the professors at Chungshan University were involved in researching galvanic skin reflexes.[10]

The purpose of the professorships was to improve the teaching of physics, chemistry, zoology, botany, and educational psychology. The subject distribution over the ten-year period was as follows:

Year	Physics	Chemistry	Botany	Zoology	Educational Psychology	Subtotal
1926	4	5	2	2	4	17
1927	5	5	2	3	4	19
1928	5	5	3	2	3	18
1929	6	6	5	3	4	24
1930	6	6	6	5	5	28
1931	6	6	5	4	5	26
1932	2	1	3	3	3	12
1933	1	1	3	3	1	9
1934	1	1	1	2	1	6
1935				2		2
Total	36	36	30	29	30	161

Of the forty-four individual professors, ten were physicists, ten were chemists, eight were zoologists, eight were botanists, and eight were educational psychologists. The biological sciences (zoology and botany) predominated, and this to some extent reflected the main focus of the China Foundation's promotion of science education. The China Foundation's "visiting professor" program also started in the field of biology. In 1927, the Foundation invited the famous entomologist, Professor J. G.

Needham of Cornell University, to visit China to organize course work and research in biology. In addition to his work at National Normal University in Peking teaching biology and improving its laboratories, Needham also attended a number of conferences with biology teachers in Peking, Tientsin, Tunghsien, Nanking, and Hangchow. He also contributed to the organization and management of the Bureau of Entomology of Kiangsu Province and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology.[11] This stimulated interest in the study of biology in China.

Due to a lack of data, it is difficult to assess whether the professorship program actually boosted the quality of middle school teachers or improved science teaching in middle schools. Six years after the program started, the China Foundation issued the following evaluation:

> For the last six years, the Foundation has, in addition to subsidizing salaries paid by schools in receipt of grants, provided $10,000 per professorship to purchase equipment. This should have helped them to improve their science equipment. Even though our government was short of funds over the past six years, the professors who received the grants were able to obtain basic apparatus for conducting scientific experiments, to carry on teaching without having to worry about their salaries, and to find spare energy for research. Now the program has ended, but the infrastructure it has put in place and the spirit of science teaching it has developed will no doubt have a lasting impact on science education in our country.[12]

Taking his own school as an example, Professor Lee Shun-ching of National Normal University, Peking, gave the program very high marks. He thought that as far as his school was concerned, the program had produced the following results:

1. Equipment — Six years ago the biology department of this institution hardly possessed a single piece of equipment. But at present it has more than thirty high-power microscopes, besides other apparatus such as an epidiascope, batteries, delineascopes, drawing and enlarging apparatus, microtomes, incubators, and fine balances. Though not completely and fully equipped, our laboratories are now good enough for ordinary teaching purposes.
2. Books — There were fewer than a hundred Japanese and Chinese books in our department six years ago, but we now have more than a thousand reference books in western languages.
3. Number of students — Formerly, there were about twenty students in this department compared to over seventy this year. New enrolment in the next semester will increase the number to one hundred. For the past six years we have had some fifty graduates, all of whom are now teaching in middle schools.
4. Professors — Owing to frequent arrears in the payment of professors' salaries, many of our colleagues have from time to time left this institution and joined others where salaries are paid more regularly. In spite of such losses, the work of the University has flourished, simply because

of the Foundation professors who have continuously exerted a healthy influence on the whole faculty and inspired their colleagues to overcome many difficulties.[13]

The program did not have such a big effect as was anticipated. Nevertheless, during the period before the Nationalists' Northern Expedition, when education in China was in dire straits, it made a major contribution to maintaining standards in schools, encouraging teachers to devote themselves to teaching, and helping scholars to retain an interest in science. After the success of the Northern Expedition and the unification of China under the Nationalist government, the schools returned to normal operations and the program was phased out.

2. Summer Institute and Summer Schools for Science Teachers

The idea for a summer institute for science teachers did not originate with the China Foundation. It was promoted by the American science education advisors appointed in the early years of the Republic. As mentioned above, George Twiss was invited by the Education Commission of Kiangsu Province to take charge of a two-week summer institute at Southeastern University. Professors of physics, chemistry, and biology from that university acted as instructors to seventy-eight middle school teachers and university students (only fifty-eight were formally registered). Despite lack of preparation time and inadequate equipment, Twiss felt that the summer institute had been a success.[14] The most important thing

was that it set an example for providing short-term training for middle school teachers.

In an effort to improve the quality of medical students, the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation took part in the upgrading of pre-medical schools in China. In 1923, the China Medical Board recruited N. Gist Gee, a former Soochow University biology professor, as an advisor for pre-medical school education. Gee was asked to carry out a survey of science education in China, identify potential grant recipients, and draft a project schedule. Based on Twiss's experience at Southeastern University, the China Medical Board, along with the National Association for the Advancement of Education and Tsing Hua University, held a summer institute at the university. The duration of the institute was extended to four weeks, as many as thirteen instructors were recruited, and 127 students were registered. Particular emphasis was given to practical work and classroom discussion in the physics, chemistry, and biology courses. It was hoped that after completing the courses, the students would introduce innovative science teaching into middle schools. According to Gee's report, the experimental institute was praised by numerous educators from all over the country. Many other schools wanted to emulate the experiment.[15] The National Association for the Advancement of Education published a report that publicized this institute among educators nationwide. The Medical Board intended to hold another institute with Southeastern University the following year, aimed at upgrading science teaching in middle schools in the Yangtze River region, but was prevented from doing so by political instability and problems at the university. Through Gee's connections with

Greene (Gee was on the China Foundation's Advisory Committee on Science Education), the Medical Board reached an agreement with the China Foundation for the latter to take over the program completely.[16]

So in 1926, the China Foundation officially agreed to take over responsibility for the summer institute for science teachers, and to expand the program gradually in northern, southern, and central China. In 1927, Nankai University in Tientsin and Southeastern University in Nanking were selected for trial runs. In 1929, Chekiang University in Hangchow also joined the program. The participants included 18 universities professors, 130 middle school teachers, and more than 20 science professors and specialists recruited by the Foundation as instructors. The results of the research and the discussions were published and distributed to the participating schools by the program organizers.[17] In August that year, science professors, school representatives, and members of the Science Education Advisory Committee of the China Foundation presented detailed reports on teaching conditions in schools at a science education meeting held in Peking. They made a number of proposals for improving the program. The most important of these proposals was that the summer institute should be replaced by a program of summer schools for middle school science teachers.[18]

The financial support for the summer schools was limited to an annual payment of $10,000 for each school. The summer schools were operated by the institutions that had received grants for professorships. The Foundation requested that central and

local government education departments instruct their middle schools to second teachers to study in the summer schools on full pay and with the guarantee of continued employment after they finished the course. The trustees of the Foundation believed that "an organization of this kind will make up for the drawbacks of the summer institute as [it will allow] middle school teachers to receive continuing education. This will be very effective in improving science teaching."[19] With this in mind, the Foundation requested institutions that had been awarded China Foundation professorships to organize summer schools for middle school science teachers. Summer schools were held at Chengdu University and Northeastern University in 1930. The former covered mathematics and physics and the latter taught physics and chemistry. The courses were taught by the holders of the Foundation's professorships, and students were selected by county-level education departments. That year, seven students graduated from the Chengdu University course and twenty-two from the course at Northeastern University. The following year, Northeastern University ceased operations when Manchuria was occupied by the Japanese. In the south, Amoy University received a grant from the China Foundation to hold a summer biology research seminar that lasted for five weeks from July 15 to August 19, 1930. This was similar to the summer institutes but it was limited to biology. After the seminar, the Marine Biology Association of China was established and future seminars were operated by that organization.

Even though these summer institutes and summer schools/ seminars did not solve all the problems with the quality of middle

school science teachers, they did do something to upgrade teaching techniques. Regrettably, the China Foundation later turned its attention toward education and research in universities and its interest in middle school education and teachers waned.

II. Editing and Translating Science Textbooks

Training middle school science teachers was fundamental to improving science education, but "suitable textbooks and inexpensive apparatus were even faster and sharper weapons for the development of scientific knowledge." In a letter to H. C. Zen, Sun Shue-wu remarked that "crummy science textbooks should bear at least some responsibility for the failure of science to take root here." In Sun's opinion, it was necessary to concentrate on the provision of scientific apparatus and textbooks in order to improve science education in middle schools. He wrote, "If we can focus on these two things, science education will really take root. Once it has taken root, the leaves will flourish without any further cultivation."[20]

1. The Advisory Committee on Science Education

In the eyes of the trustees of the China Foundation, "improving science textbooks and an adequate supply of apparatus is an urgent matter that cannot be delayed any longer." Therefore, in February 1929 in Shanghai, ten experts were appointed to plan and take charge of the editing and translating of textbooks on mathematics,

physics, chemistry, geology, and biology. The Advisory Committee on Science Education consisted of the following members:

Mathematics: Chin Fen (Metropolitan University), Kiang Chiang Tso (Nankai University)
Physics: K. L. Yen (Kwanghua University), Y. T. Yao (Nankai University)
Chemistry: C. Wang (National Central University), T. Chang (University of Nanking)
Geology and Geography: J. S. Lee (Metropolitan University), C. C. Chu (National Central University)
Biology: C. F. Wu (Yenching University), H. H. Hu (Biology Laboratory, Science Society of China)

C. Wang and Chin Fen were elected chairman and vice chairman, respectively. The plan was that the mathematics group would, within one year, compile and publish intermediate combined (or mixed) and unmixed textbooks, while the remaining four groups would compile and publish third-year middle school mixed textbooks for the natural sciences, also within one year. The geology and geography group were to produce a set of provincial and national maps of China. The biology and physics groups were to produce college textbooks. It was planned that the committee as a whole would draw up an outline of teaching practice and commission suitable organizations to manufacture scientific apparatus to be sold to schools at a reasonable price.[21]

The plan was to rectify the inadequacies of the existing science textbooks. Since 1922 when a new school system was

put in place, the middle school natural science curriculum had followed the mixed mode in four units: the first unit in biology, the second in physics, the third in chemistry, and the fourth in physics/chemistry. The curriculum also included zoology, botany, mineralogy, astronomy, and meteorology. In practice, however, methods of teaching were not unified. Some schools used mixed mode textbooks and others used non mixed ones. As a result, there were duplications and imbalances. In 1928, Wang Chin carried out a survey of science textbooks used by middle schools in Kiangsu Province and drew the following conclusions, "The defects in science teaching in our country's junior high schools do not lie in its content or level, but are due to lack of uniformity in textbooks whose contents do not meet practical requirements."[22] He compared trends in European and American science teaching and found that the American mixed mode was "better than the European one" and "more suitable for China." Therefore, he concluded, China should adopt the former. The so-called mixed mode involved teaching a mixture of sciences at first and second grade of junior high school and teaching biology at third grade. At senior high school level, geology, physics, and chemistry were each taught for one year. Wang Chin's view was basically in line with the policies of the Nationalist government's education authorities. The Ministry of Education's Curriculum Drafting Committee for Middle and Primary School Teaching approved a draft schedule of the number of teaching hours to be devoted to each course. The curriculum included biology, physics, and chemistry, with mixed textbooks as the norm. Thus both the government and the educators agreed that China should adopt American-style mixed-mode textbooks.

As for the content of these textbooks, Wang analyzed a dozen or so American ones and concluded that "there is little difference in the content of the textbooks. The only difference is in their presentation. Generally speaking, these books deal with the daily life of family and society and the scientific principles to be properly taught on appropriate occasions." He found that physics was given the most weight of all the science subjects, followed by geology, biology, physiology, chemistry, household economy, and astronomy.[23] Although Wang did not say how Chinese textbooks should be compiled, it is not difficult to infer that he believed they should follow the American model.

To avoid old fashioned "dictionary-style" teaching materials, Wang emphasized the importance of textbooks being interesting, stimulating, and lively. Under his leadership, the Advisory Committee on Science Education started to compile and edit textbooks on individual science subjects and mixed textbooks. But the members of the committee, all prominent university professors, were too busy to actively engage in this work. At a science education conference held by the China Foundation in August 1929, Tseng Chao-lun proposed the establishment of a special editing and translation office to improve science education in middle schools. He pointed out that since the committee members were too busy to undertake this work and outside experts were afraid that it would bring them little profit as the books would be hard to sell, experts should be hired to make sure that the work was done well.[24] Consequently the Foundation started to think about reorganizing the Advisory Committee on Science Education.

2. Committee on Editing and Translation

In July 1930, the Foundation decided to replace the Advisory Committee on Science Education with a Committee on Editing and Translation. Hu Shih became chairman of the new committee, with Chang Tsun as his deputy. In addition to the remaining senior members, other recruits included V. K. Ting, S. L. Ting, Y. R. Chao, Chen Yuan, Wen Yiduo, Tchen Yin-koh, Fu Ssu-nien, and S. C. Liang. The thirteen-member committee was divided into two divisions: history/literature and natural science. The material it produced consisted of textbooks on history, literature, and science.[25] Hu Shih described the situation in the past as "disorganized." He said, "of course it would not be right to leave compilation work to the bookshops, but neither should we let extremely busy scholars entrust the work to extremely busy students."[26] Under Hu's leadership, emphasis was placed on translation rather than editing, and translation of material in the humanities was given precedence over middle school science education.

Although the volume of material in the natural sciences was less than that in literature/history, the new committee continued the work begun by its predecessor and finished a number of translations. In mathematics, these were *General Mathematics for Junior Middle Schools* (edited by Chang Hsin-hong and Chang Chih-chi); *Fundamental Concepts of Mathematics* (edited by Liu Chen-ching); *Theory of Integers* (translated and edited by H. T. Hu); *The Theory of Functions* (translated and edited by Hu Zue-chi); James Pierpont's *Theory of Functions of Real Variables* (translated by Koo Chen); and *Introduction to Integral Equations* (written by Ta Li, this was the first book in Chinese on this subject). In the natural sciences, there were *General Science for Junior Middle Schools* (edited by Chen Chao-peng); *General Science Research for Junior Middle Schools* (edited by Needham and Li Shun-ching); *Hand-outs on Basic Physics Experiments* (edited by Ting Sie-lin); *English-Chinese Physics Terminology; College Physics* and *Laboratory Manuals* (both edited by Sah Pen-tung); *Nuclear Research* (written by Yang Chen-pan); Robert Andrews Millikan's *The Electron* (translated by Chung Hsien); *Lectures on Electronics* (translated by Hou Sho-chih); *Chemistry for Senior High Schools* (edited by Tsao Yuan-yu); *Geography for Junior High Schools* (edited by Chang Chi-yun); and *A New Atlas of China's Provinces* (edited by Liu Chih-sheng et al.). A dozen or so other works were in the process of translation.

This result did not meet the target set by the advisory committee. With Wang Chin's encouragement, some general science textbooks were completed, as well as some works on mathematics and physics. Only one or two texts were completed in chemistry and geology, and regrettably no biology texts were completed. All in all, the committee provided some science textbooks for middle schools, but there was not much to show where senior high school and college texts were concerned. The committee later changed its direction and devoted itself to the translation of advanced works. Educators were not very happy with the translations as the books did not meet the needs of Chinese society. Chang Chiang-shu, for example, complained thus,

> Of course, translated works seem more useful to us than their originals. Even countries that are advanced in science like those of Europe and the U.S., cannot avoid using translations. As a matter of course, as a scientifically underdeveloped country we should also promote translations. But translation is not an easy job. The existing translations are either hard to read or not faithful to the originals. Maybe only one in ten of them is both faithful and fluent. Furthermore, there is a big question mark concerning whether the originals are of high quality and are appropriate for Chinese society.[27]

Even the few translations that were produced were not valued by educators. In the 1930s, the universities, and even the middle schools, preferred foreign-language textbooks. Some schools even held lectures in foreign languages. In 1933, H. C. Zen conducted a survey aimed at finding out how many courses for university freshmen and second and third grade students in senior high schools (formerly prep school students) were taught using Chinese-language textbooks. He issued questionnaires to thirty public and private universities with sizable colleges of science and 200 accredited senior high schools across the nation. He received twenty responses from universities and 109 from senior high schools. The results were as follows [28]:

A. Science Textbooks Used by Freshmen in Universities

Course	Number of Textbooks in English	Number of Textbooks in Chinese	Total
Mathematics*	12 (100%)	0 (0%)	12
Basic Physics	19 (95%)	1 (5%)	20
Basic Chemistry	19 (95%)	1 (5%)	20
Basic Biology	11 (84%)	2 (16%)	13
Total	61 (93%)	4 (7%)	65

*Includes algebra, plane geometry, solid geometry, trigonometry, and analytical geometry.

B. Basic Physics Textbooks Used in Senior High Schools

Course	Number of Textbooks in English	Number of Textbooks in Chinese	Total
Mathematics	255 (80%)	62 (20%)	317
Physics	117 (70%)	50 (30%)	167
Chemistry	105 (64%)	61 (36%)	166
Biology	19 (21%)	71 (79%)	90
Total	496 (67%)	244 (33%)	740

From these results we can see that 93 percent of science textbooks used by university freshmen and 67 percent of textbooks used by senior high school students were in English. In reality, there were only fifty-seven different textbooks in Chinese used in high schools. Zen concluded that “for more than a decade, we have made a big fuss about promoting science education and yet the schools have not even made the slightest effort in this respect.”[29] From Zen’s survey, we can see that there were more biology textbooks in Chinese than there were Chinese books in other subjects and that in the senior high schools they even predominated. This could be because biology had developed ahead of the other sciences in the years since the establishment of the Republic.[30] In view of this relative abundance of biology textbooks

in Chinese, the China Foundation's translation efforts were concentrated on the other natural sciences.

Zen pointed out that "all the foreign-language textbooks for senior high schools were published in the United States, there is not a single European textbook among them." This situation was criticized by the Education Inspection Commission of the League of Nations, as it was seen as allowing Americans to have too strong an influence on Chinese intellectuals. The commission also commented that the basic task of education in China was "not imitation but innovation and adaptation," and it called for foreign-language textbooks to be banned in middle schools.[31] Public opinion in China was also strongly in favor of improving education through the production of textbooks. As one commentator noted,

> If we want to improve our education, we should ask our people to compile Chinese science textbooks, in the Chinese style, and adapted to Chinese needs. … It is earnestly hoped that Chinese scientists, besides researching and teaching, will devote some of their time to compiling some general science textbooks as their obligation to society. Otherwise, if we do not have science, how can we have science education?[32]

The China Foundation did in fact begin promoting the work of editing and translating science textbooks before Chinese and foreign critics began calling for it. Unfortunately, after the changes of personnel that accompanied the reorganization of the Foundation, the work of the Editing and Translation Committee was expanded to include the humanities, something that adversely

affected the translation of science textbooks. In 1934, when the executive committee was considering how to enhance the efficiency of the Foundation's undertakings, they compared the work of the Committee on Editing and Translation to that of the National Institute for Compilation and Translation and the Sun Yat-sen Institute for Culture and Education. They concluded that "one of these two organizations focuses on modern issues and the other is mainly involved in screening publications, so there is not much duplication between our work and theirs."[33] Despite criticism from Sze Sao-ke that its involvement in translation in the field of the humanities was not in accordance with the basic aims of the China Foundation, the Foundation still insisted on expanding its work in this area. Its resources were therefore spread too thinly and its effectiveness was reduced. So when it was necessary for the Foundation to tighten its belt during wartime, it was inevitable that the Committee on Editing and Translation would be dissolved.

III. The Promotion of Research through the Provision of Scientific Apparatus

Paul Monroe was surprised to find that science education in China consisted mainly of lectures rather than practical work. This issue was also discussed among Chinese educators. For example, Professor Wu Chen-lou of Peking Normal University allowed his students to conduct experiments, and he urged schools to provide scientific apparatus for this purpose:

Training in science cannot be solely dependent on textbooks.

> …Experiments are fundamental to understanding both theory and practice. There is no science without experiments. Without experiments, science cannot be learnt.[34]

Wu found that fewer middle schools than universities possessed laboratory equipment, so, since "the crucial issue in science education is to develop it in middle schools," he concluded that "we should start with scientific apparatus which is sorely lacking in those schools."[35]

1. Middle Schools

Initially, the China Foundation did plan to focus its efforts on improving science education in middle schools. These schools were so numerous, however, that the Foundation could not hope to provide assistance to each of them individually. That is why it sought to achieve this aim by improving the quality of science teachers. However, the Foundation also found other direct ways to improve science education in middle schools. In addition to urging science professors to take charge of improving science teaching in the middle schools affiliated to their institutions or other schools in their districts and promoting the compilation of science textbooks, in 1926, the China Foundation decided to award grants to established middle schools that emphasized science education. The three private schools selected, Nankai, Tso Yee, and Minteh, were awarded one-year grants to purchase scientific apparatus in an effort to improve the effectiveness of their teaching. Unfortunately, after one year the project was stopped. From then on the

Foundation only gave grants to universities and junior colleges.

At the Foundation's fourth annual meeting in June 1928, its acting director, Y. T. Tsur, proposed three supplementary regulations governing the awarding of grants. One of these stated, "Only make grants to middle-level schools and above." It is unclear whether this was designed to include middle schools. But whatever it meant, after the Foundation was reorganized middle schools seem to have been excluded. This change in grant policy may possibly be attributed to the fact that trustees such as Hu Shih and Greene put greater emphasis on college education. The trustees who were educators mostly came from universities. Under Greene's leadership, Peking Union Medical College also emphasized the development of a medical elite. From the very birth of the Foundation, Greene's views on grants were different from those of Monroe. Greene emphasized higher education and scientific research, while Monroe cared more about middle school education and mass education. After the reorganization of the Foundation, Greene became more actively involved in its decisions, while Monroe remained in the United States and to some extent lost touch with the Foundation's operations. This dramatic change in the Foundation's policies may therefore have had some connection with the ebb and flow of the influence of these two trustees.

Apart from differences among the trustees, the major reason for the Foundation's decision to stop supporting middle schools was its limited resources. Whether the Foundation should provide direct subsidies for middle schools had been a hot topic of debate from the outset. Based on a report produced by the Commission

for the Investigation of Science Teaching, the Foundation established a policy of improving the quality of science teachers as a way of supporting schools, rather than providing direct grants to middle schools. The reason for this was that there were "more than eight hundred middle schools to be surveyed. It cannot be done at once. If we give a grant to one school, others will follow suit and we would be hard put to deal with it."[36] In 1935, Monroe again proposed conducting a survey of middle and primary schools. The executive committee drafted a plan for this, with an estimated budget of CN$66,000 to cover the hiring of experts and their travel expenses, printing expenses, and other expenditures. The executive committee thought that although one could hardly expect schools to lend the services of their academics, the Foundation's finances were very tight at that time and "it was doubtful whether the Foundation had the energy to do this job." Consequently, the planned survey was tabled.37 Once the science professorships program for normal colleges had been ended and direct grants to middle schools had been suspended, there were no more voices to be heard in support of assistance for middle and primary education at the various meetings of the Foundation.

2. Universities

In 1921, there were only five government-run universities and eight private universities in China. The number increased after the new school system was introduced in 1922, and by 1931, there were more than seventy universities in the country. The growth in the number of universities over the ten-year period is displayed below.[38]

Year	Public	Private	Total
1922	10	9	19
1923	19	10	29
1924	30	11	41
1925	34	13	47
1926	37	14	51
1927	34	18	52
1928	28	21	49
1929	29	21	50
1930	32	27	59
1931	36	37	73

For more than ten years, the university curriculum in China favored the humanities at the expense of the sciences. Only 10 percent of all university departments were science departments, including the natural sciences, agriculture, engineering, and medicine. Only 30 percent of university students were studying science. In 1932, the government ordered universities to "stop the expansion of liberal arts departments and encourage the expansion of existing science departments such as engineering, agriculture, and medicine."[39] This caused some controversy in education circles, but the change of emphasis toward science became established.

Starting in 1926, the Foundation began to award grants to universities for the purchase of scientific apparatus. Thirty-six universities had received such grants by the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (see table 4-1). Even though the Foundation had always taken pains to ensure that its grants were distributed fairly to institutions throughout the country, universities in southern and central China (eight of them in Shanghai) accounted for more than half of the grants. The remainder were in the north

(eight universities), the southwest (four), and the northeast (one).

These grants fall into two categories: those for additional science teaching and research equipment (for example, the College of Science at Central University, Nankai University, Wuhan University Amoy University, Kwanghua University, Tatung University, Tahsia University, Hujiang University, Soochow University, Northeastern University, Szechuan University, and Chekiang University) and those awarded to specific departments, especially departments of agriculture, engineering, and medicine (the College of Agriculture, Central University; the College of Agriculture and the Graduate School of Education, Chungshan University; the College of Agriculture, Private University of Nanking; the College of Agriculture, Ling-nan University; the Graduate School of Industries, University of Communications; National College of Engineering; Shanghai Medical College; and the Medical College of Chee-Loo University). Grants were distributed evenly among these two categories. Reviewing the effectiveness of its grants, the China Foundation summarized the pros and cons as follows:

> Generally speaking, the effectiveness of grants for specific projects are easy to assess, while those awarded to educational institutions are harder to assess as the funds are mostly used for maintaining equipment.[40]

Table 4-1: Grants to Schools

Schools	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	Total
Nankai U	45,000	30,000	50,000	30,000	20,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	20,000	20,000	335,000
Futan U	7,500	2,500										10,000
Chung Hua U	4,500		4,000									8,500
Hua-Chung U									9,000	5,000	6,000	20,000
Tatung U	10,000	10,000	20,000			10,000						50,000
Huchiang U						10,000				5,000		15,000
Tahsia U						10,000						10,000
Kwanghua U			10,000			10,000						20,000
Amoy U				5,500	1,588	30,000	30,000	30,000	20,000	3,000	8,000	128,088
Soochow U					2,000	2,000	2,000					6,000
Yenching U							25,000	25,000		15,000	15,000	80,000
Fukien Union								12,000				12,000
Huanan Women's								8,000				8,000
Boone Library	10,000	2,500	8,750	20,000	13,500	17,100	17,100	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000	148,950
Natl. Music C						10,000						10,000
Natl. Peking U	15,000		15,000									30,000
Peiping Normal	10,000	12,000					3,250					25,250
Northeastern U	8,000	8,000										16,000
Tonglu U			30,000									30,000
Szechuan U	8,000	3,000									5,000	16,000
Kwanghsi U										5,000	5,000	10,000
Chekiang U						30,000						30,000
Wuhan U					50,000	42,500	30,000	50,000	50,000			222,500
Tungchi					20,000							20,000
Central U	32,250	43,000	90,000	65,000	55,000	75,000	60,000				10,000	430,250
Nanking U					10,000	10,000	10,000	15,000	15,000	5,000	6,000	71,000
Lingnan U	15,000	15,000	25,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	15,000	15,000	4,000	5,000	134,000
Chungshan U	5,500	10,000			5,000	30,000	30,000	25,000	15,000	10,000	10,000	140,500
U Communications	37,500				40,000	60,000	20,000					157,500
Peiyang Eng.				50,000		10,000					20,250	80,250
Hopei Eng. C					10,000							10,000
Fuchung M.			10,000									10,000
Hsiangya Med.	45,000											45,000
Shanghai Med								30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000	120,000
Cheeloo U										14,000	14,000	28,000
Huasi Union											25,000	25,000
Sub-total	253,250	136,000	262,750	180,500	237,088	396,600	267,350	255,000	199,000	126,000	199,250	2,512,788

To enhance the effectiveness of the grants and to avoid duplication, the China Foundation opted for more cooperative projects. The principles governing the awarding of grants were as follows:

1. Grants to educational institutions should be limited to well-planned cooperative programs capable of raising standards among the recipients. Grants for ordinary equipment and maintenance are to be phased out.
2. For specific projects, preference should be given to those with the potential to produce practical results that require ongoing support on a comparatively large scale. Sundry grants that fritter away the Foundation's funds should be avoided.[41]

These principles should have helped deflect some outside criticism of the Foundation.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, educators in China frequently expressed doubts and criticism concerning the Foundation's grant policies. Indeed, the early institutional recipients of the Foundation's grants tended to have connections with the trustees. Although the grants awarded to National Peking University, National Normal University in Peking, Nankai University, and Southeastern University could be justified in terms of the strength of their science departments, it cannot be denied that another important reason was that the presidents or trustees of these schools, including Chiang Monlin, Fan Yuan-lien, Huang Yen-pei, Chang Po-ling, and P. W. Kuo, were all trustees

of the China Foundation. As a representative of the Rockefeller Foundation's China Medical Board and a trustee of the China Foundation, Greene had a major influence on the grant policies of both organizations. For example, starting in 1914, in order to upgrade the quality of students entering the Peking Union Medical College, the Medical Board subsidized the development of the college of sciences at Yenching University so that it could become a center of pre-medical education. In 1932 and 1933, under Greene's influence, the China Foundation also awarded a grant of $25,000 to Yenching University to carry out water pipe and air duct insulation works and to install a diesel generator. In 1935 and 1936, together with the Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, it provided grants to Yenching University for the purchase of scientific apparatus.[42] In another example, the missionary-operated Fukien Union University received huge grants from the Medical Board as early as 1918 to hire professors and purchase equipment. Graduates of the pre-medical department of this school went on to study at Peking Union Medical College, and its courses were integrated with those of the Medical College.[43] In 1933, the China Foundation gave Fukien Union University $12,000 for science teaching and research equipment. Similar grants were made to Amoy University and Soochow University. From this it is apparent that the two foundations often complemented each other and cooperated with each other in providing grants to support science education in China.

Among the Chinese-operated private universities, Nankai University had a good academic reputation and its science departments had been developing steadily. As early as 1923, the

Rockefeller Foundation helped Nankai build a science hall at a total cost of CN$190,000, of which the Rockefeller Foundation provided $100,000 for the building and $25,000 for equipment. It also provided $6,750 per year to hire new teachers.[44] The China Foundation's evaluation of Nankai University was excellent; it was considered to be a school that was "conscientiously run, highly efficient, and far superior to other private universities." Its science departments were outstanding, especially the departments of physics and chemistry. Therefore, the China Foundation provided the school with a special grant specifically for improving science teaching and research and for purchasing new books.[45] The annual expenditure of Nankai University's science departments was $29,498 in 1924, rising to $52,805 in 1925, $57,758 in 1926, $62,795 in 1927, $68,084 in 1928, and $73,638 in 1929.[46] Starting in 1926, the China Foundation provided annual grants of between $30,000 and $50,000 for equipment. A new thermodynamics laboratory was built and equipped, creating a good environment for the university's faculty members to conduct their research. Their published research papers were well received. However, this seeming favoritism attracted criticism. A number of Chinese students studying in France wrote letters to the press accusing the China Foundation of basing its grant policies on personal connections. They also claimed that this was a way of Americanizing universities in China.[47] Whether or not this was true, it was undisputable that the China Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation worked together to support Nankai University.

Generally speaking, a lack of stable sources of revenue

prevented China's private universities from developing their science departments. Soon after it was established, the China Foundation provided grants to Futan University's college of biology. The Foundation also helped the University of Central China expand its physics and chemistry departments. But Futan suspended operations in 1926 and the University of Central China followed suit in1927. Being situated on the coast, Amoy University, was well placed for studying marine biology. With support from the Rockefeller Foundation and the China Foundation, the Society of Marine Biology in China conducted seminars at Amoy. The success of these seminars prompted the China Foundation to subsidize Amoy's colleges of science and education, enabling the school to purchase laboratory equipment, hire two professors, increase the number of courses offered by 20 percent, and boost its student numbers by 50 percent. In addition to teaching students, Amoy University's professors conducted research and carried out a survey of coastal fisheries in Fukien Province. Many specimens were collected, some of which, particularly Amoy Amphioxus and electric rays, were much appreciated by European and American universities. The China Foundation was very supportive of university biomaterials departments. For example, the Foundation provided three-year grants to one such department at Soochow University. Its business boomed and forty-eight middle schools, thirty universities in China, ten foreign institutions, and one hundred and nine other organizations and individuals ordered biomaterials from there. This made a considerable contribution to the teaching of biology.[48]

The support offered by the China Foundation to government-

run universities was concentrated on the applied sciences, such as agriculture, engineering, and medicine. The foundation supported the colleges of agriculture at Southeastern University (which later became Central University) and Chung-shan University, the University of Communications (formerly Nanyang University), Shanghai Medical College, and the Central University medical college. This will be dealt with in more detail below. Where the pure sciences in government-run universities were concerned, the Foundation was particularly supportive of Wuhan University. That school made steady progress after Wang Shih-chieh was appointed president in 1929. The Foundation noted that "being situated in the center of China it is likely to make a great contribution to science education in our country in the future." With this appraisal in mind, the Foundation decided to grant Wuhan University the huge sum of $50,000 annually from 1931. These funds were to be used for the purchase of an air-liquefier, batteries, and photoelectric instruments, as well as the establishment of a carpentry and metalwork factory and a radio station. The Foundation also provided funds to build the university library.[49]

The National University of Peking (also called Peking University or Peita), which had been established during the late Ching Dynasty, enjoyed a high reputation in the early years of the Republic. It was the first school to receive grants from the China Foundation. The Foundation's board explained why it was supporting Peita's science departments as follows:

> [Peita's] physics department is better equipped with laboratory apparatus than the other science departments. There are five physics laboratories and one laboratory each for electric vibration, applied electronics, and x-rays. The department also has three optics laboratories. It is also equipped with machine rooms, research rooms, and reading rooms. This means that the department is ranked number one in the nation and highly suited for carrying out research. The Foundation is subsidizing this department not merely for its own benefit but in order for it to become a model for research throughout China.[50]

After 1926, however, Peita was in dire straits. It experienced a series of crises, and there was even talk of merger with another school or closure altogether. In these circumstances, the China Foundation was unable to continue its support.

Even after the success of the Nationalists' Northern Expedition and the reunification of the country in 1928, Peita was still in a very precarious situation. Chiang Monlin, who was appointed president in 1930, was determined to reorganize the administration of the school and in this he was supported by the China Foundation. Greene, Hu Shih, and Fu Ssu-nien were particularly supportive. The thorniest problem for the university was lack of funds. At that time, due to cash-flow problems, the professors were being paid meager salaries and there was a shortage of books and equipment. In order to tackle these problems, the Foundation drew up plans for a special research fund. The Foundation and the university would each contribute $200,000 per year over a five-year period—a total of $2,000,000—to fund research professorships and full-time professors, scholarships,

and the purchase of books, instruments, and equipment. Chiang estimated that under this program the school could maintain nine research professorships at an average annual salary of CN$7,000, fifteen full-time professors with an average annual salary of $5,400, fifteen scholarships of $600 each, and stipends of $10,000 for twelve graduate students studying abroad. Of the remaining funds, over $200,000 would be used to purchase books and instruments and to refurbish the libraries and laboratories.[51]

In January 1931, the China Foundation's board adopted Greene's proposal that it should cooperate with Peita in setting up the special research fund. Director Zen and Chiang Monlin, the university's president, appointed an advisory committee consisting of Hu Shih, Wong Wen-hao, Fu Ssu-nien, L.K. Tao, and H. F. Sun to select the professors and decide how the funds should be used. From 1934 to 1937 (the agreement was extended for two more years), the Foundation contributed $100,000 per year to the research fund while the university contributed $200,000. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War resulted in the early termination of the arrangement in 1936, and neither side contributed its full quota of funds, as shown in the following table:

Year	Research Prof. Salaries	Equipment & Books	Scholarship Expenses	Building	Maintenance	Others	Reserve	Total
1931	88,300	161,700						250,000
1932	132,000	165,000	9,900	80,000	7,200	5,900		400,000
1933	126,000	168,500	9,900	75,000	7,200	1,000	12,400	400,000
1934	120,600	102,000	9,900	50,000	5,760		11,740	300,000
1935	123,600	102,000	13,900	50,000	5,760		4,740	300,000
1936	120,000	106,650	13,900		5,760	50,000	3,690	300,000
Total	710,500	805,850	57,500	255,000	31,680	56,900	32,570	1,950,000

Of the total grant, 41.3 percent was spent on research equipment, books, and instruments; the salaries of research professors took 36.4 percent and only 3 percent was used for student scholarships. Interestingly, building expenses, which were not in the original agreement, became an important item and accounted for 13 percent of the total.

Before 1931, Peking University was not very well equipped compared to other state-run universities in China, as can be seen from the following list of universities and the value of their equipment.[52] (all value in CN$)

Wuhan University	910,070
Tsing Hua University	511,096
Central University	436,342
Chung-shan University	186,084
Peiping University	105,350
Peking University	30,917

After it received its grant from the China Foundation, however, Peking University was able to improve its equipment dramatically. For example, the chemistry department purchased more instruments and other supplies, as did the departments of physics, biology, psychology, geology, and mathematics. By 1935, the university's laboratory equipment was said to be worth more than half a million dollars. It had 6,200 instruments, 16,700 specimens, and 3,100 items of laboratory supplies and equipment.[53]

From 1931 to 1935, the research fund was used to hire

between sixteen and twenty-two professors each year as follows:

College of Liberal Arts --

Tang Yung-tung	(Philosophy)
Chen Shou-yi	(History)
Chow Tso-jen	(Literature)
Liu Fu	(Literature)
Hsu Chih-mou	(Western Literature)
Chang Yi	(Philosophy)
S. C. Liang	(English Literature)
George K. C. Yeh	(Foreign Literature)

College of Sciences --

Feng Tsu-shun	(Mathematics)
Wang Shou-ching	(Physics)
Leo Soo-tsi	(Chemistry)
Tseng Chao-lun	(Chemistry)
Hsu Hsiang	(Botany)
Wang Ging-hsi	(Psychology)
V. K. Ting	(Geology)
J. S. Lee	(Geology)
Kiang Tsai-han	(Mathematics)
Sah Peng-tung	(Physics)
Hsia Chia-yung	(Geology)
Chang Ching-yueh	(Biology)
Y. T. Yao	(Physics)
Chu Woo-hua	(Physics)
A. W. Grabau	(Paleontology)
Emanuel Sperner	(Mathematics)
W. F. Osgood	(Mathematics)

College of Law --

Chao Nai-t'uan	(Economics)
Liu Chih-yang	(Law)
Chang Chung-fu	(Political Science)
Wu Ting-liang	(Statistics)

Among them, Leo Soo-tsi served as dean of the college of sciences. Chen Shou-yi, Chang Yi, Feng Tsu-shun, Wang Sou-ching, Tseng Chao-lun, J. S. Lee, Chang Ching-yueh, Y. T. Yao, Chao Nai-t'uan, and Chang Chung-fu were all department heads. The grant had a profound effect on the development of the university's college of sciences. In 1937, the university recognized the significance of the grant thus:

> Since 1931, our school has received your Foundation's support through the jointly established special research fund. During the five and a half years since then, not only have we been able to increase our store of books, instruments, and other equipment, and improve our buildings, but our esprit de corps has been boosted, and we have been able to improve our research methods and curriculum, and increase the number of our full-time professors.[54]

The Foundation's grants to Peking University were an exception. The special research fund appropriations were not been listed under the category of grants, but were instead categorized as "cooperative undertakings." This special treatment attracted a lot of protest from other schools. The United Council of the Peking-Tientsin-Shanghai Universities Reading Movement sought to

expose the "inside story" of the China Foundation in a stinging attack that accused the Foundation of being "under the control of ambitious educational tsars from Peita, such as Tsai Yuan-pei, Chiang Monlin, Li Yu-ying, Hu Shih, Y. C. Chao, and H. C. Zen" since its inception. "Since they conquered most of the territory in universities across the nation," the statement went on, "they have become arrogant and feel themselves to be immune from criticism. They think they can do whatever they like with impunity. They are supposed to promote culture and yet culture is being destroyed. They are supposed to develop education and yet education is being trampled upon by them."[55] The statement went on to assert that Peita's favored treatment was solely attributable to its private connections with the Foundation's trustees. The Foundation did not respond to this attack. Zen did respond to criticism from Cheng Chi-bao, a professor at Central University. In an article entitled, "The Remission of the Boxer Indemnity and Education, Cheng commented that, "most of the funds from the remission of the Boxer Indemnity were entrusted to a few persons and these few persons, we are afraid to say, control the use of these funds." He added, "the so-called promotion and so-called assistance is piecemeal work without any overall planning. Consequently, no priorities have been set." In addition, Cheng said that it was unfair that Peita was receiving a whopping $200,000 annually, while the department of education at Central University could not even get a pitiful grant of $10,000. Zen responded as follows:

> The China Foundation's grants have a major theme, that is, to develop the natural sciences in our country. In order to do this, we have to promote scientific research. …To Mr. Cheng, these grants may seem to be tailor-made to serve private interests. But in reality, they are the products of a well-planned overall policy. As for the concentration of financial resources on some effective projects, this has actually been one of the major policies of the China Foundation in recent years.[56]

These criticisms, whether mild or sharp, had dogged the China Foundation since its establishment. Naturally, the trustees tried to navigate around these shoals, but they could not avoid all of them. For example, after the war, many universities wanted to borrow foreign exchange funds from the Foundation to purchase more scientific apparatus, and in particular, Hu Shih, as a representative of Peita, wished to borrow US$100,000 on behalf of the university's physics department. Hu remarked about this in a letter:

> I gave some thought to this. Colleagues within Peita have never protested against the US$100,000 loan to the physics department. But I am afraid that it will not go down so well with other schools. It seems a good idea to make the loan to Peita a precedent for other universities.[57]

Y. T. Yao wrote to Zen claiming that the achievements made by the Peita physics department over the years were mainly due to support and encouragement from the China Foundation, and that this new loan would boost the physics department still further. Yao continued:

> I dare to take advantage of our personal friendship to ask my big brother to loan us the funds to be used in the United States as soon as possible. In the meantime, payment should be made to Wu Ta-you and Ma Shih-chun in the States so that we can order the equipment sooner. We intend to use the equipment to carry out some important and meaningful projects and we will not waste a single penny.[58]

It is doubtful that the director of the China Foundation would have ignored such a request based on "personal friendship." Even if we dismiss the claim that the Foundation was in the hands of a few "educational tsars from Peita," it cannot be denied that the favorable treatment accorded to Peita was largely the result of the influence of trustees who were also professors at the university, such as Hu Shih.

Chapter 5: The Application of Science

From the early years of the Republic to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, and even right up until the 1980s, there was a lot of discussion in academic circles in China about the content of the "pure" and "applied" sciences and the relationship between them. In the 1920s and 1930s, academics in general believed that both were equally important. Tsai Yuan-pei was one such academic, who said:

> Scientific research should not be undertaken for the sole purpose of application. Some of the most important scientific facts with the most practical value were discovered serendipitously during research in pure science. … While results of research in pure science will become the basis for science applications, work on the applications of science often provides new leads and new instruments for pure science. Both of them should be attended to. Otherwise, if we favor one side more than the other, both sides will come to nothing.[1]

V. K. Ting and L. K. Tao also believed that science was an integrated whole and there was no difference between the pure and applied sciences. The distinction was made only for the sake of convenience. They thought that it would be more appropriate to say "applications of science" than "applied sciences."[2] Even though scholars and politicians tended to favor the applications of science, others sought to redress the balance. For example, when in 1932 the politician Chen Guofu proposed a total restructuring

of education that would see departments of literature, law, the arts, etc. in institutes of higher education closed down and resources redeployed to expand departments such as agriculture, engineering, and medicine, Tsiang T'ing-fu argued that Chen was proposing to use the study of agriculture, engineering, and medicine as educational tools for making money. Tsiang claimed that the proposal had not been studied objectively and no overall planning had been done. He dismissed the proposal as nothing more than a blank sheet of paper which, if carried out, would be superficial and short-lived.[3]

From the beginning, the China Foundation had given equal emphasis to science education, scientific research, and the application of science. The trustees had differing ideas about this. For example there were the arguments of Monroe vs. those of Greene, and those of Wong Wen-hao vs. those of Hu Shih, as mentioned in the previous chapter. The application of science was by no means favored by the Foundation. It did not provide grants to support applied science either in projects ran by itself or those classed as cooperative undertakings. It merely subsidized certain specialist colleges. The Foundation considered that "the applied sciences are too wide in scope and too resource-hungry." Of the applied sciences, the Foundation focused its support on agriculture, engineering, and medicine, and it had nowhere near enough funds to support even one of these fields completely. The Foundation could only "select a few high performing specialist schools to receive subsidies, with the hope that after a few years of support, the schools would achieve good results and other schools would emulate them. The subsidies could then be redirected to other schools."[4]

I. Agriculture

The development of agricultural science in China went through four phases in the years after the establishment of the Republic. During the first phase, before 1917, schools of agriculture and experimental farms were set up in Peking and the provinces, but there was little improvement in either the practice of agriculture or agricultural education. During the second phase, from 1917 to 1933, the provinces began to set up agricultural colleges, and by the end of the period twelve universities had set up colleges of agriculture. Two of these, at the Private University of Nanking and Nanking Higher Normal School, had, according to Shen Tsung-han, "worked hard to integrate education, research, and the promotion of agriculture. In addition to teaching, the professors also carried out research, conducted agricultural surveys, and promoted agriculture." It was, he claimed, only when students had developed a deeper understanding of the problems of agriculture in China, that the gap between education and its application would be bridged. According to Shen, Nanking had become the center of agricultural development in China.[5] The third phase spanned the years 1933-48. During that period, the Ministry of Industry established the Central Agricultural Laboratory, the National Economic Committee established the Central Cotton Production Improvement Center, and the National Rice Improvement Institute was established by the Executive Yuan. These three institutions were all in Nanking and they cooperated closely with each other. Research and promotion work was gradually taken over by the central government. The fourth phase started after 1949 when the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction carried

out most of the work in this field in Taiwan.

As for the China Foundation, most of its grants during the second phase were directed toward the agricultural colleges of the Private University of Nanking and Southeastern University (later called Central University) in Nanking.

The Foundation's director, H. C. Zen, considered that agricultural education fell within the scope of the applied sciences. Its purpose was to use scientific methods to find solutions for agricultural problems, "with the ultimate aim of effectively promoting these solutions among farmers." Therefore, the main task of the agricultural schools was to develop researchers and popularizers. As Zen said, "Fewer researchers than popularizers are needed, but it is harder to train up the former. If they cannot train both, the agricultural schools should at least train researchers." Unfortunately, the agricultural schools did not heed this advice and they failed both to train researchers and promote agriculture. In these circumstances, Zen recommended that agricultural education should go through the following three stages: academic education, the training of experts, and the dissemination of the best technologies among farmers.[6] In other words, research, teaching, and promotion. The Foundation's support for agricultural education also focused on these three areas.

The agricultural college at the Private University of Nanking was established in 1914 with funding from American missionaries. Its dean, Joseph Bailie, was known as "the father of modern agricultural education in China."[7] Bailie was succeeded by J. H. Reisner, a graduate of the department of agronomy at Yale University. These two men worked hard to make the college a center for the study of important issues in Chinese agriculture and for the training of Chinese specialists. Being privately funded, the college had limited resources, but it also had more freedom. Lacking departments of animal husbandry or veterinary medicine, the college was able to devote more energy to important subjects, such as thremmatology (breeding research). In 1924, the university signed a five-year agreement with Cornell University and the International Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation to engage in the improvement of agricultural production in China. Reisner's teacher, H. H. Love, came to China to start this project, and he was succeeded by other American professors. They worked with missionary-run farms in northern China, providing technological support, personnel, and funds. They tried to improve the production of wheat, barley, sorghum, millet, soybeans, etc., with major emphasis on wheat and sorghum. Every summer, under the leadership of the Cornell University professors, they gathered the farms' breeding specialists together to learn new breeding techniques and to review the results of previous breeding experiments. This international cooperation was a great success and the university's thremmatology work made rapid progress. It was praised for being "the top school in this field both in China and abroad."[8]

In 1930, the China Foundation decided to subsidize the continuation of this cooperation project. The grants were earmarked for research equipment for the department of agronomy and the plant pathology section. Shen Tsung-han, the head of the

agronomy department, took charge of the experimental growing of crops and research into genetics and pathology. The experiments designed to increase yield focused on rice, sorghum, and wheat as they were the staple foods of China. The university set up experimental farming areas in northern and central China and organized cooperative experimental farms. The best varieties were distributed to other regions for planting. Research in plant genetics was concentrated on wheat and rice. The researchers studied nematode resistance and the inheritance of such features as the hairy leaf and awns. By 1935, they had produced a number of new varieties of wheat, such as King-ta 2905, Tsinan 195, Kaifeng 124, and Hsuchou 438, which were resistant to wheat flag smut and nematode disease. They test-planted the new varieties in Nanking, Kaifeng, and Nan Suchou and achieved 15-30 percent increases in yields over the local varieties. The first of the new strains were introduced to farmers with excellent results. A new variety of rice was also developed and test-planted, and that proved to be both more productive than the local strains and more resistant to borer pests. Work on plant pests was limited to rice. The researchers first of all carried out a detailed survey of the varieties of pests, their distribution, and the environment in an area between Peking and Shanghai and between Shanghai and Hangchow. The team also studied the life cycles and paths of transmission of such diseases as helminthosporium blight, kernel smut, stem blight, rice plague, picularia (rice blast), and rhizoctonia sheath blight, and successfully developed and promoted varieties that were resistant to these diseases.[9]

Under the leadership of P. W. Kuo, Southeastern University

(later to become National Central University) made steady progress. Kuo had a close relationship with the local gentry in Kiangsu Province, and the university was mainly funded by the local military governments. Because he had a Ph.D. in education from Columbia University, Kuo was also on good terms with American educators. Therefore, after the university's science classrooms were destroyed by fire in 1923, the Rockefeller Foundation did what it had done for Nankai University and donated $140,000 toward the construction of a 21,000 square foot, three-story science building. In 1926, $80,000 of the school's annual budget of between $350,000 and $400,000 was spent on the college of science10 which grew rapidly as a result. The China Foundation gave a one-year grant to the college of science for the purchase of apparatus for the physics and chemistry departments, although the bulk of the Foundation's grants went to the colleges of agriculture and medicine.

Southeastern University's college of agriculture was established in 1917. Under the leadership of P. W. Kuo, its research work focused on breeding, planting, the improvement of farm implements, cotton, and pests. In the early years of its existence, National Central University formed a plant improvement committee tasked with enhancing the progress of agriculture. The China Foundation's grants to this committee were earmarked for work on the development and promotion of improved varieties of cotton, wheat, and rice. Work on cotton included the development of disease-resistant cotton, early-ripening cotton, and five-carpel varieties of cotton; determining the percentages of natural hybridization; and comparing the breeding of American and

Chinese cottons. Regarding wheat, the university's work focused on the classification of Chinese wheat, the analysis of pure lines, research on wind-resistance, observation of the appropriate time for pollination, and research into the growth stages and genetics of ears of wheat. As for rice, the university carried out work on the inheritance of infertility in hybrid rice, the physiology of flowering and fruit-bearing, and the testing of technologies in the rice paddies. Most of the university's experimental work consisted of observing different varieties, conducting breeding experiments, research in genetics, devising techniques for testing varieties, comparative studies of fertilizers, and pest control. The university distributed more than three thousand *picul* (60.52 kilos per *picul*) in weight of superior seed to farmers in the Shanghai, Kunshan, and Chengchou areas. They showed farmers how to plant the seed and promoted its sale through cooperatives.[11]

The agricultural college at Ling-nan University consisted of departments of farming, horticulture, stock-raising, and sericulture. The department of sericulture was the most accomplished, as silk was one of the most important industrial products of Kwangtung Province. The university established a bureau for improving sericulture in Kwangtung and together with the Ling-nan Agricultural Products Company operated an agricultural implements factory which made a great contribution to the improvement of agriculture in the province. The China Foundation's grants to Ling-nan University were dedicated to research into silkworm diseases, plant pathology, and disseminating the results of this research to help the development of agriculture

in Kwangtung. The department carried out research into the origin and prevention of pebrine disease, flacherie, and silkworm sclerosis; compared the disease-resistance of different silkworms; and conducted experiments into germ-free living environments for silkworms. They recorded the diseases of silkworms and conducted surveys of pests in the silkworm producing regions of Kwangtung. This work yielded good results, especially with regard to pebrine disease. The university's breeding department produced disease-free silkworm eggs which were distributed to silkworm breeders. In this way, pebrine disease was limited to less than one percent of the silkworm population and there was also a reduction in the prevalence of softening disease and sclerosis. However, no effective cure was found for pus silkworm disease or stiff silkworm disease. In the early years, there was no one in charge of plant pathology at the university, so there was nothing to show in this area. But after 1933, under Lu Ta-ching, the department began investigating fruit, vegetable, and grain crop pests. It produced an index of pathogens in Kwangtung Province, carried out research on citrus and rice pathogens, and conducted a survey of plant pathogens in Haikou, Wenchang, and Leichou. In addition to conducting a survey of the silk industry in Kwangtung, the university investigated the financing of silk mills and their labor conditions, and carried out research into the social and economic problems of silk farmers. The university also established promotion centers in Shundeh, Lowchong, Luchou, and Sueteng; organized a society for the promotion of the silk industry dedicated to improving silkworm breeds; provided guidance to silkworm farmers; and promoted the single twist weaving system and new ingot-type tools for reeling. Through this work, the university was

able to accelerate the progress of the silk industry in Kwangtung Province.[12]

The China Foundation's grants to the college of agriculture at Chung-shan University fell into two categories. With its three-year grants for research into rice, the college was able to purchase more research apparatus and books on rice planting, expand its experimental rice paddies, and recruit more staff. The college's experimental work covered pure lines selection, hybridization, natural hybridization, comparison of different varieties, how to increase yields, pest prevention, trial planting on saline soil, fertilizers, climate, and water requirements. Its researchers published numerous papers. They also engaged in research into economically valuable plants. The other category of grants consisted of funding for plant research. In 1928, the university established a plant research section which in 1930 was expanded to become the institute of agricultural and forestry research under the leadership of Chen Huan-yong. This institute commenced a survey of plants throughout Kwangtung, while its survey of economically valuable plants was to serve as the basis for improving and developing agriculture and forestry in the province.[13] The China Foundation's grants were mainly used to fund the collecting of plants on Hainan Island, and in Peichiang, Zup-yuan, Yaoshan, and Wentong Shan. After 1935, the institute cooperated with the plant research institute of Kwangsi University, which also received grants from the Foundation, in dispatching plant collection teams all over Kwangsi Province. This did much to augment the institute's collection of specimens and enabled it to sign agreements to exchange plant specimens with Ling-nan University and the New

York City Botanical Garden. Using these specimens, the institute conducted studies on Asian corianders, the Kwangtung water pine, benzoin, corchoropsis crenata, gesneriaceae, symplocaceae, and the economically valuable plants of Hainan Island, etc.[14]

Generally speaking, grants from the China Foundation were directed toward teaching and research in agriculture. The trustees believed that responsibility for promotion lay with central and local government. As H. C. Zen said, "Under present conditions in our country, due to limitations of talent and money, it is obvious that we should adopt an elitist approach regarding research institutions and a more universal approach toward institutions devoted to promotion. In other words, we do not have to set up agricultural universities in every province, although every province should have institutions for the promotion of agriculture."[15] However, at that time, all the provinces had more schools of agriculture than they had experimental farms and, according to Zen, "the bigwigs of the government like the idea of having more agricultural schools whenever the subject of the promotion of agriculture is raised." In Zen's opinion, these bigwigs did not care what these schools of agriculture achieved, neither did they care about the overall problems of agricultural education. They saw the establishment of schools as a panacea. The consequence was that "agricultural education in China is bound to fail and our bigwigs are bound to be disappointed."[16] In this situation, the China Foundation was only prepared to focus on certain sectors of agricultural education. At the very minimum, it was prepared to assist teaching and research in breeding, plant pests, sericulture, and the selection of economically useful plants.

II. On-the-Job Technical Training and Research in Industry

Students of agriculture in China rarely came from farming families, and they rarely went on to work full-time in agriculture. Similarly, engineering students in China rarely received on-the-job training in factories, and this was the same for engineering graduates who had studied abroad. Joseph Bailie, the organizer of the college of agriculture at the Private University of Nanking, had devoted himself to nurturing talented engineers since 1920. First of all, he arranged for U.S. firms such as the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and the Ford Motor Company, to offer two-year stints of on-the-job training for about three hundred Chinese students. Bailie also promoted factory apprenticeships in Shanghai. With the approval of the local gentry, the Yang Tse Pu Social Center, the Municipal Power Plant in the International Settlement, and the Kiangnan Dock and Engineering Works all established schools for training apprentices. After the establishment of the China Foundation, Bailie lobbied the American trustees for support. He paid a visit to Alfred Sze Sao-ke in Washington, D.C., to explain what he had already done and his plans for the future in the U.S. and in Shanghai. Sze was so enthusiastic that he not only joined with Greene and Bennett in recommending Bailie's plans to the board, but also pledged that if the China Foundation would not support the plans, he would fund them out of his own pocket.[17] At the same time, many Chinese students in the U.S. also wrote to Y. T. Tsur stressing the importance of Bailie's plans. The China Foundation board was convinced, and they emphasized that "this plan is important for the development of industrial personnel in China, and the Foundation should provide the support necessary

to maintain its effectiveness." About the apprenticeship scheme in Shanghai the board said, "The equipment in the factories is far superior to that in the schools. Furthermore, with the help of good teachers, students can put into practice what they have learned and this is much better than classroom learning. Our workers will definitely benefit from having more opportunities of this kind." Therefore, the China Foundation accepted Bailie's proposal and provided three-year grants of CN$10,000 and US$10,000 per year in order to establish the Chinese Institute of Technical Training to execute the proposed plans and expand them further.[18]

In November 1929, with the Foundation's support, Bailie set up a board of trustees in Philadelphia. The board adopted a constitution for the institute and elected Herman Schneider, president of the University of Cincinnati, as its chairman. Bailie visited a number of U.S. universities and selected some that had technical training arrangements with factories to cooperate with the institute. At the same time, he asked the Shanghai branch of the institute to recommend more than twenty students to undertake technical training with the Ford Motor Company. However, Bailie encountered difficulties in obtaining U.S. work visas for the apprentices, as U.S. immigration laws were very strict at that time. This forced Bailie to explore other opportunities for technical training in Europe while at the same time negotiating with the U.S. Department of Labor to register the U.S. branch of the institute. Registration was refused, however, because the branch had only recently been established, so its operations were almost completely suspended. Bailie returned to the U.S. to continue pushing for technical training opportunities. In the meantime, Mei Yi-chi,

supervisor of Tsing Hua students in the U.S., pleaded with the China Foundation not to abandon the work of technical training. He said that because of U.S. immigration laws, the Department of Labor was unable to permit Chinese students to work in the U.S. openly. However, there were no restrictions for students who were already in the U.S., such as the Tsing Hua students who had diplomatic visas. Even self-supporting students were permitted to apply to receive technical training in factories. Although the issue of Chinese students coming to the U.S. specifically to seek training opportunities was problematic, Mei considered that it was not completely hopeless if someone was willing to take up the matter with the U.S. authorities. Mei said:

> Last year [1929], there were more than 1,200 Chinese students studying in the U.S. and about two hundred of these were engineering students, making them the third largest category. But internships were hard to obtain, and nine out of ten students were only able to attend classes in schools. This is not good. In recent years, the American branch of the Chinese Society of Engineering set up an out-placement committee, but it did not achieve much success. The present situation is that there is an urgent need for engineering internships but they are difficult to obtain. It seems to me that an individual should be assigned to take charge of dealing with this stumbling block. If the China Foundation would only ask Bailie to devote his time to this in U.S., the Institute will avoid closure and after two years, according to the Labor Department's comments, it may receive accreditation from the American government.[19]

The China Foundation therefore decided to extend its grants to the institute for one more year. Any unused funds would be reserved for later use. Unfortunately, due to the legal environment, its work in the U.S. was not successful.

The Chinese Institute of Technical Training was able to establish three apprenticeship schools in Shanghai. The school that was affiliated to the Shanghai Municipal Power Plant had two classes for craftsmen and four for apprentices, with a total enrollment of about one hundred. The school affiliated to the Kiangnan Shipyard had four classes and more than fifty students in total, while the third school, at the Shanghai Water Works, had three classes. Besides this, the Shanghai Benevolent Industrial Institute was reorganized and started to run part-time classes for workers. The school had two hundred students and the Chinese Institute of Technical Training assigned eighty of the more senior students to the New Engineering & Shipping Works, the Shanghai Arsenal, the Mutual Telephone Co., and Butterfield & Swire for periodic technical training. This made a great contribution to basic-level engineering education.[20]

As for the universities, with the exception of small grants to Fuchung Mining University and Hopei Provincial Industrial High School, the Foundation concentrated its efforts on the National Peiyang College of Engineering in Tientsin and the University of Communications in Shanghai. The latter underwent three reorganizations during the period 1921-27. Between July 1922 and June 1927, when it was called Nanyang University, it had several different presidents. After Ling Hong-hsun took over as president

in December 1924, he began developing the university's research capability. In June 1926, the university established a graduate school of industry. The graduate school was short of funds and equipment, so President Ling negotiated a grant of $110,000 from the China Foundation to pay for new equipment. After Nanyang University was placed under the control of the Ministry of Railways in the winter of 1928 and its name was changed to the University of Communications, the original plans could no longer proceed according to the China Foundation's requirements, so the grants were stopped and the research work was also suspended. It was not until the spring of 1930, when President Li Chao-huan developed the graduate school into a research institute that the university resumed its research work and entered into a new phase of development.[21] At this point, the China Foundation decided to reinstate the grants for the purchase of laboratory equipment for the newly constructed engineering building. After the reorganization, the research institute was divided into departments of industry and economics. The former was engaged in the manufacture of rust-proof paints, designing concrete railroad ties, conducting experiments with rot-proofing wooden railroad ties, testing the thermal conductivity of oils, researching the use of solid fuels for automobile engines, conducting other studies of railroad paints and railroad ties, and investigating the industrial economy. The economics department was engaged in research on changes in the Chinese economy and foreign investment in China, etc.[22]

National Peiyang College of Engineering was one of the best engineering colleges in China. In March l929, one of its buildings was destroyed by fire and specimens and equipment were lost. The

college had to raise funds from all sides. The China Foundation provided it with a grant of $50,000 to purchase equipment for the departments of mechanical engineering, mining, and civil engineering. Later, the Foundation also provided additional grants for the purchase of laboratory equipment.

The Foundation's grants to engineering establishments represented only one-tenth of its total grants to schools. This was because the Foundation insisted on its principle of only supporting sizable, high quality institutions.

III. Research into Public Health and Medicine

Any progress achieved in medicine and healthcare in China during this period was largely a result of efforts made by foreign missionaries and philanthropists. For instance, the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation reorganized medical schools that had been set up by missionaries. In 1921, the board also established a high-quality medical school—the Peking Union Medical College—modeled on the school of medicine at Johns Hopkins University in the U.S. The president of this college, H. S. Houghton, said that its main task was to turn boys and girls with potential into the high-quality leading physicians, teachers, and scientists of the future. The college also provided short-term training opportunities for doctors across the nation. But Houghton did not single out public health as requiring intensive investment and the college paid more attention to scientific research. In order to upgrade the quality of students entering the college and to

expand the pool for recruitment, the China Medical Board also provided grants to other universities and medical schools, such as Hsiangya Medical College in Hunan Province, the medical college at Cheeloo University in Shantung Province, and the Peking Junior College of Medicine.[23] The Peking Union Medical College's trustees, including Monroe, Greene, and Y. T. Tsur, all had connections with the China Foundation and the boards of the two organizations more or less cooperated with and complemented each other.

In the early period, the China Foundation had very little involvement in medical education, providing grants only to Hsiangya Medical College at Greene's recommendation. This college was established in 1914 by the Hunan Yuchun Society and the Yale Foreign Missionary Society, and it consisted of a medical school, a nursing school, and a hospital. It was the first of seven medical schools to be accredited by the Council on Medical Education of the China Medical Missionary Association. In 1924, its American administrators withdrew after their ten-year management contract expired and it was handed over to the Chinese. The new board of trustees constructed new school buildings, added new departments, and recruited more teachers.[24] In 1926, the China Foundation decided to support this expansion, but the college was forced to suspend operations the following year because of political instability, so the Foundation terminated its grants. The college was revived in the autumn of 1929, but support from the China Foundation was stopped again on the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war.

After the establishment of the Nationalist government, the China Foundation's support for medical education shifted to the newly established national medical colleges. These included the college at Central University and the National Medical College of Shanghai. The medical college of Central University was located in the Woosung district of Shanghai rather than in Nanking, so as to be close to the Shanghai Red Cross Hospital, the Lester Institute (established by the British), and other research institutions and libraries. The grants from the China Foundation were earmarked for "the development of health education and the promotion of medical research." The college's department of public health was led by Mei I-lin. In addition to offering classes in basic public health and preventative medicine, in October 1928 the department established Woosung as a model district for public health. Students from the college were sent out into the district to put into practice what they had learned in class about conducting medical examinations and hygiene. Under the leadership of Dr. Kao Ching-lang, they collected statistics on births and deaths, carried out investigations of sanitation and infectious diseases, promoted home and school hygiene, and offered outpatient services. But with the outbreak of war in 1932, all this work was stopped. When the college buildings were destroyed in the Japanese bombardment the China Foundation made an additional grant of $30,000 to build classrooms and laboratories for the departments of public health and pharmacology. As for research, the college concentrated on studies on Chinese medicine, including analysis of sea cucumbers, the effect of rhododendron on smooth muscle, why the Chinese azalea causes vomiting, the menstrual cycle of female rats, and the denaturing of hemoglobin.[25] The sources of funding for the college in its early years were as follows:[26]

Unit: CN$

Source	1928-29	1929-30	1930-31	1931-32
Chekiang Provincial Treasury	109,794	130,000	170,000	190,000
Donations:				
China Foundation	30,000	30,000	30,000	30,000
Rockefeller Foundation	18,000	80,000	80,000	60,000
The Red Cross	12,000	13,000	13,000	13,000
Tuition & Other Income	4,120	4,700	4920	7,000
Total	173,914	257,700	297,920	300,000

Only about one-tenth of the China Foundation's budget was devoted to grants for the field of medicine; a far smaller proportion than that of the Rockefeller Foundation.

The grants from the China Foundation to the National Medical College of Shanghai were for two purposes. The first was to defray construction costs and the second was to subsidize research into public health and pharmacology. The college's public health department cooperated with Shanghai City Public Health Bureau in setting up a model district for public health in Kaochiao, a district east of the Huangpu River. In 1932, this became the Kaochiao District public health office. The office engaged in public health activities, staff training, the collection of vital statistics, disease control, and medical assistance to the poor. According to 1935 statistics, the main outpatient office and three branches treated 9,277 cases and received 25,733 outpatient visits. The most prevalent conditions were skin diseases, which accounted for 42 percent of cases, followed by malaria (9 percent), eye diseases (7.6 percent), and dental problems (6.4 percent).[27] The public health office did a lot to promote children's health, benefiting 1,402 infants, 4,870 pre-school children, and 3,000 school children.

The office also offered training in public health to twelve medical students, twenty-four nurses, and sixty-seven paramedics. Li Ting-an, the chief of the Shanghai Public Health Bureau, awarded it a mark of more than 600 out of 1,000, and the office aspired to become a national model. Unfortunately, all this work ceased after the Japanese invaded Shanghai in August 1937. The college's department of public health also conducted research into malaria protozoa, the causes of infant death, immunity to diphtheria, and the diphtheria bacterium in Kaochiao district. In addition, they hired a medical entomologist from the Pasteur Institute to assist in research into the malarial mosquito. Published papers included statistical studies on several kinds of tuberculosis in China, tests of sugar ingestion for leprosy patients, a bacteriological study of certain immune regions in skin leprosy, a report on diphtheria immunization with a single injection of alum toxoid, and a study of the distribution of blood groups among the residents of Kaochiao. Pharmacology studies included one on the pharmacological functions of beberine and others on the antipyretic effect of quinine, the pharmacological composition of schisandrin sulfate, the effect of drugs on amino acids in the bloodstream, and the production and prevention of soil perfusate.[28] Only $8,000 of the Foundation's $30,000 grant to the college was devoted to research into pharmacology; the remainder was earmarked for public health.

In addition to the medical college at Central University and the National Medical College of Shanghai, the Foundation also provided grants to the medical college of Chee-Loo University and the West China Union Medical College to cover maintenance expenses and to purchase equipment for their affiliated hospitals.

The Foundation provided less grant funding to medicine than it did to either agriculture or engineering. At that time, there were many problems with both medical education and public health in China.[29] Since the Foundation only gave small grants to certain areas of research in just a few medical schools, its influence was limited and far weaker than that of the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation which had been supporting the development of medicine in China for many years.

During the Sino-Japanese War period, the emphasis in science education necessarily shifted toward the applied sciences,[30] and the Foundation's grant policies followed this trend. Due to lack of funds, the Foundation suspended most of its grants to universities but still continued to support colleges of agriculture, engineering, and medicine, such as those noted above. In the field of engineering, the Foundation actively supported the establishment of a college of mineralogy at National Yunnan University. In medicine, it provided emergency support to National Kweiyang Medical College, the Medical College of St. John's University, and the China Medical Society. Nevertheless, the Foundation still stuck to its principle of balanced support for both pure and applied science. In 1942, when he was inspecting institutions that had received grants in Szechuan and Kwangsi provinces, Director H. F. Sun said:

> I had the pleasure of holding discussions with administrators and teachers when I was inspecting various locations in Szechuan and Kwangsi and I discovered that scholars tend to favor the applied sciences and seldom care for the pure science that is the bedrock of the applied sciences. This tendency can be easily detected in the numbers of applicants for various university departments this year. Even researchers in the laboratories have the same bias. This is a natural phenomenon during war time, but if we do not try to rectify it, it will certainly impair future academic development. Our Foundation, in its promotion of science, should take special note of this.[31]

Sun was basically in agreement with people like Hu Shih who put their faith in pure science. Even though Wong Wen-hao insisted that the Foundation's grants to applied science should account for at least 50-60 percent of its total grants, the China Foundation always emphasized pure science and never deviated from that stance.

Chapter 6: Scientific Research

During the New Culture Movement in the early years of the Republic, "Mr. Democracy" and "Mr. Science" were loudly trumpeted in China.[1] Faced with this fashion for scientism, the pioneers of science promotion in China were rather ambivalent. They were "both happy about the people's love of science and uneasy about the old Chinese habit of doing nothing but talk." One Chinese commentator, Yang Chuan, writing in the 1930s, was of the view that although the definition of science should include "all the systematic knowledge that applies the scientific method," this definition really only covers the "outward appearance, not the inner reality, of science." He maintained that "real science is nothing but research. Science cannot survive without research." From this, Yang concluded that "if Chinese people want to study science, research should be the first step. Without research, there will be no science. Without science, China cannot stand tall in the world."[2] Voices such as this, promoting scientific research or experiment and urging the avoidance of empty talk, were frequently heard in the discussions of the Science Society of China. In addition to defining and emphasizing the importance of research and innovation, H. C. Zen also suggested that Chinese scholars try to replicate the organizational structure of American research institutes.[3]

As early as at the first annual meeting of the Science Society of China in 1916, Zen delivered a speech urging the society to establish laboratories to explore "the virgin territory of profound

knowledge." He took a pessimistic view of the effectiveness of the teaching in schools at that time. He said, "If we depend solely on a few schools that are neither traditional Chinese nor truly westernized and if we cannot find other straightforward ways of teaching, although we may hope that science will make rapid progress in China, we might as well wait for the muddy waters of the Yellow River to run clear. It will be impossible!"[4] He pointed out that the biggest defect in science education at that time was lack of regard for scientific research. He said:

> All our educators talk about science education, but what they refer to as science education has at least two defects. One is that it is solely concerned with science teaching and fails to give due regard to research. The other is that it entrusts scientific research to schools alone without finding other more direct and effective routes. Research creates science. There is no such thing as promoting science without scientific research.[5]

In Zen's view, science education could not be divorced from scientific research. Therefore, he concluded that of the China Foundation's three main tasks in the promotion of science—science education, scientific research, and the application of science—scientific research should be given highest priority. Zen said:

> From the point of view of science, scientific research is undoubtedly the most important of these three tasks, as without scientific research, there can be no application of

> science. Besides, the applied sciences require a process of research. And even though science education is also fundamental to science, it is no more than the first stage of scientific training. Of course, we cannot afford to ignore science education, but we cannot treat it as the ultimate goal of the advancement of science either.[6]

From this we can see that although the China Foundation considered that science education was the foundation of scientific research, it believed that science could only be developed through research.

In 1927, there were more calls for the promotion of scientific research. First, L. K. Tao, writing in the *Contemporary Review*, asserted that "in the twentieth century, all nations should adopt a fundamental policy of emphasizing scientific research." He continued,

> If we do no more than promote the techniques of science education, we will be pursuing technicalities while ignoring what is fundamental. Nothing can survive on this earth without a source of water. If there is no atmosphere of science, no authority accorded to science, and there are no scientists, generation after generation, burying their heads in the labs, toiling away at pure scientific research, I am afraid China will never have its own science.[7]

Echoing Tao, Zen maintained that the way to establish scientific research in China was to "seek out leading researchers

and put them in adequately equipped schools so they can do research."[8] But others thought otherwise, dismissing the cultivation of researchers as "no big deal." What was worthier of discussion, they felt, was how existing researchers could be enabled to continue their work without unnecessary worry. Of course, research needs money, and the question was, where would that money come from? In Zen's opinion, the only source of funds was the China Foundation, and the Foundation's board should assume responsibility for funding research. Even though some people had doubts about the distribution and effectiveness of the grants in the first two years, they still wanted the Foundation's board to adjust its policies and pluck up the courage to find a way for the buds of scientific research in China to grow and bloom.[9] Wong Wen-hao further pointed out, "Ten or more years ago, people in our country only knew how to edit and translate textbooks, not how to carry out scientific research. In recent years, both the government and non-government institutions have begun to engage in research voluntarily." In truth, the production of textbooks and carrying out research were both necessary and neither should have been sacrificed in favor of the other. But if the intelligentsia wanted to give up the old habit of using books written by foreigners and instead wanted Chinese science stand on its own feet, it was essential to promote scientific research. Wong cited as an example the views of the famous American physicist, R. A. Milikan, when he said that developing more researchers was better than having more research institutes and better equipment, that the way to develop researchers was to provide more research prizes and more research professorships, and that a five-member advisory committee composed of top scientists and engineers should be

formed to screen the research plans of institutions applying for grants.[10]

Milikan was referring to the United States, but Wong believed that "the spirit of Millikan's proposals should be adopted by those who are responsible for promoting the development of scientific research in China." The Science Society of China adopted a similar stance when it held that scientific research should be promoted first of all by developing the research environment and secondly by cultivating talented research personnel.[11] The China Foundation followed a similar line.

I. Encouraging Talented Research Personnel

Creating a good research environment and cultivating talented researchers were both essential prerequisites for promoting scientific research, but some scholars still took the view that the cultivation of researchers was even more important than developing the research environment. For example, Wong Ging-hsi said:

> We should not think that just because we have established a research institute, we are in fact promoting research. Research institutes could meet the same fate as government offices whose only function is to feed unemployed bums. Furthermore, we should not think that we are encouraging independent research just because we have purchased a lot of lab equipment. Equipment is bought for use, but the fruits of research cannot be bought along with the equipment. We should by no means have blind faith in using research institutes and equipment to attract researchers. Physical equipment alone, without the spirit of research, will not attract talented researchers. Even if some of them chance to come along, they will soon leave.[12]

Wong believed that the most important task of research institutes was, "on the one hand to recruit the people who have conducted research abroad and to provide them with an opportunity to continue their research. We should not let them become idle for lack of job opportunities when they come back. On the other hand, we should also provide opportunities for accomplished home-grown researchers to further develop their talents and to teach some pupils."[13] To put it simply, there were three questions to answer: how to train and encourage existing researchers, how to attract talented researchers trained overseas, and how to select home-grown talent for advanced study. In 1928, the China Foundation began to establish various scientific research fellowships, prizes, and professorships. This was the first such initiative in China and its purpose was to allow people with research ability to devote themselves to research without having to worry about earning a living or finding a suitable research environment.

1. Research Fellowships and Scientific Research Prizes

At its third annual meeting in 1927, the China Foundation

approved the fifteen-point regulations governing its research fellowships, the twelve-point regulations for its scientific research prizes, and the ten-point regulations governing the activities of the committee in charge of awarding these fellowships and prizes, all of which were proposed by the Foundation's director, Fan Yuan-lien. The following year, some parts of these regulations were amended and five scholars were recruited as members of the screening committee, namely, Lim Ke-shen (head of the Department of Physiology, Peiping Union Medical College); Ping Chi (director of the Institute of Biology, the Science Society of China, and head of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology); Wong Wen-hao (Director of the National Geological Survey); T. Q. Chao (research fellow in chemistry, Peiping Union Medical College); and K. L. Yen (professor of physics, Kwang Hua University). Three kinds of research fellowships were awarded. Class A fellowships consisted of an annual grant of $3–4,000 and were awarded to researchers who could conduct research independently and who had already published research papers. Class B fellows received between $1,000 and $2,000 annually, and they consisted of college graduates who conducted research under supervision. Applicants for these fellowships had to provide letters of recommendation from their advisors. Class C fellowships were worth between $250 and $500, and they were awarded to students with inadequate funding or to those who had failed to received either a class A or class B fellowship and yet were worthy of support. The grants were given to "accomplished researchers or inventors regardless of which region of China they come from." The scientific research

prizes were "limited to the natural sciences, the physical or material sciences, and their applications." In principle, three prizes worth up to $2,000 each were awarded each year. In the absence of any eligible candidates, the prizes could be withheld.[14]

The numbers of applications and approvals in the decade before the Sino-Japanese War are listed below.[15]

Year	Number of Applicants	Number of Awards				Percentage
		Class A	Class B	Class C*	Subtotal	
1928	108	5	10	9	24	22%
1929	60	6	15	19	40	67%
1930	100	7	24	15	46	46%
1931	108	5	25	13	43	40%
1932	134	7	25	11	43	32%
1933	114	6	29	11	46	40%
1934	154	8	27	14	49	32%
1935	123	5	30	16	51	41%
1936	156	6	29	14	49	31%
1937	210	4	37	15	56	27%
Total	1,267	59	251	137	447	35%

*From 1933 onwards, these were known as special fellowships

With the exception of the early years and during the war, when approval rates fluctuated widely, there was an approval rate of around 30–40 percent. The largest number of fellowships, more than half the total over the period, were class B, while the smallest number were class A. This indicates that there were few people capable of conducting independent research in China at that time.

The fellowships were initially limited to one year, but

they could be extended. Therefore, the total of 447 approvals represented only 291 individual recipients. Few details are available as to the recipients' backgrounds, although according to an analysis carried out by H. C. Zen of the first 108 applicants, 24 came from Chekiang and 21 from Kiangsu, accounting for over 40 percent of the total. The next largest group came from Kwangtung and Fukien. Zen thought that the reason why such a large proportion of applicants came from coastal areas of China, especially Chekiang and Kiangsu, was possibly because higher education facilities were more developed in these provinces, transportation was easier, and there were more opportunities for students to study. Of the first 108 applicants, 42 were graduates of Chinese universities, notably Southeastern University (11 applicants), the National University of Peking (7 applicants), and the Private University of Nanking (6 applicants). Fifty-seven applicants were graduates of overseas universities, with 8 from Cornell, 6 from Columbia, and 4 from the University of Michigan. Zen's conclusion was that Kiangsu Province provided the best quality of education within China and that fewer domestic graduates applied for the awards than graduates of overseas universities.[16] Even though Zen's analysis of the backgrounds of the first batch of applicants did not cover scientific researchers from all over China, it was still a reflection of the total picture. Of the 291 individuals who received grants over the ten-year period, 155 held bachelor's degrees, 57 had master's degrees, 62 were Ph.D., and there were 17 whose qualifications were unknown. As many as 188 (65 percent) had studied abroad, and around one-third

of these were graduates of American universities. This indicates that China was heavily reliant on overseas institutions, especially those in the United States, for its scientific researchers.

As for the subjects being researched, these were limited to three categories: astronomy and geology; mathematics, physics, and chemistry; and the biological sciences, including zoology, botany, medicine, pharmacology, physiology, etc. From 1937, the scope of the grants expanded to include the social sciences and history. The numbers of applicants in the three categories over the ten years before the war were as follows:

Year	Astronomy Meteorology Geology	Mathematics Physics Chemistry	Biological Sciences	Others	Subtotal
1928	10	61	36	1	108
1929	7	20	33		60
1930	10	38	52		100
1931	8	52	48		108
1932	13	70	48	3	134
1933	7	68	37	2	114
1934	15	72	65	2	154
1935	16	48	52	7	123
1936	17	75	60	4	156
1937	16	76	67	51	210
Total	119	580	498	70	1,267
%	9%	46%	39%	6%	100%

As we can see, the category with the most applicants was mathematics, physics, and chemistry, although the biological sciences category had the largest number of approvals, as can be seen below.

Year	Astronomy Meteorology Geology	Mathematics Physics Chemistry	Biological Sciences	Others	Subtotal
1928	3	8	13		24
1929	3	9	28		40
1930	6	13	27		46
1931	4	19	20		43
1932	4	18	20	1	43
1933	4	18	24		46
1934	6	20	23		49
1935	9	19	23		51
1936	7	18	23	1	49
1937	5	21	19	11	56
Total	51	163	220	13	447
%	11%	37%	49%	3%	100%

Although it is not absolutely clear why the distribution of approvals among the subjects did not correspond to the distribution of applications, we can get some idea of the reason from Zen' s analysis of the first batch of applicants, although he did not compare applications with approvals. Zen concluded that the large number of applicants from the fields of zoology, physiology, botany, and geology (they were only exceeded by those from chemistry and physics) was connected with the activities of the Science Society of China's Institute of Biology, the Geological Survey, and the Union Medical College. Zen recognized that chemistry and physics were extremely important sciences and there were a number of researchers working in these fields, but they lacked an independent institute carrying out pure research. He pointed out that China's research chemists were mostly engaged in applied chemistry, and if mechanical engineering was considered to be a part of physics, then applied physics was also very significant. He recommended that attention should be paid to these

points should a decision be made to establish institutes of physics and chemistry in the future.[17]

People like H. C. Zen considered that research in the pure sciences, such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry, was not as advanced as biology in China. The committee charged with evaluating applications for grants was only supposed to take academic worth into consideration; there was no system of quotas for individual subjects. However, the approval rates were higher for the biological sciences than they were for other subjects, such as mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Whether this was a result of the committee considering that the former were more "worthy" of support than the latter will be dealt with in the conclusion of this chapter.

The purpose of the research fellowships was to support research, while the purpose of the science research prizes was to reward the results of research. The latter had more stringent standards, with each applicant having to submit at least two recommendations from prominent scientists or science professors. To be eligible for an award, research papers had to have been published within the previous ten years in a reputable journal. They had to contain original results obtained from scientific analysis of established facts or phenomena. Mere interpretations of existing research or works of a popular nature were excluded.[18] Due to these high standards and other restrictions, in some years no prizes were awarded, either because there had been no applications or because applicants failed to pass the screening process. Over a period of more than a decade, fewer than ten prizes were awarded.

The prize winners were as follows:

Y. T. Chao (Geology)	Classification and correlation of the upper Paleozoic formation in various parts of China and systematic study of the important groups of invertebrate fossils contained therein
K. K. Chen (Pharmacological Chemistry)	Study of ephedrine in Chinese medicine
C. S. Yu (Astronomy)	Research into stellar spectrophotometry
T. Q. Chou (Pharmacological Chemistry)	Fifteen research papers on the active ingredients of Chinese drugs
Ping Chi (Zoology)	Twenty-seven books on biology (2 systemic surveys, 3 on neurology, 4 on conchology, 7 on vertebrate zoology, and 11 on paleontology)
T. P. Feng (Physiology)	Research on the energy of muscles and nerves
L. F. Yeh (Geology)	Research on petrology and mineral deposits in South-eastern China
Yin-koh Tchen (History)	Research on the political systems of the Sui and T'ang Dynasties in China
Hsu Hsi-fan (Parasitology)	No details

No prizes were awarded to pure scientists in the fields of mathematics or physics, and there was an apparent emphasis on research of a local character, such as geology, biology, and pharmacology.

The major difference between the fellowships or prizes and support for students studying abroad was that the former emphasized research after graduation and the latter focused on overseas study. The purpose of the prizes and fellowships was to encourage domestic research in order to help scientific research take root in China. Scholars like V. K. Ting in geology, Kuo Zen-yuan in psychology, Tchang Chun-lin who studied Chinese fish, and Hou Te-pang whose field of study was alkali manufacturing,

were all working within China. A China Foundation report on its program of fellowships and prizes stated the following:

> This program is far more economical than the previous scheme for sending students to study overseas. Because researchers have already attained a certain academic level and are well prepared, we can achieve a lot more with only a modest amount of expenditure, regardless of whether these men have studied abroad or not. In recent years, the British and Belgian Boxer indemnity foundations and the Tsing Hua Foundation have also sent students abroad and the Tsing Hua Foundation selected its best graduates for overseas study. But those institutions focus on selection by examination, while our Foundation focuses on research results. The methods are quite different. Therefore, most of our candidates are outstanding in terms of their maturity and research experience, and the scope of our selection is far wider, without the limits imposed by examinations. We have more and better candidates to choose from as there is no need for applicants to be interviewed in person.[19]

This was why H. C. Zen boasted that "since 1928 when the program was inaugurated, it has achieved more in terms of effectiveness and nourishment of talent than any of the programs for study abroad."[20] This kind of selection based only on research topic rather than on academic qualifications or examinations certainly made up for the inadequacies of other programs that funded students to study overseas. Those other programs could not replace that provided by the China Foundation. For example, the

self-taught mathematician Hua Loo-keng was only a middle school graduate who, it was said, had been working as a grocery clerk when he was hired as an instructor by the mathematics department at Tsing Hua University. In 1935 and again in 1936 he received a class B science fellowship from the China Foundation to carry out research into transcendent numbers and the Waring and Hilbert-Kamke problems at Hamburg University. In 1937 he received class A fellowship and carried out research at Cambridge University. He not only solved some well-known and difficult mathematical problems but also laid the foundations for his later famous work entitled *Additive Theory of Prime Numbers*.[21] Another recipient of China Foundation support was W. C. Pei, a paleontologist. After graduation from the department of geology at Peking University, Pei worked on the excavation site at Choukoutien under the Cenozoic Research Laboratory of the Geological Survey of China. The discovery of Peking Man made him a celebrity overnight.[22] But Pei came to realize that discovery was not equal to research. In 1935 and 1936, he received class B fellowships from the China Foundation to carry out research at the Institute de Paléontologie Humaine and the Dynamic Tectonic Geology Research Center at the University of Paris. In Paris, Pei studied the correlation between Quaternary geology and prehistory in Europe and East Asia. His work in Paris provided him with a solid foundation for developing further research into paleontology. Other geology graduates from Peking University, such as T. K. Huang, Chen Shu, Tien Chi-chun, and Sze Hsing-chien, worked for the Geological Survey of China, and with that experience behind them, they were awarded grants from the China Foundation to carry out further research abroad, later becoming leaders in their field. Wu Ta-

you, the well-known physicist, and the chemist Chien Shih-liang (both of them later to serve as chairmen of the China Foundation), as well as the mathematician, Chern Shiing-shen, all received research grants after graduation. Chern, a world-renowned mathematician, recalled his experience as follows: “In the summer of 1936 when my government scholarship expired I received offers of employment from Tsing Hua and Peking universities. But I decided to go to Paris to work with Professor Elie Cartan for one year with a grant from the China Foundation. That was a decisive year for my development in mathematics.”[23]

During the war years, even though the Foundation was short of funds, it did not entirely stop its research grants, although it was forced to reduce their scope somewhat or suspend them for a year or two. In an effort to adapt to wartime needs, the Foundation decided to “emphasize grants to applicants in the field of applied sciences.”[24] In relation to this, in 1940 Wong Wen-hao proposed that the scientific research fellowships be replaced by scientific research and technical training fellowships, as training in the applied sciences, including agriculture, mining, engineering, and medicine, was equally important as theoretical research. The Foundation’s regulations were amended accordingly. Recipients of the new fellowships could either study overseas or work in professional schools, institutions, or mines within China under the guidance of experts. Wong also proposed that the size of the grants for researchers working within China should be increased in order to cover their living expenses.[25]

The regulations governing the grants were amended a number

of times. The Foundation no longer classified the grants into the categories of astronomy, physics/chemistry, and biology, etc. In addition to the original categories, it was specifically stipulated that researchers in such applied science subjects as aeronautics, mining, metallurgy, radio engineering, veterinary science, microbiology, agricultural chemistry, soil science, economic geology, etc. were also eligible for grants. The screening committee was expanded from thirty to forty members. However, when the government began to place more emphasis on technology, eventually sending about twelve hundred students to study overseas, the trustees realized that the small grants awarded by the China Foundation were of little significance in comparison. Therefore, the Foundation shifted the emphasis of its grants policy toward the social sciences and liberal arts in order to "supplement the government's grant policies, bring about balanced growth in public welfare, and promote international understanding."[26]

During the war, the fellowships were classified as either domestic or foreign (mainly for study in the United States). The domestic grants were further divided into class A and class B, with the former being for professors and the latter for research assistants. Like the special fellowships, they funded the recipients' research but not their living expenses. In 1944, due to serious financial constraints, the domestic grants were suspended for one year. They were restarted in July 1945. The outbreak of the Pacific War made travel outside China difficult, so the Foundation did not send any more researchers overseas. Instead, the Foundation's

special committee in the United States provided continuing support to existing grant recipients or selected new recipients from among the Chinese students already in the country. The China Foundation also cooperated with the Ministry of Communications in supporting around twenty apprentices receiving on-the-job training in highway management and automobile engineering in the United States so they could return to tackle wartime transportation problems. In the years 1928–45, 735 grants were awarded to a total of 415 individuals (some individuals received more than one grant).[27]

Because of rampant inflation after the end of the war, the value of a class A fellowship was increased from $100,000 to $300,000, and that of a class B fellowship rose from $60,000 to $200,000. But no matter how tight financial conditions were, the China Foundation continued to award fellowships. After the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, the Foundation continued to provide the fellowships at National Taiwan University.

2. Scientific Research Professorships

In addition to supporting potential research personnel, the China Foundation also found ways to subsidize established scientists and allow them to continue their research. In 1930, the Foundation established its scientific research professorships which gave distinguished scholars an opportunity to work in well-

equipped and convenient research institutions. These professors were mainly tasked with conducting and supervising research. The location of the professorships was decided through discussion between the Foundation, the professors involved, and the research institutions. In addition to receiving a high salary (about $6,000–7,000 per year), the professors had access to an annual grant of $2,000 for equipment and another $1,000 to fund their investigations and hire assistants. If necessary, they were required to teach for three hours each week for no additional remuneration. The institutions in which they worked had to provide standard equipment and supplies to facilitate their research. The equipment purchased with the China Foundation grants was to be donated to the institution once the research was completed.[28]

This program was similar to one for science professorships in normal colleges, the difference being that the normal college program was focused on teaching while this program focused on research. Research was considered to be even more important for the development of science in China than teaching.[29] The Foundation's criteria for selecting candidates for the scientific research professorships were extremely strict, and it was considered better to leave a post vacant than to pick a candidate without proper credentials. Two professorships were awarded in the first year, 1930, and in the years after that there were no more than five. Since the professorships were frequently extended, some for more than the stipulated five years, only seven individuals held the posts throughout the duration of the program. These were:

Wong Wen-hao	1930–33	Geology, National Geological Survey of China
Li Chi	1930–48	Archeology, Institute of History & Philology, Academia Sinica
Ping Chi	1932–48	Zoology, Fan Memorial Institute of Biology
Chuang, C. K.	1935–46	Chemistry, Institute of Chemistry, Academia Sinica
Chen, H. Y.	1935–40	Botany, Institute of Agriculture & Forestry, Chung Shan University
Grabau, A. W.	1938–46	Paleontology, Research Office of Paleontology, National Geological Survey of China
Hu, H. H.	1946–48	Botany, Fan Memorial Institute of Biology

The professorships were mainly established in institutions that were the recipients of China Foundation grants. For example, in 1930, the Foundation began providing grants to the Institute of Agriculture and Forestry at Chung Shan University to carry out a survey of the flora of Kwangtung Province. Using the research experience he had gained under this program, the head of the institute, Chen Huan-yong, set up an Institute of Botany at Kwangsi University. In addition to helping to equip the new institute, the China Foundation awarded Chen a scientific research professorship specifically to work in both universities on reclassifying benzoin and Ephedraceae and redefining Chinese Gesneriaceae. Another holder of a scientific research professorship, Li Chi, was in charge of Academia Sinica's excavation of a Shang Dynasty tomb at Anyang which was partially funded with grants from the China Foundation. This work continued throughout the war, and as late as the 1960s, Li held a China Foundation research professorship at the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica. C. K. Chuang, head of the Institute of Physics, Chemistry, and Engineering at Academia Sinica (the construction of which

was funded by the Foundation) was also the dean of the College of Science at Central University. In 1935, Chuang was awarded a scientific research professorship to enable him to devote himself to research full-time. His research was mostly related to the molecular structures of physiological materials. He synthesized cholic acid, sterols, vitamin D, toad toxins, plant toxins that damage the heart, the intermediate elements of the male and female sex hormones. He also conducted research into the synthesis of chemical compounds. Chuang held the professorship until 1946 when he resigned in order to undertake a field trip in the United States.

Geology and biology had always been important focuses of China Foundation funding. Wong Wen-hao, who was head of the Geological Survey of China, the Graduate Institute of Geology at Peiping Geological Institute, and the Department of Geology at Tsing Hua University, was awarded a professorship by the Foundation in 1930. Wong subsequently worked on a number of projects, including a comparative study of the strata of the lower Yangtze River, the extraction of coal using solvents, estimating the size of China's coal deposits, a study of China's river basins and mountain ranges, and an investigation of sedimentation and erosion rates in the flood plains of Hopei Province. Wong also studied geography, and he worked on measuring the areas of the various provinces, analyzing the distribution of population and arable land, and correcting maps produced during the Kang-hsi and Chien-lung periods of the Ching Dynasty. Wong published a lot of research, and by 1933 he was so busy that he had to give up his professorship. Before he came to China, Dr. A. W. Grabau was already an internationally renowned paleontologist. He was

invited to China by V. K. Ting to carry out geological survey work and to teach at National Peking University. Grabau pioneered paleontology research in China.[30] After the war, when physical infirmity forced him to stay in Peking, the China Foundation came to the rescue, awarding him a professorship that enabled him to work on his long-cherished pulsation theory. Chi Ping is considered to have been a pioneer of the study of biology in China, and he served as director of both the Science Society of China and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology. Both of these institutions were fully supported by the China Foundation. Under the sponsorship of the Foundation, Ping undertook a number of research projects, including the classification of gastropods in coastal areas and inland provinces, the distribution of fauna in the lower Yangtze River valley, and the classification of economically valuable fish in coastal areas. He also conducted physiological and neurological experiments, including investigations of the functions of the cerebral cortex in mammals, the determination of the premotor cortex in the hedgehog, and certain effects of decortication of the cerebral hemisphere in guinea pigs. During the war, Ping continued his research in Shanghai. After joining the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, H. H. Hu devoted himself to researching new species and genera of plants in China. He published a brief introduction to Chinese flora and produced research papers on new kinds of benzoin in China, the genus Rehderodendron, new genera within the Boraginaceae family, and the sinojohnstonia. He also established the Lushan Botanical Garden and Arboretum and formed the Botanical Society of China. Hu was known internationally as a pioneer of modern plant taxonomy in China.[31] In 1946, he was awarded a research professorship so that he could

continue his research in the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology during the post-war reconstruction period.

According to the regulations governing the research fellowships and professorships, they were to be focused on pure science rather than the applied sciences. The Foundation's draft guidance stated:

> These two projects (the research fellowships and research professorships) are specifically targeted at the sciences. It is easy for experts in the applied sciences to receive financial support from commercial enterprises. But there are only limited sources of income for those engaged in theoretical research. They have a pressing need for encouragement by way of grants and their work is truly meaningful. The Foundation feels a strong sense of responsibility toward them.[32]

However, the concentration of grants among a small number of researchers and institutions went against the Foundation's principles of universality and diversification where grants were concerned. For example Ping Chi, who was awarded both a research fellowship and a scientific research professorship, was a member of the screening committee for fellowships and prizes. In other examples, the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology was jointly run by the China Foundation, while the Geological Survey of China, the Science Society of China's Institute of Biology, and the Institute of Agriculture and Forestry at Chung Shan University were all regular recipients of China Foundation grants. The

directors of these institutions, including H. H. Hu, Wong Wen-hao, and Chen Huan-yong, also received grants from the Foundation. This is evidence of a degree of favoritism in the awarding of grants and support. This favoritism had an influence on the direction of scientific research at that time.

II. Grants to Research Institutions

As H. C. Zen declared, "the development of science in China depends on whether or not we have any scientific research institutions, since these institutions are specifically designed to develop the sciences."[33] In the early years of the Republic, there were few such research organizations. The oldest one, the National Geological Survey of China, was established in 1916. It was followed by the Biology Laboratory of the Science Society of China in 1922 and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology in 1927. These were small, poorly-staffed institutions. Academia Sinica and the National Peiping Research Academy were set up after the establishment of the Nationalist government. The central laboratories of industry and agriculture and the university research institutes came along later. Some large-scale manufacturing firms also established research units, such as the Golden Sea Chemical Research Institute. Thus the environment for scientific research gradually took shape. According Ministry of Education statistics, in January 1935 there were 142 major academic organizations in China, 34 of which (30.9 percent) were engaged in the natural sciences. Tsai Yuan-pei divided these organizations into three categories: those that were government owned, privately owned

organizations, and university institutes. They included not only research institutes but also bodies like the National Economic Committee, the Henry Lester Institute of Medical Research, and the West China Institute of Science.[34]

The China Foundation's policy where grants for institutions were concerned was one of "doing without owning." The Foundation preferred to cooperate with other well-established organizations than go it alone, as that enabled it to achieve more with less. At that time in China, most research institutions were short of funding. It was very difficult for them to keep their existing work going, let alone consider expansion. According to Zen, "the reason why most organizations in our country have become soup kitchens and most scholars are wringing their hands for want of work is the lack of only a small amount of money. Even though the grants from the China Foundation are small, they are enough to cover this deficiency. In this way we put our limited resources to the best use."[35] Even though the Foundation was also supposed to support reputable private organizations with growth potential, only a few, such as the Golden Sea Chemical Research Institute, the West China Institute of Science, and the Biology Laboratory of the Science Society of China, actually received grants. China Foundation grants were mainly directed at government-run research institutes, such as Academia Sinica and the National Geological Survey of China. It was only during the war that grants to the biology laboratory and the Science Society of China were increased dramatically (see table 6-1).

1. Geology and Soil Science

The predecessor of the National Geological Survey of China was the geological section of the mining department under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. It was established in 1913 but it was only after 1916, when it became the Geological Survey, that it had its own staff of about twenty individuals, an independent budget of about $68,000 per year, and its own office at No. 4, Feng-Shen Alley, West Peking. During the term of office of its first administrator, V. K. Ting, funds were tight enough, but with grants from the mining industry, the Geological Survey could afford to build a library and exhibition rooms. After Ting resigned to become president of the Pei-piao Coal Mine in 1921 and his deputy, Wong Wen-hao, took over as acting director, the Geological Survey was even more short of funds and often had no income at all. In 1926, Wong was formally appointed director, and in that year the China Foundation undertook to fund half of its annual budget. This move had a profound influence on the organization.

Table 6-1: China Foundation Grants to Research Institutions

Year	Geological Surveyb	Biology Laboratory, Science Society of China	Academia Sinicae	Golden Sea	Othersg	Total
1925					500	500
1926	35,000	20,000			4,000	59,000
1927	35,000	15,000				50,000
1928	35,000	15,000				50,000
1929	50,000	60,000	500,000[f]			610,000
1930	55,000	40,000	25,000		10,000	130,000
1931	57,200	40,000	90,000	10,000	25,000	222,200
1932	50,000	40,000	30,000	10,000	26,000	156,000
1933	100,000	50,000	30,000	10,000	17,000	207,000
1934	100,000	50,000	125,000	10,000	23,000	308,000
1935	96,000	48,000	120,000	8,000	2,000	274,000
1936	96,000	52,000	123,350	10,000		281,350
1937	96,000	55,000	118,000	10,000	3,000	282,000
1938	96,000	50,000	60,000	10,000	15,000	231,000
1939	96,000	50,000	105,000	10,000	60,000	321,000
1940-46[a]	451,000[c]	3,510,000[d]	2,625,000	855,000	275,000	7,716,000
Total	1,448,200	4,095,000	3,951,350	943,000	460,500	10,898,050

(a) Publication of the Annual Report was stopped during the Emergency Period. Finances for the period of the war were dealt with differently in the 16th Annual Report published in 1947.

(b) In 1930, the Soil Survey became part of the Geological Survey but its budgets were listed under projects run independently by the China Foundation (see table 3-2). After the war, the annual grant for the soil survey was $50,000.

(c) The grant to the Geological Survey was stopped in 1944 and not started again until after the war.

(d) This included grants to the Science Society of China and the Biology Laboratory.

(e) These included grants to the Institute of Social Research, Institute of History & Philology, Institute of Geology, and for the manufacture of scientific apparatus.

(f) This grant covered the construction of the Institute of Physics, Chemistry and, Engineering as well as expenditure on equipment, hence its huge size.

(g) This included grants to the Hunan Geological Survey, Scientific Expedition to the Northwest, the West China Academy of Science, the Tsingtao Observatory, and the Kiangsu Entomology Bureau. After 1938, the main recipient of grants was the Kweichow Provincial Hall of Science. This did not include grants to hospitals and societies.

From its inception, the National Geological Survey focused on the tangible gains to be derived from research. Its main tasks were to carry out mining and geological surveys and to draw geological maps. Between 1919 and 1936, the organization produced twenty-nine volumes of the *Soil Bulletin* and twenty-three volumes of its *Special Report on Soil*. Almost every volume of the report contained a chapter on mining. In 1920, A. W. Grabau came to China to work at the Geological Survey and began publishing *Paleontologia Sinica*. Grabau also began training research personnel in paleontology at Peking University. This changed the research culture for geology in China, and the study of historical geology, including strata and paleontology, became the mainstream. At the National Geological Survey, however, "economic geology," consisting of the study of such subjects as mining and rocks, remained the core task.[36]

Having originally been established under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the National Geological Survey was later transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and then to the Ministry of Agriculture and Mining. In 1930 it came under the Ministry of Industries, and during the war, it was switched to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. In 1934, after Nanking became the capital under the Nationalist government, the organization moved into newly constructed premises on Pearl River Road, Nanking. From that time onwards, its old headquarters in Peking became a branch office, although with an expanded staff of more than fifty. In its early days, the organization had an administrative department and two research departments, one dealing with geology and one with mining. In 1928, the institute

was reorganized and a number of research departments were set up. The department of geology was expanded to become the department of geological survey, a mineral deposits office was set up, the department of mining was expanded to become the research section of the economic geology office, and a mineral research center was established to study minerals using chemical and optical analysis. At the same time, the organization received support and grants from all sides. In 1928, it began receiving grants from mining companies such as the Kailan Mining Co. and the Peipiao Mining Company, to fund the construction of its administrative office and office for paleontology research which promoted research into fossil invertebrates. In 1929, with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the National Geological Survey established a Cenozoic unit where research was carried out into fossils of vertebrates and ancient humans. The unit commenced excavations at Choukoutien and conducted research into Peking Man. In 1930, with donations from Lin Shin-kwei and Sze Sao-ke, a seismology research unit, which kept records of earthquakes, and the Chinyuan Fuel Research Unit for the study of coal and other related minerals were set up. After the outbreak of war, the National Geological Survey moved first to Changsha and then to Chungking. Wong Wen-hao was succeeded as director by T. K. Huang; Huang was followed by Yin Tsan-shun and Li Chun-yi.[37]

In 1944, the China Foundation ended its grants to the National Geological Survey. The precise reason for this is unknown, but it was probably due to the Foundation's financial crisis. But since by this time the organization had close links with the National

Resources Commission, the Foundation's annual grant of $100,000 was no longer so important. For over twenty years, the National Geological Survey had received support and grants from all sides; its researchers had carried out soil surveys, drawn topological maps, and prospected for minerals throughout China. As the report on the organization's twenty-fifth anniversary recorded:

> Our colleagues walked more than four hundred thousand kilometers and surveyed areas of more than two million square miles to produce more than six hundred 1/1,000,000 scale geological maps, some of them published and others unpublished, plus a far larger number of larger-scale maps. Over more than two decades, we have collected over seventy thousand mineral, rock, fossil, and soil specimens; measured 208 coordinates of latitude and longitude and 38 geomagnetic fields; recorded 2,302 earthquakes; and collected sixty-eight thousand Chinese and Western books and forty-five thousand maps. Besides this, we have achieved great successes in mineral surveying, ore research, paleontological description, stratum structure recording, topographic surveying, mineral prospecting, fuels research, soil surveying, and chemical analysis, as well as publishing many reports.

The National Geological Survey's outstanding achievements included the discovery of Peking Man at Choukoutien, primitive mammals of the Triassic Period, and fossils of Eothyriddae in Lufeng, Yunnan. These discoveries "were widely discussed and their importance was recognized by scholars all over the world." However, the report lamented the fact that although such research

was recognized internationally it was, "surprisingly, rarely noticed by our own countrymen."[38]

In 1930, at its sixth annual meeting, the China Foundation gave its approval for a soil survey project to be carried out by the Geological Survey on a three-year trial basis. It was stipulated that, "during the three-year period, the Geological Survey of China should recruit one or two soil specialists from overseas while at the same time developing talented domestic specialists in order to take the work forward. In that period, the Geological Survey of China should produce a rough sketch of the area surveyed and select some important agricultural areas in which to carry out detailed surveys as a basis for later work. If the work is related to agriculture, the Geological Survey of China should hire agricultural specialists to participate in or cooperate with the project."[39]

From that year onwards, the Foundation granted between $20,000 and $40,000 annually to the Geological Survey to establish a soil research office and to hire Professor R. L. Pendleton of Laguna Agricultural College in the Philippines to assist with the project. The researchers, Chang Long-ching and Hsieh Chia-jong, started by surveying the soils of the Wei River basin in Shensi Province and the Ping valley in Hopei. Their work expanded to include Salachi, Tatung, Harbin, Nanking, and Hangchow. The purpose was to provide reference materials that would enable farms belonging to schools of agriculture and fertilizer plants to solve practical problems to do with soil. In 1933, Dr. James Thorp of the U.S. Soil Bureau came to China to replace Dr. Pendleton. The grants from the Foundation increased to $50,000 per year,

enabling the Geological Survey to expand its staff and equipment. The Survey also worked with the Central Agricultural Laboratory of the Ministry of Industry and the College of Agriculture of the Private University of Nanking in carrying out soil surveys and research.[40] The results of the soil surveys in the northern provinces of China were published in the Special Bulletin on Soil and the Soil Bulletin, and they served as extremely valuable reference material on the use of fallow land, irrigation, and the provision of assistance to rural areas of the northern provinces. They were also helpful in the work of soil conservation and boosting agricultural production. After the outbreak of war, the Geological Survey and its staff moved to the interior of China and began surveying in the northwestern and southwestern provinces. By the end of the war, a survey of the entire country had been completed and soil maps were published. Soil analyses and tests were carried out simultaneously with surveys on the ground, thus completing research into the nature of the soil across the whole country. After the war, the Foundation decided that since the soil survey was a national project, it should be supported by the government rather than the China Foundation which had limited resources.[41] Therefore, in 1946 the Foundation handed the project over to the Ministry of the Economic Affairs and played only a supporting role from then on.

The National Geological Survey had always been the leading geological institution in China. The provincial geological surveys played only a supporting role due to their having been established more recently and having only limited resources in terms of staff and funding. The earliest provincial geological survey was

established by the Bureau of Public Works of Honan Province in 1923. A similar institution was set up in Hunan Province in 1927. Between 1930 and 1934, the China Foundation awarded a grant of $10,000 per year to the Hunan Geological Survey to fund survey work and equipment. Its work was focused on mineral surveys and it published more than ten bulletins on economic geology.[42] Before the war, there were only a few geological surveys in existence and they were unevenly distributed across the country. There was only the Honan Geological Survey in the north and three such institutions in the south: in Hunan, Kwangtung/Kwangsi, and Kiangsi. They were mostly engaged in drawing geological maps; surveying mineral deposits; collecting statistics on the mining industry; conducting research into soil, hydraulic power, thermal power, and irrigation; and producing industrial designs. They received only a token amount of funding from the central government and they often asked the National Geological Survey to cooperate with them in conducting research.

2. The Biological Sciences

A. The Biology Laboratory of the Science Society of China

The Science Society of China was established in 1914 in the United States. It had thirty-five founding members all of whom were students studying in the U.S. Its chairman was H. C. Zen, and its key members included Ping Chi, Y. R. Chao, Fu Ming-

fu, Yang Chuan, and Chu Ko-chen. In its early years, the society was engaged in promoting science and popularizing scientific knowledge. From the 1920s, its members turned their backs on scientism and embraced scientific research instead. The society believed that "setting up research institutes and libraries, etc., is more important than publishing journals and defining scientific terms."[43] The question was, what kind of research institutes should be established? Having looked at the situation in the West, people like Yang Chuan and H. C. Zen believed that research institutes fell into one of five general categories: private laboratories, research institutes attached to universities, institutes set up by academic societies, institutes set up by manufacturing companies, and those established by the government. In their view, research institutes attached to universities and those set up by academic societies were best suited to conditions in China at that time.[44] The Science Society of China therefore sought to cooperate with university research institutes. A number of well-known biologists who were also members of the Science Society of China, including Ping Chi, Chen Cheng, H. H. Hu, and H. Y. Chen, were on the faculty of Southeastern University. In 1922, using the Wistar Institute of Anatomy and Biology in the United States as a template,[45] they set up a nongovernmental biology laboratory.

At its inception, the laboratory received a monthly payment of only $300 from the treasury of Kiangsu Province. Although its facilities were basic, it collected specimens of flora and fauna and established the first museum of natural history in Nanking. Support from the China Foundation started in 1926, and in 1929, the Foundation awarded the laboratory an additional grant of

$20,000, which together with another $20,000 grant from the Science Society funded the construction of a two-story building occupying more than one mu of land to the west of the Society's own premises. The building contained research laboratories and space for an exhibition of specimens.[46] The director of the laboratory, Ping Chi, was awarded a China Foundation scientific research professorship and his salary from the laboratory was used to pay the salaries of two new members of staff. Its funding secure, the laboratory's research made steady progress.

The main business of the laboratory consisted of research, the training of personnel, and the promotion and popularization of its research results. There were two research departments, one for zoology and one for botany. The former was headed by Ping Chi and Shisan C. Chen and the latter by S. S. Chien and H. H. Hu. The laboratory began by surveying and investigating the flora and fauna of China, as Ping insisted that "the most urgent task in biology today is collection and classification."[47] The staff of the laboratory considered that taxonomy was the foundation of biological research and the collection of specimens was one of the most important tasks of the biologist. Under the leadership of Chen, Chien, and Fu, the laboratory collected specimens from all over the country. They focused their research on evolutionary biology. Chien and Hu had carried out research at Harvard University and had close links with the Arnold Arboretum at Harvard, the main center of evolutionary biology in the United States, where the collection of specimens and taxonomy were emphasized. The laboratory exchanged specimens with the Arnold Arboretum and was influenced by it.[49] This emphasis on collection

and surveys rather than experimental work spawned a debate between two different camps of biologists.[50] The laboratory later adjusted the scope of its research. A report issued by the China Foundation in 1935 commented as follows:

> Due to its limited budget, the laboratory previously focused mainly on taxonomy. In view of the importance of other areas of biology, it has recently put a lot of effort into animal physiology, biochemistry, and economic entomology, in the hope that it can contribute to such areas as hygiene, nourishment, and the elimination of plant pests. It has done similar work in the field of botany, especially with regard to research into economically valuable plants and fungi.[51]

Shisan C. Chen studied the morphology and variations of goldfish, their hybridization with crucian carp, and the principles of strain formation, etc. Even though Chen pioneered the study of genetics in China, he had no influence on taxonomy and evolutionary biology in the laboratory as he soon left Nanking to teach and carry out research at Tsing Hua University in Peking.[52]

The establishment of the biology laboratory was a milestone in the development of modern biology in China. It trained a number of researchers who went on to carry out strategic research in the universities. It contributed to the establishment of such institutions as the Academia Sinica Museum of Natural History (which later became the Research Institute of Zoology and Biology); the Institute of Agriculture and Forestry, Chung Shan University; and the Institute of Biology of the West China

Institute of Science. These institutions worked closely together on taxonomy and survey work, as did the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology.[53]

B. The Fan Memorial Institute of Biology

The origins of the Fan Memorial Institute and the entrustment of its endowment to the China Foundation have already been described in chapter 3. The main task undertaken by the institute was a survey of the flora and fauna of northern China. Its zoology department was directed by Ping Chi and its botany department by H. H. Hu. Ping, the institute's first director, after shuttling back and forth between the north and south of China for several years, eventually resigned his position to devote his full attention to the Biology Laboratory of the Science Society of China. He was succeeded by H. H. Hu. These two institutions conducted almost the same kind of research, although the scope of that research was different. The China Foundation also believed that having one institute in the north of the country and one in the south was a good idea and that the friendly cooperative relationship between the two was appropriate. It reported:

> Besides the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, there are the Biology Laboratory of the Science Society of China and the Institute of Plants and Forestry, Chung Shan University in Canton. All three institutions receive our grants. Because their directors have always been on good terms with each other, they cooperate in their work and avoid duplication. Since the three institutions are located far apart in northern, western, and central China, and the territory of China contains an abundance of species, the distribution is seamless.[54]

The main task of the institute was to "follow in the footsteps of the National Geological Survey and to survey the taxonomy of the flora and fauna of China." Its survey area stretched from Mongolia in the north, Hainan Island in the south, to Tibet and Szechuan in the north- and southwest. Its researchers discovered many new species, and they published their reports in such publications as the *Bulletin of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, Chinese Plants Illustrated, and Zoology Monographs.*

During his early years of study at Harvard University, H. H. Hu based his Ph.D. dissertation on plant specimens he collected in the university's botanical garden. In 1933, Hu's interest in botanical garden management prompted him to contact the Provincial College of Agriculture in his home province of Kiangsi to discuss the establishment and joint operation of the Lushan Botanical Garden and Arboretum. The garden was established the following year and Chin Zen-chang was hired as the curator. Chin had been a researcher at the Royal Botanic Garden, Edinburgh, and Kew Gardens in London. The Kiangsi Provincial College of Agriculture provided an initial grant of $30,000 to cover organization costs, and the ongoing budget of $12,000 was shared between the college and the Fan Memorial Institute. The garden covered an area of nine thousand mu, and in addition to cultivating trees and garden plants and conducting experiments on them, its staff carried out a survey of the plants of Lushan. The Lushan Botanical Garden became

the largest establishment of its kind in China. In addition to being employed by the College of Agriculture as curator of the Lushan Forest, Chin also established the Meisan Forestry Laboratory at the request of Lu Tso-fu, the director of the Bureau of Public Works, Szechuan Province.[55] The Fan Memorial Institute's joint project to establish the Lushan Botanical Garden and Arboretum was scheduled to last for three years. But when the agreement expired in 1937, some members of the institute opposed its extension on the grounds that, according to its policy, the institute should be devoted entirely to research, and its limited resources meant that it could not afford to engage in the applications of that research. In these circumstances, Hu put forward the following proposal:

> Since our organization is a research institute, we should focus on pure scientific research and only engage in research related to production when we have spare resources to do so. But since China has such a huge territory and an abundance of resources, people will criticize us if we do not engage in applied science. So should we, in these circumstances, change our policy?[56]

After some discussion, the institute decided to extend its involvement in the project, as a botanical garden was an important enterprise of a permanent character which could not be compared with a mere short-term cooperative business.

It was impossible to move the institute's collection of specimens and books to the south of China after the outbreak of war, so it came under the protection of the U. S. embassy. H.

H. Hu took some of his staff to Yunnan where they established the Yunnan Agriculture and Forestry Laboratory in cooperation with the provincial education department. The laboratory was established at Dragon Spring Park, near Black Dragon Pond, in a northern suburb of Kunming. Chin Zen-chan and the staff of the botanical garden transferred to Likiang County in northwestern Yunnan where they established the Likiang Working Center of the Lushan Botanical Garden and Arboretum and continued their research. They carried out a survey of the plants of Yunnan and the Houlan Mountains, and published many research papers on ferns. The China Foundation continued to support them with grants. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese military treated the institute as an American organization and confiscated its property. Its equipment was totally destroyed. Despite this setback, H. H. Hu continued to issue bulletins in Kiangsi, publishing a paper on his most important discovery in Szechuan, the metasequoia or dawn redwood, which has been described as a "living fossil." After the war, the China Foundation could not afford to fund the institute's move back to Peking, while the market value of the Fan Memorial Fund's investments—which were in Chinese government bonds—were halved. The Foundation therefore asked the government for a grant of $500 million to maintain the institute.[57] In 1948, the Foundation wrote to the Ministry of Education asking for the salaries of the institute's staff to be included in the government's budget for education and culture, while the Foundation would continue to be responsible only for its business and administration expenses. After the Nationalists lost control of mainland China, the institute was merged with the Institute of Plant Taxonomy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.[58]

3. Academia Sinica and Other Institutions

A. Academia Sinica

Academia Sinica was established in June 1928 as China's senior academic research institution. Upon its establishment, Tsai Yuan-pei indicated that it was to be tasked with conducting academic research, as well as publishing and promoting research. He said that it was a composite institution, part national academy and part national research society, similar to those in the developed countries of the West. Academia Sinica's duties included (1) conducting scientific research and (2) guiding, coordinating, and encouraging academic research. In fact, this second task was so difficult that Academia Sinica was never able to fulfill it completely. In order to become the "academic vanguard of the nation," Academia Sinica had to concentrate on its first duty: to set up research institutes.[59]

Academia Sinica's initial budget was CN$1,200,000 per year. Besides covering salaries, it was short of funds for construction and the purchase of equipment. Wearing two hats, one as the chairman of Academia Sinica and the other as chairman of the China Foundation, Tsai Yuan-pei set up a planning committee for the development of physics, chemistry, and engineering. The committee presented a report to the China Foundation asking for a grant of $500,000 toward constructing and equipping the Research Institute of Physics, Chemistry, and Engineering. Tsai's request was approved at the Foundation's fifth annual meeting in June 1929. During the construction period, Academia Sinica and the Foundation formed a joint committee to oversee operations, consisting of Wong Wen-hao, Ting Sie-lin, Yen Zen-kuang, Wong Chin, and H. F. Sun. The building was to be located in Shanghai[60] and the grants for its construction were paid in six installments, with the final installment due in 1932.

According to its director, V. K. Ting, Academia Sinica was to carry out three categories of work: conventional or long-term research, the use of scientific research methods to study raw materials and production in China in order to solve the various problems faced by industry, and pure scientific research. Even though Ting believed that the pure and applied sciences could not be separated, he insisted that "the most important and practical task for Academia Sinica is to use scientific methods to conduct research into raw materials and production in order to solve our various industrial problems."[61] With this in mind, the Institute of Engineering set up a cotton textile dyeing laboratory and laboratories for steel, glass, and experiments in magnetism. The Institute of Chemistry conducted research into the industrial use of alum and Chinese herbs, while the Institute of Physics produced laboratory equipment for middle schools. This kind of work was very practical and the China Foundation was supportive. Starting in 1932, it provided a grant of $15,000 to the Institute of Physics for the provision of laboratory equipment for senior high schools and universities, and $8,000 to the Institute of Meteorology to purchase specialist equipment such as an electric weather testing machine, barometers, thermometers, and hygrometers for

the Chinien Observatory. During the war, the Foundation also provided grants to the Institutes of Meteorology and Geology and the glass testing laboratory for the purchase of equipment. These were one-off grants and were not ongoing in nature. The ongoing grants provided by the Foundation were focused on the Institute of History and Philology, and the Research Institute of Social Sciences (later the Institute of Sociology).

Starting in 1931, the Foundation granted $30,000 to the Institute of History and Philology to fund its archeology work, research into linguistics, and the publication of research papers. The institute's linguistics division asked Y. R. Chao to purchase new recording apparatus in the United States for use in dialect surveys, the collection of phonemes, and the creation of phonetics files. The archeology division, which was divided into three sections: excavation, surveying, and research, was a long-term recipient of China Foundation grants. The chief of the division, Li Chi, was awarded a China Foundation scientific research professorship. Being adequately funded, the division was able to make some important discoveries during excavations in Honan and Shantung. The research reports published by Li Chi, Liang Ssu-yung, and Tung Tso-pin made important contributions to archeology. The Institute of Sociology (formerly the Institute of Social Sciences) was established in 1928 in Shanghai, although it later transferred to Nanking. Tsai Yuan-pei, Yang Chuan, and Fu Ssu-nien all served as part-time directors of the institute until in 1934 it merged with the Foundation's own Institute of Social Research (see chapter 3). L. K. Tao was appointed director of the new body, and he continued in post until the end of the war when

the central government moved back to Nanking. Of the more than CN$100,000 granted by the China Foundation to the institutes of Academia Sinica, CN$80,000 went to the Institute of Sociology, which is an indication of its importance. The work of the institute initially encompassed law, ethnology, sociology, and economics. After the merger, the work of the ethnology division was taken over by the Institute of History and Philology and the law division was suspended. From then onwards, the Institute of Sociology dealt only with sociology and economics, with emphasis on the latter. This bias toward economics can be seen from the list of proposed research topics which included such subjects as modern economic history, industrial economy, agricultural economy, international trade, banking and finance, public finance, and population and statistics. After the war, the institute moved to Changsha, then to Kweilin, Kunming, and finally to Li Chuan in Szechuan Province. The grants from the Foundation continued, and the institute shifted the focus of its research to such subjects as an economic survey of Yunnan Province and studies of the wartime economy.[62] The Foundation's grants to the Institute of History and Philology and the Institute of Sociology were exceptions. They were among the few major grant recipients after the Foundation expanded its scope to include the social sciences.

B. The Golden Sea Chemical Research Institute

Before World War I, most Chinese consumer goods were imported or produced in factories operated by foreigners. The war gave the Chinese opportunities to produce their own goods. At

that time, manufacturers of products such as matches, soap, glass, paper, dyestuffs, and pharmaceuticals were all classified as being part of the chemical industry. The pioneer of the chemical industry in northern China was Ray Fan (Fan Hsu-tung, born in 1882, a brother of Fan Yuan-lien).[63] In 1914, Fan established the Chiu-Da Refined Salt Company in Tangku, Hopei. Because of Fan Yuan-lien's close links to the Peking government, the company was able to expand rapidly and make substantial profits. Three years later, Fan set up the Yong-Li ("Ever-Profitable") Salt Company, with $50,000 capital, to produce pure alkali, a substance commonly used in the manufacture of soap, paper, glass, and pharmaceuticals. In 1922, he established the Golden Sea Chemical Research Institute, based on his company's laboratory, with a $100,000 donation out of his dividends from Chiu-Da. Fan hired Sun Shue-wu, a Harvard Ph.D., as director of the institute, and employed more than thirty researchers in five research divisions. In 1931, the China Foundation decided to give the institute a grant of $10,000 to expand its research. The research carried out by the institute covered a wide range of areas. In the field of microbiology, the researchers carried out surveys of alcohol manufacturers in various places, studying the fermentation of alcohol and lactic acid, as well as collecting and experimenting on microbes and investigating their application in industry. They also carried out research into nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium fertilizers and their application in agriculture, as well as research into aluminum. The institute also looked into simple methods of producing brine using lime and ammonium carbonate.[64] The scope of the institute's research work went beyond topics which were directly beneficial to Fan's company; it expanded to include general industrial research.

It is hard to judge what contribution the institute actually made to research, but as a pioneer private chemical engineering research institute, Golden Sea did at least serve as a model for similar institutions in both the public and private sectors.[65] This was the real reason why the Foundation was willing to offer it long-term support.

C. Scientific Expedition to the Northwest

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, numerous Western collectors and explorers had travelled to China. One of the most famous among them was the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin (1865–1952), who was a frequent traveler to the inner regions of China and Central Asia. In 1926, with the support of a German airline, he made an expedition to northwestern China. Through the good offices of a former director of the Swedish geological survey, J. G. Anderson (who had served as mining advisor to the Geological Survey of China), Hedin signed a draft agreement with V. K. Ting stipulating that staff from the Geological Survey would accompany his expedition, although anything that they collected in Inner Mongolia and Chinese Turkistan would be sent to Sweden for research. When the draft agreement was published in March the following year, it created uproar among the academic societies in Peking. As a result, fourteen institutions formed the Association of Academic Institutions in China and signed a nineteen-article cooperative agreement with the Swedes under which the expedition was renamed the Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition to the Northwest. The institutions concerned included Peking University,

Tsing Hua College, the National Museum of History, the National Metropolitan Library, the Central Observatory, the Palace Museum, the Geological Survey of China, the Chinese Society of Astronomy, and the Society of Geology. The chairman of the new association, Liu Fu, said that the spirit of the agreement was three-fold: first, it guaranteed that there would be no violation of national sovereignty; second, it ensured the protection of national treasures; and third, it stipulated that important fossil remains would stay in China in order to promote the development of science.[66] Several of the academic institutions took part in the expedition. The Chinese team leader was Hsu Bing-chang (later succeeded by Yuan Fu-li), and the European team leader was Hedin. There were ten Chinese and eighteen Europeans, mostly experts in geology, astronomy, meteorology, and archeology. They set off in 1927 and spent six fruitful years exploring northwestern China.

The funds for the expedition were raised by Hedin in Sweden and Germany; the Chinese side did not contribute any money. In February 1928, the Association of Academic Institutions in China submitted a request to the China Foundation for a grant of $30,000 to fund the publication of the expedition's findings and another $30,000 to ensure the safekeeping of the artifacts and specimens. The expedition's work covered seven areas grouped into two sections. The first section included geology, anthropology, archeology, and folklore, and the second section included geomagnetism, meteorology, and astronomy. The Association of Academic Institutions of China was only willing to pay the publication and printing costs for work in the first section.[67] For three years from 1931, the China Foundation made

an annual grant of $15,000 to the expedition, also for printing and publication costs only. This grant was used to fund publication of a Chinese translation of Hedin's My Exploration Career, to publish photographs of two Han Dynasty wooden slips together with a research report, to produce maps, and to sort out ancient artifacts. Other publications included Huang Wen-pi's Catalogue of Pottery from Kao Ch'ang and research papers on the geology and fossils of Mongolia and Chinese Turkistan by Yuan Fu-li and Ting Dao-heng.[68]

D. The West China Academy of Science

Western China's abundance of natural resources attracted many Chinese and foreign explorers to the provinces of Szechuan, Yunnan, and Kweichow, and what was then the province of Sikang (now split between Szechuan and Tibet), where they investigated and collected specimens of the local flora, fauna, and minerals. The first properly planned and organized Chinese expedition to the region was that led by H. H. Hu in 1927. The purpose of Hu's expedition was to collect plant specimens in Szechuan and Sikang with members of the Szechuan branch of the Science Society of China. From that time on, the academic societies often dispatched expeditions to western China. A visit to Szechuan by H. C. Zen (chairman of the Science Society of China) and Wong Wen-hao (director of the Geological Survey) marked the beginning of a high tide of scientific activity in the region which sparked new interest in scientific research among local military, political, business, and educational figures.[69] The trip also improved communication

between people in Szechuan and scientists working in central China.

The West China Academy of Science was established in 1930 in a suburb of Chungking by Lu Tsou-fu (1893–1952), founder in 1925 of the Minsheng Industrial Corporation. Lu received support from the Szechuan warlord Liu Hsiang (1888–1938) and encouragement from the leaders of the academic societies in Peking and Shanghai, such as Tsai Yuan-pei, Ping Chi, and Wong Wen-hao. The thinking behind the academy was the widely held belief among the military and political authorities in Szechuan and people inside and outside of China that "the western provinces, with their vast territory and plentiful resources not only serve as a defensive barrier in the southwest but are also equal in economic importance to the provinces of the northeast." Therefore, the purpose of this academy was to "engage in scientific research in order to develop [the region's] natural wealth and enrich the people."[70] The funding for the academy came from the Minsheng Corporation—at this time China's largest private shipping company—and its affiliates.[71] The academy also received support from the headquarters of the 21st Army under Liu Hsiang, the Three Gorges Defense Regiment, the Bank of Szechuan, and various industrialists and financiers. It had an endowment of $160,000 and an annual budget of more than $50,000. In line with the policy of "studying the applied sciences in order to boost the economic and cultural development of western China," institutes of physics and chemistry, geology, biology, and agriculture and forestry were set up within the academy. The Institute of Physics and Chemistry engaged in the testing of minerals and industrial

products and research into fuels. The Institute of Geology carried out geological and mineralogical surveys. The Institute of Biology collected and studied biological specimens. The Institute of Agriculture and Forestry engaged in the improvement and promotion of arboriculture and agricultural production.[72] The Institute of Biology collected specimens in cooperation with the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology and the Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China. In 1932, the China Foundation started providing small grants to support the academy's cooperative projects. Even though these grants of between $2,000 and $3,000 annually did not have a major impact on the academy's development, they served as an important symbol of academic exchange between the interior of China and the frontier regions. During the war, more than twenty academic institutions were relocated to the suburbs of Chungking and most of them operated out of premises borrowed from the academy. These institutions jointly established the Science Museum of Western China (later renamed Beipei Museum) where the results of their research were exhibited in order to promote scientific education in the region and improve the Chinese people's knowledge of science.

III. Summary

How should we assess the China Foundation's performance in supporting scientific research? It is beyond the scope of this book to assess the results of individual research projects, but from the way the Foundation distributed its grants, we can discern the characteristics of scientific development at that time. In its

emphasis on “indigenous” or “local” science, the China Foundation reflected the mainstream thinking of its time. ”Local science” means science built on the study of subjects with specific local characteristics, such as geology, biology, or meteorology. Scientific disciplines such as physics or chemistry are universal rather than local. In H. C. Zen’s view, only when a scientist had fulfilled his duty in the former could he proceed to the latter. As he put it, “the local should take priority over the universal.” He gave two reasons for this. First, even though the universal sciences are the foundation of science, in a scientifically underdeveloped country, it is difficult to master them right away. With limited talent and equipment, it would be useless to try to master them; second, since these sciences are universal, Chinese scientist are able to borrow them from others; there was no urgent need to reinvent the wheel, so to speak.[73]

At that time, there were many scientists who agreed with this definition of science and how the different kinds of science should be prioritized. For example, the physicist Ny Tsi-ze said:

> Physics is the mother of experimental science. It developed earlier and it has been progressing very fast in recent years. Therefore, students in this field need more training and better equipment before they can produce any results. It is natural that the study of physics in China should lag behind the study of geology and biology. But physics is an international science without much local character, and as soon as there is a discovery in physics, people all over the world take notice.[74]

In a speech on the subject of how scientific research should be conducted, Wong Wen-hao suggested that priority should be given to sciences with local characteristics. In highly patriotic fashion, he explained why as follows:

> China really has a vast territory and abundant resources. There are many things that have never been touched by scientific research. But once we carry out research into them, there will be new findings, and these new findings will make a contribution…. Therefore, if our scientists do not make use of local material, foreign scientists will happily utilize it. From the point of view of global science, scholarship knows no national boundaries, and we should welcome foreigners to China to uncover our hidden treasures in order to promote the development of human knowledge. But from a Chinese point of view, if we do not make haste to study our own material and our own problems, so as to make our own contribution to the world, but let foreigners do it first, we should feel doubly ashamed. Therefore, we should drive ourselves doubly hard.[75]

The paleontologist Young Chung-chien believed that what was fundamental in “local” science was “horizontal” research that treated regions as the “warp” and subjects as the “weft,” and vertical research that treated subjects as the warp and regions as the weft.[76]

Setting aside the question whether such a classification of the sciences and ordering of the priorities of scientific development are in fact tenable or not, this was the consensus among promoters of

science at that time. In reviewing the "pure results" achieved in the promotion of science by the China Foundation, H. C. Zen said:

> The China Foundation has made a tremendous contribution to the development of the indigenous sciences. Geology should be counted as the most well-developed subject in China. …But until the inauguration of the China Foundation, the funding given by the government could hardly ensure the basic livelihood of the staff of the Geological Survey. How could they find the extra energy to undertake a field trip? The China Foundation feels the Geological Survey has very important links to the economy and science in China. Over the last decade, grants from the China Foundation have continuously increased and the academic contributions made by this institution have also been advancing. …Of all the academic institutions in China, I am afraid that I cannot find another that has made a comparable contribution. … Biology in China has followed in the footsteps of geology. Given time, it will also become an independent science. This is because the two subjects are indigenous in nature. Without undertaking surveys, it would be impossible to use local material to build up the local sciences. …We just have to look at biology in China before the Foundation extended a helping hand to it, when it was ruled by the out-of-date concept of mixing biology and zoology into one undifferentiated course of teaching. Several years on, the results of the research carried out by various institutes of biology, both in terms of quantity and quality, are almost equal to those achieved in geology. Both lectures and experiments in schools also make use of Chinese material. This is another example of the contribution made by the China Foundation.[77]

Geology and biology started earlier in China and therefore their accomplishments were higher, and it is undeniable that the China Foundation made major contributions to these two subjects. It is hard to assess the Foundation's contribution to other sciences because of their different nature. In 1936, the Science Society of China and other scientific societies (including the Chinese societies of mathematics, physics, chemistry, zoology, botany, and geography) held their first joint national conference in Peking. Of the 250 research papers presented at the conference, about 60 percent resulted from projects that had been supported by China Foundation grants.[78] This one concrete example provides an indication of the China Foundation's contribution to scientific research.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

By adhering to its principles of "doing without owning" and "leveraging limited resources to achieve the best results," in the years prior to 1949, and especially before the Sino-Japanese War, the China Foundation made major contributions to the development of modern science in China. Its role was not just that of a passive supporter; it was also an active promoter. Because the Foundation was the first of its kind in China, it had to use its U.S. counterparts, especially the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, as the blueprint for the direction of its business and its administrative structure. The two bodies not only had some trustees in common, but they also cooperated with or supplemented each other in their grant-awarding activities. However, through the efforts of its Chinese and American trustees, the China Foundation gradually formulated its own policies adapted to the unique needs of China, and it also developed a unique modus operandi for grants-in-aid.

In the area of science education, the Foundation initially focused on improving the quality of teachers and teaching in middle schools, as well as on editing and translating science textbooks. Even though it achieved some degree of success in these basic tasks, later policy changes meant that they were discontinued. The emphasis on editing and translating was altered as a result of personnel changes within the Foundation, and it gradually shifted its attention toward universities, eventually completely cutting off its support for middle schools. It is hard

to evaluate the overall achievements of the Foundation's policy toward university science education, although it is possible to point to a few individual success stories. But in the 1920s and 1930s, when education budgets were tight and some were even in deficit, timely grants from the Foundation played an important role in "saving starving institutions from total collapse." The revival of Peking University and the resurgence of the Research Institute of the University of Communications are two good examples.

After the end of the 1930s, the Nationalist government started to focus on science education, and the Foundation more or less followed that trend. In agriculture, engineering, and medicine, it steadily increased its grants to the colleges of agriculture and medicine at Central University, the College of Agriculture of Chung Shan University, the University of Communications, and the National Medical College of Shanghai, among others. Even though these "applied sciences" were within its business scope, the board of the China Foundation had always avoided treating support for these subjects as its primary task. The majority of the trustees insisted on the importance of pure science instead. Therefore, the Foundation's contribution to the applied sciences was not outstanding. Even during the war, when the urgent need to rebuild China forced the Foundation to direct its grants toward agriculture, engineering, and medicine, there was always a counter-force pulling it back toward pure science.

Scientific research was seriously underdeveloped in China, so it was no wonder that the Foundation paid particular attention to research. The way it did this was through the development

of talented personnel and the provision of equipment. In short, its task was to "provide job opportunities for accomplished scholars and to provide development opportunities for young people with potential." The Foundation sought to achieve this through its scientific research professorships, fellowships, and prizes. On the equipment side, the Foundation provided grants to universities specifically to purchase of scientific apparatus. These subsidies for scientific research represented the largest single item in the Foundation's total budget. As Chu Ko-chen remarked, "Chinese research institutes such as the Geological Survey, the Biology Laboratory of the Science Society of China, and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, as well as the Peking University professorships, all depended on the payment of the Boxer Indemnity, i.e. the endowment of the China Foundation. As a result, the U.S. remission of the Boxer Indemnity became an important source of funding for scientific research institutes in China."[1]

Funding always affects the direction of research. Wang Ging-hsi, who felt strongly about the uneven funding of science, joined the debate among Chinese biologists,

> Most of the funding for biology has gone into research in taxonomy and morphology. Over the past decade, the government's spending on education has always been inadequate and in arrears. Therefore, we do not have great expectations where government funding is concerned. … Funding from the Boxer Indemnity endowments is more dependable. But the China Foundation's grants to biology have also mostly gone to taxonomy and morphology. The Foundation provided grants to the Biology Laboratory of the Science Society of China, the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, the Institute of Agriculture and Forestry of Chung Shan University in Canton, and the marine biology summer school run by Amoy University. The foreign biologists hired by the Foundation to teach in China were also taxonomy and morphology specialists. The Foundation's main grants have also gone into these two fields.[2]

The China Foundation's particular interest in the "local" sciences of biology and geology reflected the view of many scientists at that time regarding the definition of science and the priorities for its development. This view was promoted by members of the Science Society of China, of which H. C. Zen was a member, so it is no surprise that the Foundation was also influenced by it.

How could the Foundation play the role of supporter of science as well as promoter of science? In Zen's opinion, there were two prerequisites for this dual role: targeted funding and an emphasis on cooperative working.[3] Right from the beginning, the China Foundation adopted a clear and careful direction and clear and careful principles. In education, it limited its grants to the promotion of science, and where cultural institutions were concerned, its grants were limited to libraries. The principle behind the Foundation's funding was to subsidize successful schools and institutions. Although its direction may seem lopsided and its subsidies to already flourishing institutions may appear

superfluous, the way it concentrated its limited resources on a few carefully selected targets was much more effective than if it had scattered its largesse over a wide range of educational projects.

This policy of awarding grants to only a few schools and research institutes attracted a lot of criticism. In the early years of the Foundation, the Joint Committee of National Educational Groups Monitoring the Usage of the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity and the Joint Committee of Provincial Educational Councils both questioned the principles upon which it distributed its funds. In 1931, the Foundation's special funding for Peking University provoked an outcry and demands that the "inside story" of the China Foundation be told, as well as criticism from a professor at Central University, as mentioned above. In the face of this criticism, the Foundation repeatedly explained why it was sticking to its principle of concentrating its limited resources on a few big projects. H. C. Zen pleaded thus:

> My personal opinion is that only a very small portion of the remission of the Boxer Indemnity is being spent on education. With the exception of the American remission that was used for Tsing Hua University and the China Foundation, and a portion of the French remission that was used for the Sino-French University, were the tens of millions of dollars of the Sino-British and Sino-Russian remissions and others spent on education? Now, even the Sino-American remission is being questioned. It would be impossible, as some colleagues in education have demanded, for the Sino-American remission to be used to achieve what is supposed to be achieved with the entire Boxer Indemnity of a hundred million dollars. We hope that our colleagues in education will once again demonstrate their enthusiasm and courage and ask for more remission funds to be used in education. If that were done, the problem of funding education would be solved.[4]

Zen continued, "With such a vast territory and so many enterprises to be initiated in China, the resources devoted to scientific research are pitifully small. To expect rapid results from such meager resources is like expecting an offering to the gods of a small pig's trotter to yield a full larder." Zen asked his countrymen to support the policy and projects of the China Foundation, as "the business of developing science will be accomplished a step at a time. What we should be worried about is not lack of advancement, but that a lack of continuity will spoil the entire effort. The China Foundation is a relatively stable organization that could be an effective instrument for the promotion of science. I hope that all people of goodwill and intelligence will support the Foundation."[5] The policy of the Foundation was correct; the only problems were in its execution. Especially after the reorganization of the Foundation, its grants lacked focus and it sometimes strayed away from its stated scope of business under pressure from the government and the education establishment. For example, the Foundation provided grants for the construction of the Institute of Physics, Chemistry, and Engineering at Academia Sinica and provided funding for the Ministry of Education's compulsory education program. Yet another example was the way the Foundation changed its investment policy at the "suggestion" of the government. Besides, its grants were frequently awarded

to individuals or institutions connected with its trustees, such as Ping Chi, the Science Society of China, Southeastern University, and Peking University. Among the trustees, Charles Bennett was particularly critical of this. He said that the Chinese trustees were incapable of resisting personal pressure, so grants were frequently wasted on irrelevant and inconsistent projects that lacked meaningful long-term plans. When remission payments stopped under the new Sino-American treaty in 1943 and the Foundation was in crisis, Bennett even asserted that it should be wound up.[6] This kind of criticism of the way the Foundation was run really hit a sore spot, as such perceived favoritism was the reason why the American trustees were unhappy with Director H. C. Zen and it was also the origin of outside disaffection with the Foundation.

The other prerequisite for the Foundation's dual role as a supporter and promoter of science was its principle of engaging in cooperative or joint enterprises. Most of its projects belonged to this category, including the National Library of Peiping (a joint project with the Ministry of Education), the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology (a joint project with the Hsiang-chih Research Society), and the Soil Survey (run jointly with the Geological Survey). Even when it undertook independent projects, the Foundation sought the cooperation of other institutions. For example, its science education professorships were funded in cooperation with universities; its scientific research professorships were administered in cooperation with research institutes; and its work in agriculture, engineering, medicine, mass education, and vocational education was conducted in cooperation with schools or academic societies. This policy of "doing without owning" was a far cry from that of

the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, which single-handedly founded the Peking Union Medical College and used it to develop American-style medical education and research in China. But at that time, education in the natural sciences in China was not developed enough to serve as the foundation for sophisticated medical research. As a result, in the late 1920s the Rockefeller Foundation changed its policy and started to pay attention to the overall educational environment in the country. The two foundations frequently cooperated or supplemented each other's grants, but the Rockefeller Foundation never involved itself in geological surveys, biological investigations, or engineering, or in certain institutions, including public universities and research institutes such as Peking University, Central University, or Academia Sinica. These areas were left to the China Foundation.

Strangely enough, the China Foundation did not engage in cooperative projects with other Boxer Indemnity administrations, which included the Sino-British, Sino-Russian, Sino-Belgian, Sino-Dutch, and Sino-Italian foundations or administrations. With the exception of the Sino-British Foundation, which had achieved a certain amount in the fields of culture and education, these were not influential.[8] If these organizations had been able to draw up detailed and sound plans for dividing up work between them and had been able to cooperate with one another, they could, in theory, have played a crucial role in China's overall cultural and educational development. Regrettably, they went their separate ways and eschewed coordination. Frequently, they were not even capable of performing their own work, let alone entering into cooperation with others. While other Boxer Indemnity

administrations collapsed and died an early death due to the ravages of the Sino-Japanese War, or to mismanagement, or the global economic and financial crises, the China Foundation exists to this day, an independent and self-perpetuating organization that supports education and culture in Taiwan. The basic reason for this is that the Foundation has always had a sound organization and good personnel. As Hu Shih said back in 1926:

> These few years in Peking, I have witnessed the tragedy and the scandal of so many people trying to get money from the remissions of the Boxer Indemnity. I am sad and angry. I am puzzled about the remission from the French to this day. The committee of the Russian remission, according to my understanding, is a bunch of politicians who took advantage of a coup d'état to get themselves made trustees. The Japanese remission got itself embroiled in controversies over cultural matters. …If at that time, educators in the north and south could have abandoned their selfishness and adopted an "attitude of cooperation with proper supervision," things would not have reached such a low point. The American remission is better because the president of the United States had full power until the board of trustees was formed. Having established a solid foundation and a sound organization, he then gave full power to the board. It has therefore had fewer problems and has accomplished more.[9]

But a healthy organization needs devoted staff in order to perform well. The reorganization was the result of a few trustees sticking to their ideals and fighting the government. Legally,

the China Foundation is a non-profit juristic person. Its source of funding was the U.S. government's second remission of the Boxer Indemnity. Its political and diplomatic significance makes it radically different from other private foundations. In the spirit of the original agreement between the Chinese and American governments, the Foundation was not under government control, and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service treated it as a "private charitable organization" and gave it tax-exempt status. However, after the Northern Expedition and the unification of China, the Nationalist government took the view that since the Foundation controlled public funds, it should be placed under the guidance and supervision of the Ministry of Education.10 Therefore, the Foundation's policy and financial management was frequently subject to government meddling. As a result, many compromises were made, as we have discussed above. But the Ministry of Education did not have the power to control the China Foundation. The principle of independence that was insisted upon by the trustees was never lost. Later on, under the assiduous management of the Chinese and American trustees and thanks to some adroit negotiation by Wong Wen-hao and H. C. Zen, the Foundation emerged unscathed from its life-and-death struggle in 1943. After the fall of mainland China, H. C. Zen and L. T. Yip transferred the Foundation's securities to Hong Kong, and then on to New York for safekeeping, thus preserving the Foundation's assets. In March 1950, Chiang Monlin was assigned the task of convening a special meeting so that the Foundation's operations in the United States could be restarted. All of this proves that people like Hu Shih, H. C. Zen, Wong Wen-hao, and Chiang Monlin were, as Hu Shih said, "able to consider the long-term interests of their country; they

were resolute and dared to speak out impartially to either our own countrymen or foreigners."12 The achievements of these trustees are unquestionable. On many occasions, when faced with a crisis, they stood firm and insisted on upholding their ideals. This is the most important reason why the China Foundation continues to exist and operate to this day.

Epilogue

The China Foundation continues to exist today, though the story told in this book ends in 1949. The main reason for this is that after the Foundation's investments were transferred to New York, it was found that most of them had become worthless, drastically reducing the Foundation's income and importance. In addition, in the years since 1949, the economy of Taiwan has expanded and the government's science budget has grown rapidly. By the late 1960s, the government was spending an average of NT$200 million per year on science, while the annual income of the China Foundation was a paltry US$80,000 to US$110,000 (around NT$4 million).[1] Therefore, the Foundation's grants were quite small and it could only play a minor role in Taiwan's scientific development. However, despite these difficulties, the Foundation's faculty fellowships, research grants, chair professorships, visiting professorships, etc., still played an important role in Taiwan's scientific development in the 1950s and 1960s. Just as Wang Chi-wu, the late acting director of the Foundation, said, the Foundation acted as a trailblazer for those that came along later, especially the government in Taiwan.[2] Therefore, it is worth at least mentioning the Foundation's activities over the two decades after 1950.

After the fall of mainland China in 1949, the trustees of the China Foundation were dispersed far and wide. It was not possible to achieve the necessary quorum to hold an annual meeting, and it was even impossible to convene meetings of the executive committee. Donald Brodie, one of the American trustees, wrote to

the chairman, Chiang Monlin, drawing his attention to this. Chiang replied by cable, asking Brodie to arrange a date for a meeting and to issue the relevant notices. Brodie and Hu Shih turned up for the scheduled annual meeting at the office of the China Institute in the United States on February 8, 1950, but it had to be postponed until March 7 as the meeting was not quorate. As one of the other trustees, John Leighton Stuart, was receiving medical treatment in the Bethesda Naval Hospital, the venue was changed to the Chinese embassy in Washington D.C. This time, Hu Shih, Chiang Monlin, T. F. Tsiang, Ho Pao-hsu, Donald Brodie, Paul Hopkins, and Claude Hutchison all turned up, but again the meeting was adjourned due to the lack of a quorum. The venue was moved to the Bethesda Hospital to allow Stuart to attend. With the necessary quorum secured, the board elected Y. C. Mei to replace Fu Ssu-nien whose term of office had expired. In the afternoon they returned to the embassy for a further meeting and elected James Mackay to replace J. T. S. Reed who had resigned. Hu Shih was elected acting director and was charged with reactivating the Foundation's operations.[3] A couple of years later, with Wong Wen-hao and H. C. Zen trapped in China and Y. T. Tsur having retired, Wellington Koo, Lee Kan, and Chien Shih-liang were elected to the board. Through the 1950s, there were few changes among the Chinese trustees and Chiang Monlin, Hu Shih, Y. C. Mei, and Chien Shih-liang became the main actors promoting the Foundation's activities in education and culture in Taiwan. When Stuart died and Paul S. Hopkins resigned they were replaced by Kenneth Issacs and K. C. Li.

At the end of 1949, the Foundation moved from Hong Kong

to New York. At that time, its U.S. dollar securities and a small number of securities denominated in other currencies had a total market value of US$5,937,760. These assets represented the endowment of the China Foundation and three entrusted funds—those of Tsing Hua University, the Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library, and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology. The total market value of these funds tripled over the next three decades or more.[4]

In US$

Year	China Foundation Fund	Tsing Hua University Fund	Chinese Library Fund	Fan Memorial Fund	Total
1949	1,276,078	4,553,868	83,275	24,539	5,937,760
1954	1,740,177	7,194,035	122,371	40,608	9,097,191
1959	2,023,960	7,976,784	163,183	53,670	10,217,597
1964	2,483,232	9,448,551	212,583	75,870	12,220,236
1969	2,668,271	9,426,001	253,462	91,182	12,438,916
1974	2,279,824	8,240,850	211,494	71,095	10,803,263
1979	2,683,701	9,083,748	269,523	85,511	12,122,483
1984	3,360,606	10,374,571	355,080	120,970	14,211,227
1986	3,602,603	11,697,923	360,192	123,526	14,784,244

With few exceptions, only the income from the endowment could be used for grants. The annual income 1949–89 was as follows:[5]

In US$

Year	China Foundation Fund	Tsing Hua University Fund	Chinese Library Fund	Fan Memorial Fund	Total
1949	55,040	184,982	2,668	667	243,357
1954	62,453	241,769	4,041	1,361	309,593
1959	72,546	285,857	5,374	1,911	365,688
1964	78,174	313,120	6,913	2,491	400,698
1969	87,927	345,920	6,247	2,260	422,354
1974	173,830	584,552	9,867	3,931	772,180
1979	214,595	677,725	18,332	6,071	906,723
1984	463,917	1,182,675	44,601	15,067	1,706,260
1986	343,977	891,397	29,508	10,171	1,275,053

The income from the Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library Fund and the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology Fund was originally not used for grants. In 1964, at the request of the then minister of education, Huang Chi-lu, the income of the two funds was diverted to institutions it had not originally been intended for,[6] the former being used to subsidize the Institute of International Relations and the Central Library, and the latter being diverted to the Institute of Botany, Academia Sinica. The income of the Tsing Hua Fund played an extremely important part in the revival of Tsing Hua University in Taiwan. The minister of education at the end of 1949, Han Lih-wu, was concerned about the Tsing Hua Fund. He cabled the China Foundation requesting that the fund be transferred to the China Institute in the United States for safekeeping. This request had no legal force, however, and through the efforts of Hu Shih and others, it was kept under the management of the China Foundation. Within five or six years, the market value of the Tsing Hua Fund increased by more than two million dollars and this was naturally very useful in the revival of Tsing Hua University. In his 1956 report to the annual meeting of

the board, Hu Shih said that “if it hadn’t been for the rapid growth in the income and principal, it would have been next to impossible to have realized our long-cherished dream of establishing a Tsing Hua research institute in Free China. Now that this research institute has indeed been established in Hsinchu, Taiwan, we are witnessing the actual revival of Tsing Hua University. It is a great pleasure for us to provide, and to continue to provide in the future, a small amount of support for this university.”[7] Later, Tsing Hua University borrowed funds from the China Foundation to build atomic reactors and other facilities. The university even asked the China Foundation to use the income from its investments to pay off its debts. The China Foundation complied with these requests as far as possible.

Over the past two decades, the China Foundation’s average annual income has stood at around US$60,000-US$80,000. With such a meager income, the Foundation has only been able to provide a small amount of emergency support for academic research in Taiwan. During this period, its main activities have included the funding of faculty fellowships, research grants, chair professorships, and visiting professorships. These have amounted to more than one million U.S. dollars, accounting for 70 percent of the Foundation’s total income.[8] The faculty professorships accounted for the largest portion of the expenditure.

In the spring of 1950, at request of Fu Ssu-nien, president of National Taiwan University, the Foundation began funding faculty and graduate fellowships for research/study in the United States. The graduate fellowships were discontinued after a two-year trial,

but the faculty fellowships were extended to other universities apart from National Taiwan University and to Academia Sinica. The funding for these fellowships included round-trip tickets worth US$1,400, ten months' living expenses (US$2,000), US$150 each for sundry travel and books, and a tuition and research grant worth approximately US$4,000. Between 1950 and 1960, the Foundation awarded grants to sixty-three scholars to carry out research abroad. The recipients came from the following institutions: National Taiwan University (42 recipients), the Provincial Normal University (7), Provincial Cheng Kung University (5), The Provincial College of Agriculture (6), And the Institute of History & Philology, Academia Sinica (3). All but three of these recipients returned to Taiwan to continue their teaching and research. Starting in 1953, the Foundation also provided graduate scholarships worth US$200 per year, firstly to students of the research institutes of the College of Liberal Arts, Taiwan University, and later to graduate students at other universities. The number of annual grants increased from five to fifteen. According to Hu Shih, "these minuscule subsidies really changed the views of people in Free China toward this system." From 1957, the Ministry of Education began awarding modest scholarships to all graduate students to cover their living expenses and as a result, the Foundation discontinued its grants. As Hu Shih said, "Our small efforts have obviously achieved their goal." The Foundation believed that the grants had been "very effective and something we should be pleased with." Hu Shih also said that he felt a certain degree of satisfaction that these projects had been useful and beneficial.[9] There were no other faculty fellowships or graduate student scholarships in Taiwan during that period. The Foundation's grants not only fulfilled an urgent need but also acted as a model for similar grants in the future.

In the 1950s university faculty members in Taiwan were poorly paid and it was hard to conduct research. From 1952, the Foundation offered forty research grants worth US$300 annually to faculty members at National Taiwan University. But demand for the grants was so high, that the committee in charge (consisting of two Foundation trustees, Chiang Monlin and Chien Shih-liang, plus the commissioner for education of the Taiwan Provincial Government) decided to divide the funding among sixty-two faculty members. The following year, the number of recipients was increased to seventy-six. Some of these received a full grant, some received half, while others received one-third. In the third year, the Foundation negotiated with Y. C. Mei, the president of Tsing Hua University, for a contribution from the income of the Tsing Hua Fund so that the research grants could be offered to one hundred faculty members from universities in Taiwan. This idea was rejected by the minister of education, Chang Chi-yun, who felt that the program would interfere with the equality of remuneration enjoyed by all faculty members in Taiwan. At the request of Chien Shih-liang, the president of National Taiwan University, the funds earmarked for his university under the program were diverted to a special fund providing medical aid for faculty members and administrators, and to purchase additional equipment for the university. The Foundation's plans to revive the scientific research professorships were also stopped in their tracks. In 1960, the Foundation decided to establish three research professorships with a stipend of US$1,800 at National Taiwan University. Tung Tso-

pin, Li Chi, and Ruey Yi-fu, all from the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, were selected for these posts. The project was aborted, however, because the three scholars were reluctant to accept appointments that would have given them higher stipends than their poorly remunerated colleagues.[10] But by 1960, conditions had changed and people were more open to the idea, so the Foundation was able to establish research professorships in the Institute of History and Philology, the Hu Shih Memorial Chairs, and research professorships in the National Council for Scientific Development. These became the Foundation's most important programs.

The Foundation's faculty fellowship program was terminated for a number of reasons. One was that some of the trustees, including Hu Shih, Chien Shih-liang, Y. C. Mei, and Chiang Monlin, believed that the most important task in education at that time was not to help graduate students and faculty to study abroad, but to attract elite scholars back to Taiwan by offering them better living conditions and an improved research environment. Also, grants from the China Foundation were less necessary now that the program of Fulbright Scholarships, with its annual budget of US$250,000, was helping to promote academic exchange with the United States; the National Academy of Science in Washington, D.C., was offering several post-doctoral scholarships for young scientists to carry out advanced research in the United States; and the number of inter-university exchange and cooperation programs increased.[11] The most important and direct reason, however, was that Hu Shih, after he returned to Taiwan in 1958 to assume the presidency of Academia Sinica, began lobbying the

government to draw up a scientific development plan. As a result of this combination of factors, the China Foundation's grant policy changed once again.

In the autumn of 1956, Hu Shih invited Wu Ta-you to take up the post of China Foundation Research Professor. At the time, Wu was also teaching at National Taiwan University and the Institute of Atomic Science, Tsing Hua University. He had strong feelings about the quality of teaching and research in Taiwan. At the first Convocation of Academicians at Academia Sinica in April 1957, Wu proposed that the government should draft a policy and plans for long-term academic development in Taiwan. Before his return to Taiwan, Hu Shih had asked Wu to draft a detailed plan for scientific development and to "bring this plan back to Taiwan to act as a path-finding map, to lay the foundations for a new road."[12] Based on Wu's draft, Hu Shih came up with the document, "Outline National Five-Year Plan for the Development of Science and Scientists." The aim of this plan was to encourage Chinese scholars to return to Taiwan, emphasizing the training of researchers and the provision of adequate scientific equipment. Specifically, it included the establishment of national visiting professorships, national research professorships, research grants, and graduate student scholarships.[13] The basic structure of the plan was, as Hu Shih conceded, similar to that of the China Foundation, although its scope was wider.[14]

Hu Shih's plan received the blessing of Premier Chen Cheng, and in January 1959, the National Council on Science Development (NCSD) was inaugurated with Hu Shih as its first chairman and Y.

C. Mei, the minister of education, as vice chairman. Funding came from USAID and the profits of government-owned enterprises. The NCSD's budget for its first year was NT$30 million, plus another US$400,000. Although this budget was modest, it was significant in that it set a precedent for direct government support for academic research.[15] But Hu Shih's plan was to some extent frustrated because his proposed research professors would have received a stipend that was three times greater than the salary of a regular university professor, and the government was worried that this might create bad feeling and have political repercussions. Also, USAID regulations meant it could not be used to fund the salaries of teachers in Taiwan. For these reasons, the trustees of the China Foundation stepped in, providing an annual grant of US$30,000 to fund the research professorships. This allowed for the appointment of thirty professors, each with an annual stipend of US$1,000. At the same time, the Asia Foundation decided to support fifteen additional professorships over the next three years. All the candidates were to be selected by the NCSD.

The China Foundation's cooperation with the NCSD did not terminate upon the death of Hu Shih in 1962. In 1965, the new chairman of the NCSD, Wang Shih-chieh, who was also president of Academia Sinica, asked the Foundation to support a "special chairs" program. The government had allocated US$3 million over a four-year period to help the NCSD establish five research centers for mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering. As the salaries of the overseas scholars were much higher than those of local professors and as government regulations on stipends were very strict, Wang asked the China Foundation to divert a portion

of its funding for research professorships toward subsidizing the special chairs program.[16] In 1966, the Foundation provided a grant of US$36,000 to support the research professorships and NCSD special chairs, allowing the NCSD to decide how the money should be distributed between them. In 1967, a reorganized and expanded NCSD was renamed the National Science Council (NSC) and placed under the Executive Yuan. Wu Ta-you, its chairman, was also a trustee of the China Foundation. The Foundation's support for the two programs mentioned above continued. But as the NSC' s budget increased, its dependence on the Foundation gradually reduced. In 1969, the NSC was able to establish and fully fund three hundred research chairs without any need for support from the China Foundation. But the NSC still needed the Foundation' s support in some areas, such as grants in foreign exchange, as the government could not make payments in U.S. dollars. Therefore, the NSC asked the China Foundation to terminate the research professorships project and divert the funds to the special chairs.

Faced with the reality that the China Foundation's role in Taiwan's scientific development was steadily dwindling in importance, its acting director, Lee Kan, recognized the need for a reorientation of its policies. In his opinion, the Foundation had acted as a trail-blazer for the government where scientific development was concerned, but that it should consider how it could work closely with the NSC and how it could promote Sino-American cultural exchange.[17] In February 1972, the Foundation opened its office in King Hua Street, Taipei. Its organizational structure and personnel had also been changed. Under its new acting director, Wang Chi-wu, the Foundation tried to break

through some bottlenecks and eliminate some blind spots. For example, it changed its rather fragmented grants policy, and the grants also became more project-oriented rather than institution-oriented. But being a small foundation with very limited resources, there was not much it could do to expand the scope of its operations. Wang further suggested that in the future, the China Foundation should concentrate on encouraging changes in public policy. It should also support, supplement, or balance the plans initiated as part of that public policy. In other words, the Foundation should be supporting properly reviewed, cutting-edge research.[18] This is the direction the Foundation has followed since 1974. Half a century after its establishment, the role played by the China Foundation changed from that of a patron and initiator of modern science in China to that of a catalyst for education in Taiwan, and subsequently to that of a supporting actor to other educational and cultural institutions. In this, the Foundation was responding to the need to adapt to its environment. The Foundation's long years of experience, however, may provide a mirror or a model for other foundations in our country, especially those of an educational or cultural nature.

Notes

Prologue

1. See, Ruth E. S. Hayhoe, "A Comparative Approach to the Cultural Dynamics of Sino-Western Educational Co-operation," China Quarterly, 104 (December 1985): 676–89; Marianne Bastid, "Servitude or Liberation? The Introduction of Foreign Educational Practices and Systems to China from 1840 to the Present," in R. Hayhoe and M. Bastid eds., China's Education and the Industrialized World: Studies in Cultural Transfer (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1987), 3–20.
2. E.g., Peter Buck, American Science and Modern China, 1876–1936 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mary Bullock, An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical College (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
3. E.g., Richard Brown thinks that the education plan devised by the China Medical Board of the Rockefeller Foundation was strongly influenced by imperialism. Its purpose was not to serve the health requirements of an underdeveloped nation, but to build an elite class that would push for cultural and technological change. See, "Rockefeller Medicine in China: Professionalism and Imperialism," in Robert Arnove, Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980), 123–46. Frank Ninkovich thought that the forty-year-long effort by the Rockefeller Foundation was undoubtedly a successful experiment. Even though it

had ethnocentric tendencies, it never reached the point of cultural imperialism, See, "The Rockefeller Foundation, China and Cultural Change" in The Journal of American History 7, no. 4 (March 1984): 799–820. On the basis of her own research and experience of Sino-American cultural exchanges, Mary Bullock concludes that the huge input of manpower and financial resources into Chinese-operated schools and research institutes had a powerful impact on the professionalization of science and the localization of Western-style higher education in China. See, "American Exchanges with China, Revisited" in Joyce Kallgren and Denis F. Simon eds., Educational Exchanges: Essays on the Sino-American Experience (Berkeley: University of California, 1987), 23–43.

4. See the author's, "A Brief Introduction to the Files of the China Foundation," Modern Chinese History Research Correspondence, no. 6 (September 1988): 154–59.

Chapter 1: The Establishment of the China Foundation

1. After the indemnity was reduced, the United States was supposed to return US$10,785,286 to China. For details of the negotiations, see Wang Shu-huai, The Boxer Indemnity (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1974 [1st edition] and 1985 [2nd edition]), 269–336.
2. Tsing Hua University History Compilation Group, Draft History of Tsing Hua University (Peking: Chung Hua Book Co., 1981), 5.
3. Chinese Mission in the United States to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 25, 1923, files of the Chinese Embassy in the U.S. in the period of the late Ching Dynasty and the early Republic (referred to hereinafter as Embassy Files), deposited at the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.
4. Chiang Monlin, "The Usage of the American Remission of the Boxer Indemnity," New Education 6, no. 4 (April 1923): 563–69.
5. Yen Wen-yu, "Miss M. E. Wood and the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity," Biographical Literature 18, no. 5 (May 1971): 13–19.
6. Chinese Mission in the United States to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 25, 1923, Embassy Files.
7. Terence E. Brockhausen, "The Boxer Indemnity: Five Decades of Sino-American Dissension," (PhD dissertation, Texas Christian University, August 1981), 217.
8. The text was translated into Chinese and published. See, Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education, The Negotiation of the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity by the U.S. (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1925). For analysis of the discussion, see Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 300–304.
9. Chinese National Association for the Advancement of Education, Negotiation of the Remission, 164–65.
10. Cable to the Foreign Ministry, May 15, 1924, Embassy Files.
11. Wang, The Boxer Indemnity, 305.
12. Cables from Military Governor Chi, April 3, 4, and 5, and May 4, 1923; from Hwei River Irrigation Bureau & Kiangsu-Anhwei Irrigation Bureau, May 15 and 17, 1924; from Kiangsu-Chekiang Lake Tai Irrigation Bureau, July 26, 1924;

and from Association for Highway Construction of China, August 20, 1924, all in Embassy Files.

13. Letter to Foreign Ministry, June 23, 1924, Embassy Files.
14. "The Manifesto of the Science Society of China Concerning the Usage of the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity," Science 9, no. 8 (January 1915): 868–71; also Shen Pao (Shanghai News), August 12, 1924.
15. Shen Pao, August 25, 1924.
16. Greene had earlier served as U.S. consul general in Hankow. He had also been resident director of the China Medical Board, director, general director, and vice-president in the Far East of the Rockefeller Foundation, and he was later appointed acting director of the Peking Union Hospital and the first American trustee of the China Foundation. He was associated with the Foundation for twenty-two years (1925–47), serving on the executive and finance committees and the special committee in America, of which he was the associate director. After the War, he was elected vice-chairman of the board of the China Foundation. See Warren I. Cohen, The Chinese Connection (Columbia University Press, 1978).
17. Roger S. Greene, "Education in China and the Boxer Indemnities," Chinese Social and Political Science Review 7, no. 4 (1923): 199–207.
18. Greene to MacMurray, February 9 and May 13, 1924, Roger S. Greene's papers at Houghton Library, Harvard University (hereafter RSG), Box 17, folder 451, 453.
19. MacMurray to Greene, May 31, 1924, and Greene to Sao-ke A. Sze, May 14, 1924, RSG, 17/454.
20. Paul Monroe, "Memorandum in Regard to School of Applied Science, China," June 1924, RSG, 17/455.

21. Max Shop, "A Chinese-American University: A Plan for the Use of the Boxer Indemnity Returned by the United States," July 1, 1924; J. Leighton Stuart, "Memorandum Regarding Proposals for Returning to China the Remainder of the American Boxer Indemnity Fund," August 18, 1924; H. S. Houghton to Greene, August 7, 1924, and Henry F. Osborn to Sze, President Coolidge, Secretary Hughes, etc., August 11 and November 24, 1924, RSG, 17/460-467, 50/2098.
22. Copy of Note from Chinese Minister to U. S. Secretary of State, June 14, 1924, Record Group No. 59, General Records of the Department of State, Decimal Files, China Foundation Files (hereafter CFF).
23. Letter from Foreign Ministry, August 23, 1924, Ministry of Education File (hereafter MEF).
24. Shen Pao, September 8 and 14, 1924.
25. Ibid., September 15, 1924.
26. Foreign Ministry Bulletin, no. 42 (December 1924): 1–2.
27. Copy of Note from Chinese Minister to U.S. Secretary of State, September 16, 1924, Record Group No. 59, CFF.
28. Letter from the State Department, September 22, 1924, MEF.
29. Draft proposal of the Ministry of Education (MOE), September 30, 1924, MEF.
30. H. C. Zen to Hu Shih, October 6, 1924, in Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih (Peking: Chunghwa Book Co, 1979), 1:267.
31. Letter from the Board of the National Boxer Indemnity Remission, National Educational Association, January 21, 1925, MEF.

32. Hu Shih to Tao Hsing-chih and Ling Bing (draft), April 25, 1926, Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih, 1:370.
33. "Report to the 1st Board Meeting, China Foundation," March 15, 1926 (hereafter, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc. Report to the Board), 25, 2–3.
34. Minutes of 1st board meeting and discussions, Nanking 2nd Historical Archives (hereafter Nanking 2nd Archive), Chuen-Chung 484 (2), Folder 30.
35. The text of the letter is as follows: "I have felt that this Government might subject itself to criticism, were it not to require some such statement as I have indicated, in order that there may be an assurance that the funds will actually be expended in conformity with the intent of the congress," Secretary Hughes to President Coolidge, December 15, 1924, CFF.
36. Cable from the Foreign Ministry, March 12, 1925, Embassy Files.
37. Minutes of the 1st board meeting, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 1.
38. Sze to Kellogg, June 6, 1925, Embassy Files.
39. U.S. Executive Order, July 16, 1925; Kellogg to Sze, July 20, 1925, Embassy Files.
40. China Foundation (hereafter CF) to MOE, September 14, 1925, MEF.
41. H. C. Zen, "Review of the Activities of the China Foundation over the Last 10 Years," Eastern Miscellany 32, no. 7 (April 16, 1925): 19.
42. Shen Pao, September 19, 1924.
43. Hu Shih to Tsai Yuan-pei, August 11, 1928, the Reorganization File, CFF.

44. "An Interview with Kuo Ting-yee," in Oral History Collection (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987), 141.
45. Yang Chuan, "Discussions on Warlords and Education with Students at Southeastern University," in Collected Works of Yang Shing-fuo (Shanghai: Ping-Fan Books Co., 1929), 317–22; Chiang Chun-chan, "My University Life before the Northern Expedition: Memories of My Freshman Year at Southeastern University," Chung-Wai Magazine 7, no. 1 (January 1970): 41–46.
46. Yang Chuan to Wang Zu-tan, July 29, 1928, in Collected Works of Yang Shing-fuo, 329–32.
47. Wang Zu-tan to Yang Chuan, July 11, 1928, in Collected Works of Yang Shing-fuo, 332–34.
48. Yang Chuan to Wang Zu-tan, July 12, 1928, in Collected Works of Yang Shing-fuo, 335–38.
49. China Times, July 28, 1928. Only five trustees were replaced. Huang Yen-pei and John Dewey resigned in June, 1927 and were replaced by Tsai Yuan-pei and Leighton Stuart; Fan Yuan-lien died the same year. At the fourth meeting in June 1928, Wang Wen-hau succeeded Fan. According to the news report, there was an ulterior motive for Huang Yen-pei's replacement which Hu Shih later criticized.
50. Hu Shih to Tsai Yuan-pei, August 11, 1928, Reorganization Files, CFF.
51. Ibid.
52. Tsai Yuan-pei to Hu Shih, August 13, 1928, Reorganization Files, CFF.

53. Fu Ssu-nien to Hu Shih, August 13, 1928," Reorganization Files, CFF.
54. Y. T. Tsur to H. C. Zen, August 24, 1928, Reorganization Files, CFF.
55. Two cablegrams from Paul Monroe to C. T. Wang and Tsai Yuan-pei, August 17 and 31, 1928, Reorganization Files, CFF.
56. Paul Monroe to C. T. Wang, Tsai Yuan-pei, and Y. T. Tsur, September 7, 19, and 27, 1928, Reorganization Files, CFF.
57. Shen Pao, September 3, 1928.
58. China Times, October 4, 1928.
59. Ministry of University Education to Hu Shih, September 13, 1928, CFF.
60. China Times, October 4, 1928.
61. For the abolition of the Ministry of University Education, see Tao Ying-huei, "Tsai Yuan-pei and the Ministry of University Education," New Knowledge 3, no. 5 (October 1973): 40–59, and no. 6 (December 1973): 47–60.
62. Chiang Monlin to Hu Shih, November 26, 1928, CFF.
63. Hu Shih to Sun Fo, December 7, 1928, CFF.
64. Sun Fo to Hu Shih, December 12, 1928, CFF.
65. Hu Shih's diary, December 19, 1928, CFF.
66. Paul Monroe, "Memorandum re the China Foundation from the American Point of View," n.d., CFF.
67. Hu Shih's diary, December 25, 1928, CFF.
68. Executive Order from the Executive Yuan, No. 172 (photocopy), CFF.
69. Sun Fo and others to China Foundation, December 25, 1928, CFF.
70. Hu Shih's diary, December 28, 1928, CFF.

71. Ibid., January 3, 1929.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. At the third meeting on June 6, 1927, the following were elected: Bennett, Fan Yuan-lien, and Huang Yen-pei (for one year); Sze Sao-ke, P. W. Kuo, and Chiang Monlin (two years); Baker, Chang Po-ling, and W. W. Yen (three years); Willoughby, Y. T. Tsur, and Wellington Koo (four years); V. K. Ting, Monroe, and Greene (five years). See 3rd Report to the Board (March 1929), 3–4. Hu Shih was also elected a trustee that year with a term of office of five years. He replaced V. K. Ting.
75. Hu Shih's diary, January 4, 1929, CFF.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Hu Shih, "China Foundation Regains Its Independence," China Weekly Review, January 26, 1929, 368.
79. Buck even thought that the China Foundation had been subjected to "sporadic harassment and lack of cooperation from the Chinese Government." See Peter Buck, American Science and Modern China, 1876–1906 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 223.

Chapter 2: Organization and Finance

1. "The Constitution of the Board of Trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture," 1st Report to the Board, China Foundation (March 15, 1926), 25-26.

2. "Draft By-Laws," minutes of 1st board meeting, China Foundation, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 1.
3. "By-Laws of the Board of Trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture" (5th Revision, December 1936) in The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, 1924-1970 (Taipei: 1971), 111–19.
4. "Draft By-Laws."
5. Ibid.
6. 11th Report to the Board (1936), 1–3.
7. "By-Laws of the Board of Trustees."
8. For more about Zen, see Chao Hwei-chi, "A Chronological Biography of H. C. Zen," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology 9, no. 2 (1988): 52–66; 9, no. 4 (1988): 37–48; 10, no. 1 (1989): 47–62; 10, no. 3 (1989): 39–55.
9. V. K. Ting to Hu Shih, July 3, 1929, in Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih, 1:518–19.
10. Hu to Ting, June 11, 1935, in ibid., 2:270–72.
11. Wong Wen-hao to Hu, May 23, 1936, in ibid, 316.
12. Hu to Ting, June 11, 1935, in ibid., 2:270–72.
13. "The Emergency Committee and Other Planned Measures," Minutes of the 17th Board Meeting, Appendix 4, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484(2), 4.
14. Wong Wen-hao to Hu Shih, February 7, 1945, in Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih, 3:3–5.
15. Memorandum from CF to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), January, 26, 1943, CFF.
16. Zen to Greene, February 16, 1943, Green's file, CFF.
17. Zen to Hu Shih, February 8, 1943, Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih, 2:555–56.
18. Cable from Hu and Sze to Wong and Zen, uncertain date, quoted in Keng Yun-chi, A Chronological Biography of Hu Shih (Chengdu: Szechuan People's Publications, 1989), 308.
19. Wong to Greene, February 22, 1943, Greene's file, CFF.
20. Quoted from a memo of the Dept. of North American Affairs, MOFA, April 14, 1953, CFF.
21. Wong Wen-hao's memo to Chiang Kai-shek (hand-written copy), November 1944, in Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih, 3:3–5.
22. Zen to Greene, October 18, 1944, Greene's file, CFF.
23. For details, see Zen to Greene, August 30, 1944; Greene to Zen, October 19 and December 20, 1944; and Hu to Wong, October 27, 1944, in Greene's file, CFF.
24. Zen to Greene, December 23, 1944, Greene's file, CFF.
25. Zen to Greene, February 9 and 24, 1945; Wong to Hu and Greene, March 16, 1945; and Zen to Greene, March 20, 1945, in Greene's file, CFF.
26. Deferred radiogram from Hu and Greene, March 24, 1945, Greene's file, CFF.
27. Monroe resigned in January 1944 and was replaced by Donald M. Brodie at the 5th meeting of the emergency committee.
28. 16th Report to the Board (1937), 3–4.
29. From July 1935, the check was delivered to the assistant treasurer of the China Foundation stationed in Shanghai after endorsement by the U.S. consul general in that city.
30. 6th Report to the Board (1931), 47.
31. 7th Report to the Board (1932), 57–58.
32. 8th Report to the Board (1933), 40.

33. In the years 1925–27, the U.S. dollar–silver dollar exchange rate varied from 2.00 to 3.30 silver dollars to the U.S. dollar, but in 1931–32, the rate increase to between 4.60 and 4.80 to the U.S. dollar.
34. Minutes of the 1st board meeting.
35. 1st Report to the Board, 8–9.
36. 7th Report to the Board, 9, 19.
37. 11th Report to the Board, 33–35.
38. 6th Report to the Board, 4, 13.
39. The report to the 3rd board meeting, January 4–25, 1929, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 33.
40. 7th Report to the Board, 2.
41. 8th Report to the Board, 41.
42. 9th Report to the Board, 2.
43. Foreign currency investments consisted of: treasury bonds (30%), Chinese government bonds (25%), preferred stocks (15%), and common stocks (30%). Domestic investments consisted of: Chinese government bonds (30%), bonds of the Bureau of Public Works, Shanghai International Settlement (10%), bank deposits (20%), real estate mortgage loans (10%), and others (10%), Minutes of the 1st meeting of the finance committee, March 3, 1936, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484, 640.
44. H. F. Sun, "Report to Greene about the 4th Joint Meeting of the Boxer Indemnity Administrations on March 4, 1936," Greene's file, CFF.
45. Minutes of the 7th meeting of the finance committee, September 1, 1936, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484, 640.
46. Agreements signed between the China Foundation and the Chungking branches of the Bank of China, the Central Bank of China, the Bank of Communications, and the Farmers Bank of China, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484, 55.

47. "The Activities of the China Foundation over the Last Three Years" (December 1944), 2.
48. The exchange rate was US$1=CN$3,350 in 1946 and US$1=CN$11,900 in 1947.
49. The China Foundation, 1924–1970, 20.
50. Tsing Hua University History Compilation Group, Draft History of Tsing Hua University, 55–57.
51. 5th Report to the Board, 47–48.
52. Ibid., 46–47.
53. Ibid., 29–30.
54. 8th Report to the Board, 43.
55. The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, 17th Report (Shanghai: 1948), 29.
56. The China Foundation, 1924–1970, 28.
57. 4th Report to the Board, 21.
58. 8th Report to the Board, 45.
59. 12th Report to the Board, 23.
60. In this year income was reduced due to a fall in interest rates and a moratorium on the payment of the principal of government bonds. The book value of the Foundation's securities was CN$185,462, while the market value was only CN$149,163, a capital loss of CN$ 36,299 and a 20 percent reduction.
61. The China Foundation, 1924–1970, 28.
62. L. T. Yip's files accessed by the author at Yip's New Jersey home, July 1, 1990.
63. The China Foundation, 1924–1970, 35.

64. 6th Report to the Board, 53.
65. 7th Report to the Board, 62.
66. The China Foundation, 17th Report, 30.
67. L. T. Yip's files.
68. 12th Report to the Board, 23.

Chapter 3: The Policies and Activities of the China Foundation

1. For details of Monroe's opinions, see Grover Clark, "American Boxer Money Belongs to China and Should Be Used Directly to Benefit Chinese People," The Peking Leader, September 19, 1924; China Weekly Review, "Commission Appointed for U.S. Boxer Indemnity Fund," October 11, 1924; Yuan Shi-tao, "The Realities and Hopes of the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity," originally published in Shen Pao "Education and Life," no. 53, and reprinted in The Issues of Promotion of Education through the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity (Shanghai: Education Compilation House, 1935), 1–34.
2. Greene to Y. T. Tsur, December 8, 1924; Baker to Tsur, October 21, 1924 and January 17, 1925; Bennett to Tsur, January 15, 1924; and Dewey to Tsur (n.d.), all in RSG, Box 17/472–483.
3. Greene to Tsur, in ibid.
4. Ting to Greene, June 30, 1924, RSG 50/2097.
5. 1st Report to the Board, 3.
6. "General Principles Governing the Allocation of Funds," June 1925, in 1st Report to the Board, 27.

7. 1st Report to the Board, 13–15.
8. Ibid. 15–16.
9. "Supplementary Principles Governing the Allocation of Funds," February 1926, in 1st Report to the Board, 28.
10. 1st Report to the Board, 19.
11. Letter from the Joint Committee of the National Education Groups Monitoring the Usage of the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity, April 15, 1926, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 75.
12. "The First Manifesto Regarding Boxer Indemnity by the Board of Boxer Indemnity of the National Educational Society of China," 1926, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 75.
13. The China Foundation's reply, April 17, 1926, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 75.
14. 3rd Report to the Board, 6.
15. 7th Report to the Board, 21.
16. 8th Report to the Board, 2.
17. "The Executive Committee's Draft Research Report on Improving the Efficiency of the Self-Conducted Projects of the Foundation," document of the 8th board meeting, February 2, 1934, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 38.
18. "The Executive Committee's Second Report on Improving Efficiency," minutes of the 10th board meeting, June 29, 1934, appendix 1, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 4.
19. 6th Report to the Board, 24–25.
20. Sao-ke Sze to H. C. Zen, April 14, 1934, Greene's file, CFF.
21. Selskar M. Gunn, "Report on Visit to China, June 9th to July 30th, 1931," R.G.1, Ser. 601, Box 12, Folder 129, Rockefeller Archives, Tarrytown, New York (hereafter RA).

22. Gunn to H. C. Zen, January 2, 1934, Greene's file, CFF.
23. 4th Report to the Board, 7.
24. 6th Report to the Board, 9.
25. "The Educational and Cultural Activities of the Boxer Indemnity Administrations," Executive Yuan work report, published November 1935, reprinted in Documents of the Revolution (Taipei: Party History Compilation Committee, KMT Central Committee, 1971), no. 53, 458–59.
26. 9th Report to the Board, 9.
27. "A Survey of the Boxer Indemnity Administrations," published by the Joint Meeting of the Boxer Indemnity Administrations, January 1936, appendix 1, minutes of the meetings, 115–34, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 59.
28. C. R. Bennett to H. C. Zen, January 14, 1935, Greene's file, CFF.
29. Minutes of the 11th board meeting, April 19, 1935, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 4.
30. Hu Shih to Tsai Yuan-pei, June 7, 1935, CFF.
31. 11th Report to the Board, 1.
32. Zen, "Review of the Activities of the China Foundation over the Last 10 Years," 20.
33. "Brief Description of the Activities of the China Foundation over 20 Years," December 1936, 2.
34. "Discussion of the China Foundation's Policy on the Allocation of Funds," minutes of the 3rd board meeting, January 4, 1929, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 33.
35. 2nd Report to the Board, 16.
36. "The Executive Committee's Draft Research Report," 38.
37. 9th Report to the Board, 20.

38. "Agreement between the Ministry of Education and the China Foundation concerning the Organization of the National Library of Peiping," 5th Report to the Board, 48–50.
39. 3rd Report to the Board, 21; 5th Report to the Board, 23–24, 6th Report to the Board, 43–44.
40. Concerning the National Association for the Advancement of Education, see Liu Hwei-shuen, "The National Association for the Advancement of Education and the Movement for the Independence of Education" (master's thesis, Institute of History, National Normal University, June 1986).
41. 5th Report to the Board, 39.
42. 4th Report to the Board, 28–29.
43. 6th Report to the Board, 41; 9th Report to the Board, 46.
44. Minutes of the 101st meeting of the executive committee, May 27, 1936, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 41.
45. Sun (a.k.a. C. L. Senn, 1889–1953) was a former dean of the College of Science, National Central University. After the reorganization of the China Foundation, he was appointed executive secretary and associate director. In 1935, when H. C. Zen was appointed president of Szechuan University, Sun took over as acting director and was appointed director the following year.
46. Memorandum 36-37-3, the minutes and attachments of the 13th board meeting, April 30, 1937, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 3.
47. 12th Report to the Board, 2.
48. Wong Wen-hao to Hu Shih, April 17, 1937, in Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih, 2:354.
49. Hu to Wong, May 17, 1937, in ibid., 357–58.

50. "Trustee H. C. Zen's Memorandum," minutes of the 14th board meeting, April 27, 1938, Appendix 4, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 4.
51. 13th Report to the Board (1938), 5.
52. "Proposal for a New Direction of the Foundation's Activities," minutes of the 16th board meeting, April 15, 1940, appendix 1, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 29.
53. 15th Report to the Board (1940), 1.
54. "Opinion on the 'Proposal for a New Direction of the Foundation's Activities'," minutes of the 17th board meeting, April 18, 1941, appendix 3, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 29
55. Wong to Hu, July 2, 1941, in "Selected Correspondence of Hu Shih, 2:526.
56. "Activities of the China Foundation over the past Three Years," 3–8.
57. Ibid, 9.
58. The members of the research and teaching grants committee were as follows: H. C. Zen, Chiang Monlin, Chu Chin-nung, Hang Lih-wu, Wu Chun-shen, Fu Ssu-nien, and Ho Lien; the regional conveners were Ku Yu-hsiu (Chungking region), Li Chun-yu (Bei-Pei region), I. C. Mei (Kunming region), Wu Yi-fang (Chengdu region), Wang Hsin-kon (Chiading region), Hsu Song-min (Lichuang region), Chu Ko-chen (Kweiyang region), Liu Chi-hong (Northwest region), Chu Chia-hua (Academia Sinica), and Chu Heng-be (medical staff). See, minutes of the 9th meeting of the emergency committee, January 28, 1945, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 53.
59. "Activities of the China Foundation over the past Three Years," 9.
60. Memorandum of the China Foundation to MOFA, January 26, 1943, CFF.
61. "The Director's Report, 1946," minutes of the 19th board meeting, March 14, 1947, appendix 3, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 29.
62. Minutes of the 12th meeting of the emergency committee, September 23, 1945, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 53.
63. Greene to Bennett, September 11 and 16, 1946, CFF.
64. "The Director's Report, 1946."
65. "The Director's Report," minutes of the 21st board meeting, September 18, 1948, appendix 4.
66. Hu Shih to Fu Ssu-nien, March 20, 1950, CFF.
67. "The Director's Report," minutes of 21st board meeting, appendix 1.

Chapter 4: Science Education

1. Roger S. Greene, "Aspects of Science Education," in There Is Another China (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1948), 99–107.
2. Koo Shing, "Research into Innovations in Science Teaching," Chinese Educational Review 10, no. 1 (January 1918): 44–52; Cheng Chung-hai, "A Different View of Innovation in Science Teaching," Science 4, no. 2 (1918): 115–23.
3. "Notes of an Address by Dr. Paul Monroe Delivered before the Social & Political Association at Peking, December 21st, 1921," Chinese Social and Political Review 6, no. 2 (1923): 143–48; Paul Monroe, "Report on the Premedical School

Situation Made to the Trustees of the Peking Union Medical College," February 25, 1922, RGIV2B9, Box 95, folder 676, RA.

4. Wang Sheu-lu, "Science Education in Middle Schools in China," Science 7, no. 11 (1922): 1121–30.
5. See George R. Twiss, Science and Education in China (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926).
6. E.g., a portion of Twiss's 1917 work, A Textbook in the Principles of Science Teaching, was translated by Tong Shi and published in Science 6, no. 11 (1921): 1095–1110 and 7, no. 3 (1922): 252–59. Other examples of Chinese responses to Twiss are the articles "The Proposals by Twiss to Improve Science Education in Primary and Secondary Schools in China," Science 8, no. 7 (1923): 776, and "Science Education and Science," Science, 9, no. 1 (1924): 3–4.
7. Minutes of the round table discussions held by the China Foundation, September 26, 1925, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 30.
8. "A Plan for the Establishment of Professorships in Science Teaching," "Rules Governing the Allocation of Funds for Professorships in Science Teaching," 1st Report to the Board, 31–32.
9. There were also seven graduates from France and three each from Germany, the U.K., and Japan.
10. 4th Report to the Board, 9–10.
11. 3rd Report to the Board, 10.
12. 7th Report to the Board, 25–26.
13. Ibid.
14. Twiss, Science and Education in China, 20.

15. N. Gist Gee: "Annual Report: Premedical Education, 1924," R.G. 1.1, Ser.601, Box 3, folder 38, RA.
16. N. Gist Gee, "Annual Report of 1925," R.G. 1.1, Ser.601, Box 3, folder 38, RA.
17. 5th Report to the Board, 14.
18. Extracts from the Minutes of the Science Education Conference, August 15–17, 1929, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484, 508.
19. 5th Report to the Board, 15.
20. Letter to the Contemporary Review 6, no. 132 (June 18, 1927): 19–20.
21. 3rd Report to the Board, 11.
22. Wang Chin, "Issues in Mixed Science Teaching in Primary Schools," Science 13, no. 8 (1929): 1093.
23. Ibid., 1096–1100.
24. Full text of the resolutions of the Science Education Conference, August 15–17, 1929, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484, 508.
25. 6th Report to the Board, 3.
26. Hu Shih's diary, August 15, 1930, hand-written copy, vol. 9 (Taipei: Yuan Liu Publications, 1990).
27. Chang Chiang-shu, "The Causes of the Malady Afflicting Science Education in China," Kuo-Feng Bimonthly 2, no. 1 (January 1933): 21.
28. H. C. Zen, "A Survey of Natural Science Textbooks," Independent Critic, no. 61 (July, 1933): 5–10.
29. Ibid., 15.
30. See Chen Sheng-kun, "A Study of the Biology Laboratory, Science Society of China" (master's thesis, Institute of

History, National Normal University, 1985).

31. The Educational Inspection Commission, the League of Nations, The Improvement of the Education in China (National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 1932), 19–30.
32. Chang, "The Causes of the Malady."
33. "Draft Report by the Executive Committee on Improving the Self-conducted Projects of the China Foundation," document of the 8th board meeting.
34. Wu Chen-lo, "Details of how the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity Can Be Used to Purchase Essential Scientific Apparatus in China," Science 9, no. 11 (1924): 1441–42.
35. Wu Chen-lo, "Outline of Scientific Apparatus in China," Science 9, no. 8 (1924): 950–77.
36. Minutes of the round table discussions held by the China Foundation, September 26, 1925, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 30.
37. "Executive Committee Report on the Survey of Primary and Secondary Schools in China," document of the 9th board meeting (October 26, 1935), Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 40.
38. First Educational Yearbook of China (repr., Taipei: Chungching, 1981), 3:22–24.
39. Ibid., 6–8.
40. "Draft Report on Improving the Self-conducted Projects."
41. Ibid.
42. 8th Report to the Board, 26; 9th Report to the Board, 23; 11th Report to the Board, 24.
43. Yeh Ming-shun, "Private Fukien Union University," in The Universities of the Republic of China (Taipei: China News, 1953), 173–75.
44. N. G. Gee to M. K. Eggleston, September 12, 1925, R.G., 4, CMB, Ser. 1, 62/1527, RA.
45. 2nd Report to the Board, 7.
46. Gee to Eggleston.
47. Gee to R. S. Greene, May 9, 1926, R.G., 4, CMB, Ser. 1, 62/1527, RA.
48. 9th Report to the Board, 32; 7th Report to the Board, 47.
49. 6th Report to the Board, 37.
50. 2nd Report to the Board, 7.
51. See this author's "Chiang Monlin and Peking University," Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, no. 27, pt. 2 (December 1988): 261–305.
52. First Educational Yearbook, 3:34.
53. An Overview of Peking University, 1933 (Peking University), 9.
54. "Report on the Cooperation between the National University of Peking and the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture," April 1937, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 59.
55. "Formal Declaration on Revealing the Inside Story of the China Foundation," July 2, 1932, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 75.
56. Letter to the editor, Independent Critic 2 (1932): 20–22.
57. Hu Shih to H. C. Zen, February 13, 1948, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484, 1054.
58. Y. T. Yao to H. C. Zen, March 19, 1948, ibid.

Chapter 5: The Application of Science

1. Tsai Yuan-pei, "Outline of the Work of Academia Sinica" (April 16, 1936), in First Draft of the History of Academia Sinica (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1988), 23–28.
2. V. K. Ting, "The Mission of Academia Sinica," Eastern Miscellany 32, no. 2 (1935): 6–8; L. K. Tao, "Scientific Research: The Foundation of a Nation," Contemporary Review 5, no. 117 (March 1927): 4–7.
3. Tsiang T'ing-fu, "The Education Policy of Chen Guofu," Independent Critic, no. 4 (1932): 6–8.
4. 1st Report to the Board, 22.
5. Shen Tsung-han, "Outline of Advancements in Agriculture," The Science of the Republic of China, part 5, 1–10; R. Feng: "Agriculture," in Sophia Zen ed., Symposium on Chinese Culture (1931; repr., New York: Paragon, 1969), 224–36.
6. H. C. Zen, "Agricultural Education and Agricultural Improvement," pts. 1 and 2, Independent Critic no. 21 (1932): 14–16; no. 23 (1932): 7–10.
7. For Bailie, see Randall E. Stross, The Stubborn Earth, American Agriculturalists on Chinese Soil, 1897–1937 (University of California Press, 1986), 66–91.
8. Shen, "Outline of Advancements in Agriculture," 4; Chao Chin-ying, "The Private University of Nanking," in Universities of the Republic of China, 144–45.
9. 6th Report to the Board, 37–38; 7th Report to the Board, 47; 8th Report to the Board, 27; 9th Report to the Board, 30–34; 10th Report to the Board, 22–23.
10. N. G. Gee, "Southeastern University, Nanking," December 1922; Chi-pao Cheng, "National Southeastern University: Metropolitan in Scope," The China Press, October 18, 1925; N. G. Gee to R. S. Greene, June 16, 1926, R.G. 4, CMB, Ser. 1, 83/1927, RA.
11. 5th Report to the Board, 32–33; 6th Report to the Board, 35–36, 7th Report to the Board, 44–45.
12. 2nd Report to the Board, 8; 4th Report to the Board, 26; 5th Report to the Board, 34; 6th Report to the Board, 36–37; 7th Report to the Board, 46; 8th Report to the Board, 27–28; 9th Report to the Board, 35; 10th Report to the Board, 22.
13. Huang Fu-ching, Higher Education in Modern China: National Chung Shan University, 1924–1937 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1988), 125–26.
14. 7th Report to the Board, 46; 8th Report to the Board, 26–27; 9th Report to the Board, 33–34, 10th Report to the Board, 33; 11th Report to the Board, 25.
15. Zen, "Agricultural Education."
16. Ibid.
17. Sze to Greene, May 6, 1925, RSG 17/484.
18. 1st Report to the Board, 22.
19. Transcripts of I. C. Mei's letter of November 6, 1930, document of the 5th board meeting, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 35.
20. 2nd Report to the Board, 9; 5th Report to the Board, 40.
21. A History of the University of Communications, 1896-1949 (Shanghai Educational Publishing Co, 1986), 177.
22. 6th Report to the Board, 38; 7th Report to the Board, 47; 8th Report to the Board, 28.
23. For details of Peking Union Medical College, see Bullock, An American Transplant; and Fu Chuan-kwei, "An Outline of the

Establishment of Peking Union Medical College," Selections of Materials on Literature and History, no. 43 (1980): 129–51.

24. Chou Wen-bin, "Chang Shiao-chien and the Hsiang-Ya Medical College," Selections of Materials on Literature and History, no. 101 (1985): 139–46.
25. 5th Report to the Board, 33; 6th Report to the Board, 36; 7th Report to the Board, 44–45.
26. "Statement Regarding College of Medicine of the National Central University," December 15, 1928, R.G. 4, CMB, Ser. 1, 37/809, RA.
27. Chen Sheng-kun, "The First Chinese Medical Utopia: Kaochiao Rural Health Demonstration Center," in Modern Medicine in China (Taipei: Modern Medicine Magazine Co., 1978), 80–87.
28. 8th Report to the Board, 28–29; 9th Report to the Board, 36; 10th Report to the Board, 21; 11th Report to the Board, 25.
29. See Chen Chih-chien, "Public Hygiene and Medical Education," Independent Review, no. 138 (February 17, 1935):5–11.
30. Wang Hsin-kon, "Science Education in War Time," Educational Report 2, no. 5 (January 1939); H. C. Zen, "Science Education and the War Time Reconstruction," ibid., no. 22 (June 1939): 1–4.
31. Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the emergency committee (June 6, 1942), appendix 3, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 52.

Chapter 6: Scientific Research

1. For more on scientism, see D. W. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

2. Yang Chuan, "Science and Research," Science 5, no. 8 (1919), reprinted in General Science (Nanking: Science Society of China, 1934), 214–21.
3. H. C. Zen, "Invention and Research," pts. 1 and 2, Science 4, nos. 1 and 2 (1919), reprinted in General Science, 171–203.
4. H. C. Zen, "Foreign Science Societies and the Science Society of China," Science 3, no. 1 (1917), reprinted in General Science, 439–59.
5. H. C. Zen, "The Past and Future of the Science Society of China," Science 8, no. 1 (1922), reprinted in General Science, 460–69.
6. Zen, "Review of the Activities of the China Foundation over the Last 10 Years."
7. L. K. Tao, "Scientific Research."
8. H. C. Zen, "Scientific Research: How to Realize It," Contemporary Review 5, no. 129 (May 28, 1927): 4–8.
9. Tan Fu, "Issues of Scientific Research in China," Contemporary Review 5, no. 130, 11–150.
10. Wong Wen-hao, "How to Develop Science in China," Science 11, no. 10 (1927), reprinted in General Science, 387.
11. Editorial, "Opportunities for Scientific Research," Science 12, no. 10 (1927): 1319–21.
12. Wang Ging-hsi, "The Most Important Thing in the Promotion of Science: Developing Talented Personnel," Independent Critic, no. 26 (November 1932): 10–14.
13. Ibid.
14. For the regulations governing scientific research fellowships,

class C fellowships, scientific research prizes, and the committee in charge of awarding them, see 3rd Report to the Board, 30–35.

15. Social science and history were included in the list of subjects eligible for grants this year, so the number of applicants increased dramatically.
16. H. C. Zen, "The Current Status of Scientific Research in China," Science 13, no. 8 (1929): 1063–69.
17. Ibid.
18. 3rd Report to the Board, 30–35.
19. "Draft Report by the Executive Committee on Improving the Self-conducted Projects of the China Foundation."
20. Zen, "Review of the Activities of the China Foundation over the Last 10 Years."
21. For the life and career of Hua Loo-keng, see Biographies of Modern Chinese Scientists (Peking: Knowledge Publications Co., 1983), 1:91–104; Stephen Salaff, "A Brief Biography of Hua Loo-keng," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology 7 , no. 1 (1986): 58–64; no. 2 (1986): 53–63; no. 3 (1986): 62–64.
22. W. C. Pei, "Remembering the Discovery of the First Skull of Peking Man," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology, 1982, no. 3:2–5; "Changes in Longgu (Dragon Bone) Mountain," ibid., 1983, no. 2:1–9.
23. Chern Shiing-shen, "Forty Years of Mathematics," Biographical Literature 5, no. 5 (November 1964): 4–7.
24. 14th Report to the Board (December 1939), 3.
25. "Proposal for a New Direction of the Foundation's Activities."
26. Zen to Greene, November 24, 1943, CFF.

27. "A Brief Description of the Activities of the China Foundation in the Last 20 Years," 5.
28. "Regulations Governing the Scientific Research Professorships," 5th Report to the Board, 52.
29. "Improving the Self-conducted Projects."
30. For more on A. W. Grabau (1870–1946), see V. K. Ting, "Biographical Note," Bulletin of Geological Society of China, no. 10 (1931): iii–xviii; "Grabau," in Dictionary of Scientific Biography (1972), 5:486–88; "Grabau: The Good Teacher and Best Friend of Geologists in China," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology, 1982, no. 3, 22–50; Yang Ching-yee, "A Brief Biography of A. W. Grabau," Research on the History of Natural Science 3, no. 1 (1984): 83–90.
31. See Tan Chia-chen, Biographies of the Biologists of Modern China (Hunan Science & Technology Publishing Co., 1985), 70–85.
32. "Proposal for a New Direction of the Foundation's Activities."
33. H. C. Zen, "Science over the Last 50 Years," in Pang Kong-chan ed., China in the Last 50 Years (Chungking: 1945, reprinted in facsimile by the Party History Committee of the KMT, 1976), 185–99.
34. Tsai Yuan-pei, "Academia Sinica and Scientific Research in China," originally published in Central Weekly (Nanking), no. 387/388 (November 1935), see Documents of the Revolution, 53:427–43.
35. H. C. Zen, "The China Foundation and Science in China," Science 17, no. 9 (1933): 1521–29.
36. See the author's "The Development of Historical Geology in China (1912–1937)," Bulletin of the Institute of Modern

History, Academia Sinica, no. 15, part 1 (June 1986): 319–34, and "The Development of Economic Geology in China (1912–1937)," Thoughts and Expressions 24, no. 2 (July 1986): 199–215.

37. For more on the history and work of the Geological Survey, see The National Geological Survey of China (15th anniversary edition) (Peking: Geological Survey of China, 1931); Wang Yang-chih, "The Old Geological Survey," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology, 1983, no. 3:96–102.
38. "Report to the Meeting Commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the National Geological Survey, December 14, 1941."
39. "Regulations and Plans regarding Unpublished Monographs of the China Foundation" (July 20, 1940), Nanking 2nd Archives, 484 (2), 58.
40. 8th Report to the Board, 30; 9th Report to the Board, 39.
41. "Brief Account of the China Foundation over the Last 20 Years," 7.
42. "The Current Status of the Hunan Geological Survey," Geological Review 1, no. 1 (1936): 92–94.
43. "The Report of the 8th Annual Meeting of the Science Society of China," Science 8, no. 10 (December 10, 1923): 1108.
44. Yang, "Science and Research."
45. Ping Chi, "A Report on the Wistar Institute of Anatomy and Biology," The China Educational Review 12, no. 7 (July 1920): 1–2.
46. 5th Report to the Board, 34; H. C. Zen, "A Brief History of the Science Society of China," Selected Literature and Historical Materials, no. 15 (1961): 1–25.

47. Ping Chi, "Recent Developments in the Biological Sciences in China," Eastern Miscellany 28, no. 13 (July 1931): 110.
48. According to Chen Sheng-kun, the geological and historical situation in China and budgetary factors were behind this bias toward evolutionary biology. See Chen, "A Study of the Biology Laboratory," 172–89.
49. William J Haas, "Botany in Republican China: The Leading Role of Taxonomy," in John Bowers and Nathan Sivin eds., Science and Medicine in Twentieth-Century China: Research and Education (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1988), 31–64.
50. Wang Ging-hsi, "The Field of Biology in China Today," Independent Critic, no. 12 (August 1932): 9–11; H. H. Hu, "Discussions with Mr. Wong Ging-hsi on the Field of Biology in China Today, Independent Critic, no. 15:15–23. For further details, see Chen, "A Study of the Biology Laboratory," 288–317.
51. 10th Report to the Board, 26.
52. Laurence A. Schneider, "Genetics in Republican China," Eastern Miscellany 28, no. 13 (July 1931): 3–30.
53. Wang Tsih-chun, "A Brief Account of the Progress of Modern Biology in China," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology 9, no. 2 (1988): 17–34.
54. "Improving the Self-conducted Projects."
55. Wu Chia-zuei, "Activities of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology, 10, no. 1 (1989): 25–26.
56. The minutes of the 16th meeting of the committee, Fan Memorial Institute of Biology, January 9, 1937, Nanking 2nd

Archives, 609, 3.

57. H. C. Zen to Chang Chun and Wang Yun-wu, June 26, 1947, Nanking 2nd Archives, 484, 981.
58. Wu, "Activities of the Fan Memorial Institute."
59. Tao Ying-hui, "Tsai Yuan-pei and Academia Sinica, 1927–1940," Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, no. 7 (June 1978): 20.
60. 4th Report to the Board, 7; 6th Report to the Board, 38.
61. V. K. Ting, "The Mission of Academia Sinica," Eastern Miscellany 22, no. 2 (1935): 6–8.
62. Academia Sinica Secretariat, "Draft History of Academia Sinica," June 1988, 13–18.
63. Chi Feng, "Ray Fan, Pioneer of the Chemical Industry in China," Historical Materials on Chinese Science and Technology, March, 1980, no. 1:2–9.
64. Lu Ping, "The Golden Sea Chemical Research Institute," ibid., 1983, no. 1:56–60.
65. James Reardon-Anderson, "Chemical Industry in China, 1860–1949," Osiris, 2nd series, 1986, no. 2:172–224.
66. "Report on the Scientific Expedition to the Northwest," National News Weekly 6, no. 6 (February 3, 1929), reprinted in Documents of the Revolution, 88:317–333; Yuan Fu-li, "The Sino-Swedish Scientific Expedition to the Northwest in the 1930s," pts. 1–5, Historical Materials on Chinese Science & Technology 4, nos. 3 and 4 (1983), 5, nos. 1, 2, and 3 (1984).
67. "Outline Report of the Scientific Expedition to the Northwest, the Association of Academic Institutions in China," February 1928, File of the Remission of the Boxer Indemnity by the U.S. (II), Embassy Files, Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.
68. 7th Report to the Board, 54; 8th Report to the board, 35; 9th Report to the Board, 44–45.
69. Huang Po-yi, "The Difficult and Dangerous Scientific Activities in the West of Old China," Selected Literature and Historical Materials, no. 101 (1985): 115–24; Fang Wen-pei and Chang Shu-feng, "The Collection of Botanical Specimens in Szechuan and Sikang," Science 13, no. 11 (1929): 1509–21.
70. "A Brief Account of the West China Academy of Science," Science 19, no. 1 (1935): 131.
71. Kao Meng-sien, "Lu Tsou-fu and Bei-Pei Construction," Selected Literature and Historical Materials, no. 74 (1986): 95–111; Liang Chi-chuan and Lou Ping, "Lu Tsou-fu and the Mingsheng Corporation," Historical Materials on Chinese Science & Technology 8, no. 2 (1987): 44–54.
72. "The Activities of the West China Academy of Science," 1943, MOE files.
73. Zen, "Science over the Last 50 Years"; see also H. C. Zen, "Review of the Pan-Pacific Science Conference," Contemporary Review 5, no. 107 (December 1926), 5–9.
74. Ny Tsi-ze, "The Development of Physics over the Last 29 Years in China," Science 9, no. 11 (1935), 1706–16.
75. Wong Wen-hao, "Why and How We Research Science" (1926), General Science, 267–70.
76. Young Chung-chien, "Basic Tasks of Local Science," Science 18, no. 1 (1934), 5–11.
77. Zen, "Science over the Last 50 Years."
78. E–tu Zen Sun, "The Growth of the Academic Community,

1912–49," in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 13, pt. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 408.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

1. Chu Ko-chen, recorded by Chu Ping-hai, "Scientific Research in Wartime," Science 16, no. 6 (1932): 859–70.
2. Wang, "The Field of Biology in China Today."
3. Zen, "Review of the Activities of the China Foundation over the Last 10 Years."
4. Zen, "The Remission of the Boxer Indemnity and Education."
5. Zen, "The China Foundation and Science in China."
6. "Interviews" CBF, Washington D. C., September 27, 1946, R.G. 2, Ser. 601, Box 347, folder 2353, RA.
7. Laurence Schneider, "The Rockefeller Foundation, the China Foundation, and the Development of Modern Science in China," Social Science and Medicine, no. 16 (1982): 1217–21.
8. See "The Remission of the Boxer Indemnity and Education & Culture," First Yearbook of Chinese Education, 86–2114; "The Remission of the Boxer Indemnity and the Promotion of Education," Second Yearbook of Chinese Education, 69–90.
9. Hu Shih to Tao Hsing-chih and Ling Ping, April 25, 1926.
10. The Memoirs of Wellington Koo (Peking: Chunghwa Book Co., 1983), 1:360–64.
11. "Report of the Acting Director," minutes of the 26th annual meeting of the board of trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, October 1, 1955, appendix 3, 1–6, CFF.

12. Hu Shih to Tao Hsing-chih and Ling Ping, April 25, 1926.

Epilogue

1. The China Foundation (1929–1970) (1971), 100–101.
2. "The Acting Director's Report to the 40th Annual Board Meeting," January 5–7, 1974, CFF.
3. Minutes of the special meeting of the board of trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, March 7, 1950, CFF.
4. L. T. Yip's personal files; the minutes of board meetings, various years, CFF.
5. Minutes of board meetings.
6. MOE to China Foundation, April 4, 1964, CFF.
7. "Report of the Acting Director," minutes of the 27th annual meeting of the board of trustees of the China foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, October 6, 1956, appendix 4, 1, CFF.
8. The China Foundation (1929–1970), 99.
9. "Report of the Acting Director," minutes of the 27th annual meeting.
10. "Report of the Acting Director," minutes of the 26th annual meeting of the board of trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, October 1, 1955, appendix 3, 14–15, CFF.
11. "Report of the Acting Director," minutes of the 30th annual meeting of the board of trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, September 4, 1959, appendix 3, 1–2, CFF.
12. Hu Shih to Wu Ta-you, January 11, 1958, reported in Wu,

"The Trailblazers of Scientific Development," China News, February 25, 1986.

13. See Hu Shon-ping ed., First Draft of a Chronological Biography of Hu Shih (Taipei: Lien-Ching Press, 1984), 7:2690–97.
14. "Report of the Acting Director," minutes of the 30th annual meeting, 6.
15. "Wu Ta-You at 80," in Humanity, Society, & Technology (Taipei: Yuan Liu, 1986), 296.
16. Wang Shih-chieh to Tsiang T'ing-fu, May 29, 1965, minutes of the 34th annual board meeting, September 24, 1965, appendix 3, Encl. I, CFF.
17. "Report of the Acting Director," minutes of the 37th annual board meeting, September 26, 1969, appendix 3, CFF.
18. "Reflections on the Philosophy and Policy of Our Grants," "The Acting Director's Report to the 40th Annual Board Meeting," 19–20.

MAJOR EVENTS OF THE CHINA FOUNDATION

1921-1974

1921

U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge proposed making a second remission of the balance of the Boxer Indemnity due after October 1st, 1917, in order to further develop the educational and other cultural activities in China. The proposal was unanimously approved by the Senate but yet not acted upon by the House of Representatives (hereafter House).

1924

3/14～4/2	The House held public hearings on the bill.
5/7	The House approved the bill.
5/12	The Senate also approved the bill.
5/21	President Calvin Coolidge issued an executive order to remit to China the balance of the Boxer Indemnity between October 1917 and December 1940. The total amount would be US$6,l37,552 in principal and US$6,407,885 in interest.
June	Many institutions in China started to ask for grant support. Educational associations such as the Science Society of China assisted in drafting guidelines to define which activities qualified as education and

cultural activities and could receive grants and also how to manage and allocate the funds to be remitted by the U.S. Government.

July — Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., Alfred Sao-ke Sze recruited Professor Paul Monroe, Director of the International Institute of the College of Teachers, Columbia University, to assist and to advice in organizing a board of trustees as well as drafting a constitution for the Foundation.

August — Professor Monroe arrived in Peking and consulted with Government officials and educators regarding appropriate candidates for trustees on the board of the organization.

8/19 — Educational associations, such as the National Education Association of China, held meetings during which they insisted that the funds should be used solely for cultural and educational institutions and not be diverted for other purposes.

8/31 — The National Education Association of China nominated seven Americans and fourteen Chinese as candidates for trustees.

9/17 — President Ts'ao Kun, taking into consideration the National Education Association of China's proposed candidates, appointed fourteen trustees and with a later decree appointed fifteen prominent Americans and Chinese, who constituted the Board of Trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture. They were: W.W. Yen, V.K. Wellington Koo, Alfred Sao-ke Sze, Fan Yuan-lien, Huang Yen-Pei, Chiang Monlin, Po-ling, P.W. Kuo, Y. T. Tsur, V.K. Ting, Paul Monroe, John Dewey, John E. Baker, Roger S. Greene and Charles R. Bennett.

9/18 — The Foundation was formally established as The China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture. The inaugural meeting was held in the office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waichiaopu) in Peking. The meeting discussed and passed the constitution setting forth the purposes and organization of the Foundation. The constitution required that the trustees in the first instance would be appointed by the Chinese Government for a term of three years. At the third Annual Meeting, the terms of the members would be determined by lot: three to serve for one additional year, three to serve for two additional years, three to serve for three additional years, three to serve for four additional years and the remaining three to serve for five additional years. Thereafter, the Board would be self-perpetuating and elect its own members for a term of five years. Fan Yuan-lien was appointed Chairman, Chang Po-ling and Paul Monroe were appointed Vice Chairmen and Y.T. Tsur was to serve as Secretary.

10/17 — The President of China promulgated the constitution of the Foundation passed by the Board of Trustees on Sept. 18, with minor amendments.

1925

January — Professor Monroe arrived in China for discussion of the policy of the Foundation

6/2 ～ 4 — The 1st Annual Board Meeting was convened at the Imperial Hotel in Tientsin. By-Laws were approved and it was resolved that funds should be devoted to the development of scientific knowledge and to the application of such knowledge to conditions in China, through the promotion of technical training, scientific research, experimentation, and demonstration, science teaching training, and also to the advancement of cultural enterprises of a permanent character such as libraries and the like. Also in this meeting, the following officers were elected: W. W. Yen, Chairman; Fan Yuan-lien, Director; V.K. Ting, Secretary; Y.T. Tsur and Charles R. Bennett, Treasurers. An Executive Committee was set up to execute the resolutions made by the Board.

July — The U.S. Government paid to the Foundation the accumulated sum of all the previous installments after October 1, 1919 in the amount of US$1,377,255.02. On July 28 the head office of the Foundation was established at Shifuma Street, Peking.

August — The Constitution of the Foundation was amended.

September — Director Fan Yuan-lien appointed H.C. Zen as Special Secretary. The 1st Meeting of the Executive Committee resolved that the Foundation would fund in co-operation with the Ministry of Education the establishment of the National Metropolitan Library.

11/9 — At the 2nd Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was resolved that from then on the meetings of the Executive Committee and the Finance Committee would be held jointly. It also resolved that 20,000 Yuan be granted to the National Metropolitan Library as a temporary expenditure fund. The project to cooperate with the Ministry of Education for the National Metropolitan Library was deferred due to financial difficulties on the part of the Ministry. Thus the Foundation took over the responsibility of establishing and maintaining the library, the name then changing to Pei-Hai Library.

1926

1/27 — At the 3rd Meeting of the Executive Committee, rules of treasury operations were passed.

2/26～27 — At the 1st Semi-Annual Board Meeting, reports of the head office, the Executive and the Finance Committees were adopted. Various projects and grants were also approved. John Dewey resigned and recommended a successor, W. W. Willoughby.

3/26 — At the 4th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the constitutions and budgets for the Department of Social Research and the China Institute in America were approved.

April — H.C. Zen was reassigned as Executive Secretary to assist with the processing of grants.

6/18 At the 5th Meeting of the Executive Committee, projects and their related budgets and operating guidelines to institutions receiving grants were reviewed and approved.

6/24 At the 2nd Annual Board Meeting, the reports of the Director, Treasurers and Executive Committee were adopted. By-laws were amended. It was also resolved that the Semi-Annual Board Meeting and Annual Board Meeting were to be held separately in February and August. Officers were to be elected at the Annual Board Meeting.

8/26 At the 6th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the Treasurers' report for the year 1925 was reviewed and adopted. A grant to National Anti-Opium Association was approved. It was decided to send staff to Japan to attend the Pacific Science Inter-Congress and to survey Japanese science education.

10/7 At the 7th Meeting of the Executive Committee, 40,000 Yuan was allocated for the purchase of the Foundation's office building.

12/13 At the 8th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was resolved that Professor J.G. Needham was to be recruited to go to China to guide the study of biology and to map out training for qualified biology teachers. A grant was given to the China Research Promotion Society to defray Professor William H. Kilpatrick's travel expenses to lecture in China.

1927

3/3 At the 2nd Semi-Annual Board Meeting, reports of the Director, Treasurers and Executive Committee were adopted. Various grants and appropriations were approved.

4/7 The office of the Foundation was moved from the Shifuma rented site to the purchased office building at No. 42 Nan-chang Street.

5/5 At the 9th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided that the 2nd Science Teachers Seminar be moved to Jinling University in Nanking.

6/29 At the 3rd Annual Board Meeting, Trustees Huang Yen-pei, V.K. Ting and Westel W. Willoughby resigned and Tsai Yuan-pei, Hu Shih and J. Leighton Stuart were elected to replace them. The terms of the current trustees were determined by lot as required by the constitution. Director Fan Yuan-lien took sick leave, and Y.T. Tsur was appointed as Acting Director. Measures were approved to promote science education. A Science Education Advisory Committee was set up. A policy of grants for the promotion of science research was approved. Guidelines for research professorships and fellowships were also formulated.

7/21 At 10th Meeting of the Executive Committee, a revised budget for the National Library of Peiping was approved.

10/14 At the 11th Meeting of the Executive Committee, 390,000 Yuan was approved as the budget of the

second half of the year. It was decided to retain Yen Zen-Kwan and another four persons as members of the Screening Committee for the Applications for Fellowships and Wang Chin, J.S. Lee and another seven persons as members of the Science Education Advisory Committee.

12/23 Director Fan Yuan-lien passed away in Tientsin at the age of 52.

1928

2/11 At the 12th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided the members of the Science Education Advisory Committee would be expanded to ten members. Because of lack of a quorum, the Semi-Annual Board Meeting date was postponed to April.

3/10 At the 13th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided to accept funds of C$150,000 from the Shan Chih Society as an endowment fund to establish the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology in memory of Fan Yuan-lien.

6/29 At the 4th Annual Board Meeting, the late Trustee Fan Yuan-lien was succeeded by Wong Wen-hao. Chang Po-ling was elected Chairman; Tsai Yuan-pei, Vice Chairman; Hu Shih, Secretary; Wong Wen-hao, Treasurer; Y.T. Tsur, Director; H.C. Zen, Deputy Director. The position of Executive Secretary was abolished. Director Ping Chih of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology was retained. V.K. Ting, N.G. Gee and another seven persons were requested to

form the Committee of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology. Three additional guidelines for expenditure were approved. Grants and appropriations for next year were approved.

July At the urging of the Ministry of University Education, the Nationalist Government ordered the China Foundation to reorganize, to amend the constitution and to re-elect members of the Board of Trustees. Monroe and Hu Shih tried to salvage the organization and they argued repeatedly with the Government about the importance of the independence of the Foundation, asserting that the Government had no authority to interfere with the administration of the Foundation.

October The Nationalist Government reorganized the Ministry of University Education into the Ministry of Education, and the newly appointed Minister of Education, Monlin Chiang tried hard to minimize the damage to the China Foundation.

12/19 Paul Monroe arrived in China to discuss matters relating to the reorganization of the Foundation.

1929

1/3 – 4 At the 3rd Semi-Annual Board Meeting, the Board accepted the resignations of P.W. Kuo, W.W. Yen, Chang Po-ling, V.K. Wellington Koo, Y.T. Tsur and Hu Shih. In replacement, Wang Ching-wei, C.C. Wu, Li Yu-ying, Sun Fo, H.C. Zen and Y.R. Chao

were elected Trustees. Tsai Yuan-pei was elected Chairman and Chiang Monlin, Vice Chairman; H.C. Zen, Secretary and Director. The position of Deputy Director was abolished and the position of Executive Secretary was reinstated. Reports of the Treasurer and Director were adopted. Five articles of the constitution were amended.

1/5 At the 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee, Tsai Yuan-pei and Wong Wen-hao were appointed to organize the Museum of Natural History Project Committee. It was decided to add more committee members to the Committee on Pei Hai Library.

1/25 At the 15th Meeting of the Executive Committee, Sun Hong-fen was appointed Executive Secretary, and Y.T. Tsur Honorary Financial Advisor. Y.R. Chao and others were retained to form a Committee for Developing Physical and Industrial Science Projects.

3/27 At the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the Guidelines for Allocating Science Professorships in Normal Colleges were amended. Budgets for the projects were approved for that year.

6/4 At the 17th Meeting of the Executive Committee, C$450,000 was approved for transfer to the endowment fund. It was decided to accept the management of the Mrs. Fan's (Fan Yuan-lien's mother) Biological Fellowship Endowment Fund with the endowment of C$10,000.

6/29 At the 5th Annual Board Meeting, the following decisions were made: (1) the request from the Ministry of Education and the Board of Trustees of the Tsing Hua College Endowment Fund for permanent custody and management of the Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund by the Foundation was accepted; (2) the proposal of the Ministry of Education to manage and to re-organize the National Library of Peiping was accepted; (3) to increase support for construction costs and purchase of books for Pei-Hai Library; (4) Department of Social Research should be reorganized into the Institute of Social Research; (5) the request of the China Institute in America to subsidize the reorganization budget was rejected; (6) the report of the Committee for Developing Physical and Industrial Science Project was revised; (7) a grant of C$500,000 was approved for building and equipment outlays of the Institute of Physical Chemical Engineering, Academia Sinica; (8) trustees and officers were elected; (9) Hu Shih was elected to succeed Wang Ching-wei. Hu also assumed the position of Secretary.

7/9 At the 18th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided jointly with the Ministry of Education to retain Tsai Yuan-pei as the Director of the National Library of Peiping and Yuan Tong-li as deputy director. The Library Committee's organizational outline was approved. (The National Library of Peiping, formerly the National Metropolitan Library, had its name changed to Pei-Hai Library when the Foundation took over management of the library, and

it was finally merged with other libraries managed by the Ministry of Education and renamed as the National Library of Peiping.) The Committee also amended the Rules Governing the Administration of the Tsing Hua University Fund and the receiving of the monthly remission of the Boxer Indemnity. Tao Meng-ho was retained as Director of the Institute of Social Research. The members of various committees of the Foundation were appointed.

8/12 At the 19th Meeting of the Executive Committee, various reports by the head office on the management of the Tsing Hua University Endowment Fund were adopted.

9/19 At the 20th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the investment policy for the second half of 1930 of the Tsing Hua University Fund was approved.

10/9 At the 21st Meeting of the Executive Committee, US$2,000 was approved to dissolve the China Institute in America. Guidelines for Middle School Science Teachers Special Coaching Classes were approved.

11/26 At the 22nd Meeting of the Executive Committee, a grant to purchase land for expansion of the Foundation's buildings was approved and C$4,000 was appropriated for real estate taxes. According to a request from the Ministry of Education, the accumulated reserve funds for current expenditure of approximately C$49,000 received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was paid to Tsing Hua University to defray the deficit of current and special expenditure for that year.

1930

1/19 At the 23rd Meeting of the Executive Committee, various grants were approved.

2/9 At the 4th Semi-Annual Board Meeting, by-laws were amended. A budget for construction costs was appropriated for the Fan Memorial Biological Research Institute and the Institute of Social Research. It was decided to organize a Committee for the Preservation of Antiques Project in Peking.

2/28 At the 24th Meeting of the Executive Committee, treasury matters were discussed and a donation of C$3,000 was approved to Chao Ya-tseng's orphans for future educational expenses.

4/18 At the 25th Meeting of the Executive Committee, Charles Bennett was authorized to negotiate with The City Bank Farmers Trust Company (predecessor of Citibank) for custody of the overseas investments of the Foundation's portfolios.

5/23 At the 26th Meeting of the Executive Committee, C$560,000 was appropriated for budget expenditures.

7/2 At the 6th Annual Board Meeting, King Soh-tsu was elected to succeed Wong Wen-hao and was also appointed Treasurer. It was decided to reorganize the Science Education Advisory Committee into the Committee on Editing and Translation and to revise

its charter with a budget of C$50,000 being approved. Hu Shih was appointed Chairman and Chun Chang Vice Chairman of the Committee. Various grants and appropriations of the Foundation were approved.

7/26 At the 27th Meeting of the Executive Committee, various committee members were appointed. Twenty-three science professors were appointed. Joseph Baillie was authorized to establish a branch office of the Chinese Institute of Technical Training in the U.S.

8/2 At the 28th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the proposal made by King Soh-tsu for the Foundation Fund and the Tsing Hua University Fund to invest in gold currency was approved. The small portfolios of the Fan Memorial Biology Institute Endowment Fund (Fan Memorial Fund) were entrusted to City Bank Farmers Trust Company for management.

9/10 At the 29th Meeting of the Executive Committee, Fu Ssu-nien and Tchen Yin-koh together with another eleven prominent scholars were retained as committee members of the Committee on Editing and Translation.

10/9 At the 30th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the City Bank Farmers Trust Company in New York and London were entrusted to act as custodians of the Foundation's portfolios. They were requested to provide investment analysis every three months. Investment proposals for the month were approved.

10/30 At the 31st Meeting of the Executive Committee, grants and additional subsidies to various research institutes were approved.

12/13 At the 32nd Meeting of the Executive Committee, the cash problems of the China Foundation Fund and the Tsing Hua University Fund were dealt with.

1931

1/9 At the 5th Semi-Annual Board Meeting, the Board approved the proposal made by Roger S. Greene to cooperate with National Peking University in establishing research professorships and chair professors. Over the next five years, the Foundation and Peking University would each provide C$200,000 a year to support this project. In response to Chiang Monlin's proposal, in his capacity as Minister of Education, for the Foundation to subsidize a survey of middle schools of the whole country, Paul Monroe, Chiang Monlin and H.C. Zen were appointed to form a committee. The committee would draft a detailed proposal and report to the next Annual Board Meeting for approval. The supplementary budgets for various self-conducted projects as well as for co-operative projects were approved.

1/23 At the 33rd Meeting of the Executive Committee, various investment guidelines were approved. The committee also dealt with various matters specifically raised by the 5th Semi-Annual Board Meeting.

2/27 At the 34th Meeting of the Executive Committee,

proposals on treasury operations, investments and grants were approved.

3/26 At the 35th Meeting of the Executive Committee, guidelines on investments of the Tsing Hua University Fund were approved. In response to a letter from the Ministry of Education requesting funds for purchase of antiques and ancient books, the Director was directed to turn down the request by "carefully explaining to the Ministry what the Foundation had already done for cultural institutions in China."

4/24 At the 36th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the draft on the guidelines for working with National Peking University to provide five research professorships and fellowships were revised and approved. Chiang Monlin, H.C. Zen, Hu Shih, Fu Ssu-nien and Wong Wen-hao were retained to form an advisory committee. Assistant Treasurer, Chang Tse-kai would be sent to Europe and America to study advanced accounting and investment.

5/25 At the 37th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the amount of C$760,000 was transferred to the endowment fund. Rules on Staff Salaries and Compensation were approved.

6/22 At the 38th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the request made by the University of Communication to hire foreign professors was turned down with the comment that the whole concept needed to be reviewed from an overall and long-term

perspective. Roger Greene was directed to draft a proposal to improve the engineering education of the whole nation. Before forming a grant policy, the Foundation would not establish chair professors in engineering. Tsai Yuan-pei proposed reconsidering the supplementary guidelines for grants as passed by the 4th Annual Boarding Meeting restricting support only to institutions above the middle school grade.

6/27 At the 7th Annual Board Meeting, Roger Greene's proposal for improvement of the Foundation's accounting was approved. Roger Greene, King Soh-tsu and H.C. Zen were directed to form a special committee to enhance the efficiency of the Foundation's investments and financial management. It was decided to postpone the project on the survey of middle schools. Instead, Chinese and foreign experts in engineering education were to be hired to survey the present condition of engineering schools in China. The proposal by Tsai Yuan-pei at the 38th Meeting of the Executive Committee was not accepted and the restriction of grants to institutions above the middle school grade was retained. It was decided that the formal abbreviation of the China Foundation for Promotion of Education and Culture would be the China Foundation. Chiang Monlin and Y.R. Chao resigned. Hsu Sing-loh and Y.T. Tsur succeeded as Trustees. Y.T. Tsur also assumed the position of Vice Chairman. Treasurer Bennett resigned and was replaced by Roger Greene.

7/16 At the 39th Meeting of the Executive Committee, Roger Greene was directed to inquire by mail about the possibility of retaining American educators in engineering to take charge of surveying the conditions of engineering education in China. A message was also sent to Paul Monroe to look into this matter.

7/27 At the 40th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the Farmers Trust Company recommended selling a portion of securities in gold currency.

9/8 At the 41st Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided that instructions should be given to the Farmers Trust Company that from then on, only the proceeds of the principal portion of securities sold or redeemed were to be ploughed back into the China Foundation Fund for re-investment. The income from interest was to be deposited into the checking account of the Foundation to cover payment of checks. As for the Tsing Hua University Fund, the principal and income would be totally re-invested. It was decided that institutions receiving grants from the Foundation were to be notified that from then on, losses due to fluctuations of foreign exchange were not to be compensated.

10/22 At the 42nd Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided that starting from July of that year, capital gains from the disposal of securities were to be put into a reserve account to cover future capital losses. The following decisions were also made: (1)

to reevaluate the assets of doubtful value in the Tsing Hua University Fund; (2) to reset the percentage of investments in gold and silver currency; (3) the head office was to draft procedure to terminate the science professorships and to draft rules of sabbatical year research expenditures for professors.

11/19 At the 43rd Meeting of the Executive Committee, the budget of the overseas sabbatical research expenditure for three science chair professors from Northeastern University was approved. Since the Scientific Mission to the Northwest accepted the research conditions revised by the Foundation, the grant to the Mission was approved.

12/16 At the 44th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided that due to the unstable conditions in China, the survey of engineering education should be deferred. Director Ping Chi of Fan Memorial Institute of Biology resigned and was replaced by H. H. Hu.

12/28 At the 45th Meeting of the Executive Committee, short term borrowing for the funds under the management of the Foundation was discussed.

1932

1/8 At the 6th Semi-Annual Board Meeting, Trustees Y.R. Chao and Chiang Monlin resigned and were replaced by Y.T. Tsur and Hsu Sing-loh. The report by the Special Committee to enhance the efficiency of financial management was adopted. It was

decided that a Financial Advisory Committee be set up in Shanghai with Hsu Sing-loh, Koo Yih-chun, and Charles Bennett as committee members. The Executive Committee also approved the revised general guidelines to accumulate the endowment proposed by the Director but with a provision that whenever the circumstance changed the guidelines should also be revised. The Director also proposed that one-third of investment portfolios be invested in silver currency securities. The committee also discussed means of keeping National Peking University afloat.

1/26 At the 46th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided that investment advice be obtained from the Financial Advisory Committee prior to the holding of the meeting. The National Tsing Hua University requested that the additional remission from the U.S. from January to June be paid to the University for purchase of equipment.

2/17 At the 47th Meeting of the Executive Committee, several emergency measures were adopted to cope with the breakout of war between China and Japan at Shanghai.

3/7 At the 48th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the investment in gold currency proposed by the Farmers Trust Company for the China Foundation and the Tsing Hua University endowment funds was approved. It was decided to provide monthly support of C$57,000 as a minimal budget to maintain the

operations of National Peking University.

3/22 At the 49th Meeting of the Executive Committee, decisions were made on the Tsing Hua University Fund investment and the purchase of bonds with the accumulated cash in the account of the Tsing Hua University Fund.

4/15 At the 50th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the decision was made to reinvest cash from investments coming due. Y.T. Tsur was authorized to sign payment instructions for grants and investment, etc. in the absence of Charles Bennett in Peking.

4/21 At the 51st Meeting of the Executive Committee, H.C. Zen reported the bad news from diplomatic sources that the U.S. Government might agree to the Chinese Government's request for a one-year moratorium of the remission of the Boxer Indemnity. It was decided the Foundation would ask Tsai Yuan-pei to plead with the Chinese Government that the moratorium should exclude the U.S. remission. The Foundation also informed Roger Greene to approach the American Minister accredited to China for further information about the moratorium discussed between the U.S. and Chinese Governments.

4/27 At the 52nd Meeting of the Executive Committee, there were discussions undertaken regarding how to cope with the anticipated moratorium. While the Foundation was to request the Chinese Government to pay the unpaid remission of that year, they also requested the City Bank in Peking to provide a short-

term overdraft facility.

5/4 At the 53rd Meeting of the Executive Committee, a report was presented regarding negotiation in Shanghai with the Ministry of Finance to repay the amount affected by the moratorium. A response was attached to the report from Minister of Finance, T.V. Soong agreeing to defray the maintenance expenditures of the Foundation.

6/8 At the 54th Meeting of the Executive Committee, due to the reduction of income as a result of the moratorium, the grant policy was amended.

6/27 At the 55th Meeting of the Executive Committee, matters of reinvestment of cash and fixed deposits, which had come due, were discussed.

7/1 At the 8th Annual Board Meeting, due to the income shortage as a result of the moratorium, the budget of US$240,000 was deferred. Regarding the Government's one-year moratorium, the Foundation reacted strongly by listing losses to the Foundation and Tsing Hua University. The Foundation reasserted its strong opposition to any such moratorium in the future and requested the Government to compensate their losses. As a result of the Foundation's financial difficulties, guidelines to cut grants were put into effect.

July As the worldwide recession of that year cast a long shadow over the Foundation, investment and financial management became extremely difficult. The joint Meeting of the Executive and Finance Committees devoted much time and effort to discuss measures to cope with the situation. (Note: Hereafter only major decisions of the joint meetings will be detailed).

1933

1/6 At the 7th Semi-Annual Meeting, the Board authorized the Executive Committee to negotiate with the National Government to pay compound interest of 7% per annum on the remission affected by the moratorium in order to compensate for the losses suffered by the Foundation and Tsing Hua University.

7/14 At the 9th Annual Board Meeting, the Foundation urged the Government to return the remission owed. The Executive Committee was asked to ensure projects supported by the Foundation were not also being supported by other institutions. Cooperation with other institutions was stressed. Treasurer Greene resigned and Charles Bennett succeeded him.

9/20 At the 77th Meeting of the Executive Committee, Y.T. Tsur and H.C. Zen were appointed to represent the Foundation at a joint meeting by the various institutions that received the remission of the Boxer Indemnity.

11/30 In compliance with the resolution of the 9th Annual Board Meeting, several leaders of education and research organizations, such as Wong Wen-hao and

Fu Ssu-nien were invited to discuss how to enhance the efficiency of the Foundation and how to avoid duplicating efforts of other organizations.

1934

January The Executive Committee completed a draft of the Preliminary Report on How to Improve Efficiency of the Foundation.

2/2 At the 8th Semi-Annual Board Meeting, Hsu Sing-loh, Y.T. Tsur and H.C. Zen were appointed representatives of the Foundation responsible for contacting the Ministry of Finance regarding issuing special tariff treasury notes to pay the Foundation due to the moratorium. Due to the devaluation of the U. S. dollar that year and the reduction of income, it was decided to take a short-term loan from the endowment account which would be repaid in installments over the next five years. The current investment percentage of 54% in silver dollar securities was acknowledged. Trustee C. C. Wu passed away and was replaced by V.K. Ting.

5/10 At the 84th Meeting of the Executive Committee, V.K. Ting and H.C. Zen reported the outcome of the 2nd Joint Meeting of the Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission. They reported that in this joint meeting they asserted to other representatives that any decisions made in the meeting would not be final without the consent of the

full Board of the Foundation, and the Foundation will not be bound by them.

5/31 At the 85th Meeting of the Executive Committee, legal advisor Lin Shin-guei was retained by the Foundation and its subsidiaries. H.C. Zen proposed that the Institute of Social Survey be merged with the Institute of Social Science, Academia Sinica.

6/29 At the 10th Annual Board Meeting, regarding the proposal by the Executive Committee to enhance the efficiency of the Foundation as requested per the 9th Annual Board Meeting of the previous year, after comments by Messrs. Tsai Yuen-pei, Alfred Sze, Monroe, Greene, Baker, Bennett and Stuart, five articles contained in it were amended. The Board repealed the decision reached in the last Semi-Annual Board Meeting regarding interest-free borrowing from the endowment to be repaid in installments over the next five years to cover deficit in current expenditures. Instead, the deficit was to be put into a temporary account and to be settled in that fiscal year. Article 18 of the by-laws was amended so that the Annual Board Meeting would be held in April and the Semi-Annual Board Meeting would be held in October with the provision that when deemed not necessary the Semi-Annual Board Meeting could be canceled. New requests for grants were turned down. The Board politely turned down the proposal of establishing a botanical museum, a women's college and graduate schools made by the 2nd Joint Meeting

of the Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission.

12/20 At the 3rd Joint Meeting of the Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission, the Foundation was requested to subsidize the Ministry of Education to develop a mandatory education program.

1935

1/25 At the 94th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the Foundation had its reservations about the resolutions made at the above-mentioned 3rd Joint Meeting and requested the Secretariat of the Executive Yuan to make a formal record of this matter. The Committee approved the guidelines for the Institute of Physics of Academia Sinica to produce laboratory instruments to be used in high schools.

4/19 At the 11th Annual Board Meeting, the Board reconfirmed the 9th Annual Board Meeting's resolution that annual expenditures were to be limited to monthly remissions received and when surplus occurred, the surplus together with the investment income was to be ploughed back into the endowment account. Regarding the subsidy for developing mandatory education, the Executive Committee was authorized to consult with the Ministry of Education and other Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission for a feasible program.

7/10 At the 101st Meeting of the Executive Committee, it

was decided to set up a financial advisory committee in New York. Roger Greene and Charles Bennett were asked to look into this matter and to make preliminary preparations.

8/16 At the 103rd Meeting of the Executive Committee, because Director H.C. Zen was appointed President of National Szechwan University, it was decided to grant a vacation to him with full pay starting Sept. 1st. H.F. Sun was appointed Acting Director.

10/26 At the 9th Semi-Annual Board Meeting, the constitution and by-laws were amended to accommodate the increase of officers. Two Honorary Treasurers and three more members of the Finance Committee were put into the officers' list. Based on the proposal by the Executive Committee, C$300,000 was granted in two-year installments to support the mandatory education program.

October All the remissions to the China Foundation and the Tsing Hua University Fund paid by the customs office were changed into U.S. currency. The checks for the remission were to be paid by the U.S. Counsel General in Shanghai to the China Foundation's Assistant Treasurer residing in Shanghai. The income and endowment accounts were separated.

12/4 At the 107th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the head office was directed to map out details for moving the investment department to Shanghai.

12/26 The constitution was revised.

1936

1/5 V.K. Ting passed away.

February The Department of Custody of the Foundation was moved to Shanghai with an address at Citibank Building, No. 35 Chiuchiang Road. The Finance Committee, with responsibility for investments, in order to work closely with the Department of Custody, also moved to Shanghai. From then on, the Executive and Finance Committees were to hold meetings in Peking and Shanghai respectively.

2/10 Y.T. Tsur and H.F. Sun participated in the 4th Joint Meeting of the Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission.

3/3 At the 1st Meeting of the Finance Committee, the percentage of investments in foreign currency and in national currency investments was decided.

4/7 At the 2nd Meeting of the Finance Committee, Hsu Sing-loh was elected Chairman of the Finance Committee.

4/18 At the 12th Annual Board Meeting, it was decided to approve a grant of C$3,000 to establish the Ting Ven Kiang Memorial Scholarship in memory of V.K. Ting. The late Trustee Ting was succeeded by Wong Wen-hao. Director H.C. Zen resigned and H.F. Sun succeeded him. The Finance Advisor Committee in Shanghai was dissolved. As the modus operandi of financial management had changed, the Executive Committee was asked to revise the constitution and by-laws so that the duties of the Honorary Treasurers, Assistant Treasurers and members of the Finance Committee could be more specific and better coordinated. The Board politely turned down the request by the Ministry of Education at the 4th Joint Meeting of the Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission to increase subsidies to the mandatory education program. As to the request by the Ministry of Education to have all the Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission to subsidize Yun-Nan and Kwangsi Universities, the Board authorized the staff of the Foundation to take a field survey before making a decision.

5/27 At the 101st Meeting of the Executive Committee, Roger S. Greene proposed giving a one-time grant to support the newly established Medical School of National Central University.

9/2 At the 7th Meeting of the Finance Committee, there were discussions undertaken regarding the request raised at the above-mentioned 4th Joint Meeting. The Committee made a few explanatory points and comments.

12/26 Y. T. Tsur and H. F. Sun participated in the 5th Joint Meeting of Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission.

1937

4/30 At the 13th Annual Board Meeting, an ad-hoc committee of five was formed to look into the

dissolving of subsidiaries and the establishment of new subsidiaries as proposed by Director H.F. Sun. The members were: Hu Shih, H.C. Zen, Y.T. Tsur, H.F. Sun and John Leighton Stuart. C$100,000 was granted to support the Ministry of Education's project of mandatory education in response to the Ministry's persistent requests for continued and increased funding. An additional grant of C$50,000 was approved to the Ministry of Education for manufacturing Chinese-developed scientific experimental equipment. Charles Bennett was appointed Acting Treasurer with salary. The Board approved the Executive Committee's proposal to have the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology continue managing Lu-Shan Arboretum together with the Agricultural Department of Kiansi Province for another three years.

7/3 At the 118th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the Committee approved the Regulations and Rules of the China Foundation's Finance Committee as drafted by the Finance Committee.

7/7 The Marco Polo Bridge Incident resulted in the open declaration of war between China and Japan.

9/14 At the 119th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided the head office of the Foundation be moved to Shanghai. The Semi-Annual Board Meeting, scheduled to be held in October, was cancelled.

12/14 At the 121st Meeting of the Executive Committee, the decision was made to lay off the entire staff of the Director's Office in Peking at the end of that year.

1938

4/27 At the 14th Annual Board Meeting held in Hong Kong, the following decisions were made: (1) to approve the Regulations and Rules for the China Foundation's Finance Committee; (2) to approve the budget for establishing a branch office in Hong Kong, administrative expenditures, and purchases of books for the National Library of Peiping; (3) to approve a grant of C$60,000 to the Ministry of Education to continue the program of mandatory education for 6 provinces for that year with the stipulation that the usage of this grant should be devoted mainly to mathematics and natural history; (4) to adopt the Ad-hoc Committee of Five's report studying the closure of some subsidiaries and establishment of new ones. The Board also appointed Wong Wen-hao as Chairman and Hu Shih, H.C. Zen, Y.T. Tsur and H.F. Sun as members to form a special committee to consider a memorandum presented by H.C. Zen on the Foundation's future operations. The new committee would focus on the challenge the Foundation would face in this period of national calamity. The committee would address the question of how to make the necessary adjustments to adapt to the new needs for education, including amendments

to the project on science research prizes.

6/27 At the 126th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided to establish a correspondence office in Hong Kong.

8/24 Trustee Hsu Sing-loh died when his plane was shot down by the Japanese, during a return trip from Hong Kong to Chunking.

12/5 At the 129th Meeting of the Executive Committee, Director H.F. Sun reported his findings on the survey of educational and research institutes in the southwestern region of China.

1939

4/22 At the 15th Annual Board Meeting, the late Trustee Hsu Sing-loh was succeeded by Director H.F. Sun. The Board approved the Ad-hoc Committee of Five's preliminary report. C$10,000 and US$20,000 were approved as science research prizes for that year. Grants for the following year were approved with the provision that the Foundation would mainly support applications in the field of applied science. It was resolved that all grants received by institutions would be conditional on the success of the Foundation in borrowing from the Government. The expenditures and subsidies for institutions in the southwest region would be paid from either Chunking or Kunming, and grants to other regions would be paid from Shanghai. During the period when the remission

was to be halted, the Board decided to accede to the proposal by the Ministry of Finance as follows: (1) interest and dividend income from the endowment fund was to be used for current expenditures; (2) the deficit amount could be borrowed from the banks with the Ministry of Finance's guarantee; (3) the monthly borrowing limit was based on the monthly anticipated remission ; (4) the total borrowing limit for the year was set at C$1,500,000 to cover the deficit of the year.

4/23 At the 132nd Meeting of the Executive Committee, the Director was authorized to establish an office in Chunking.

1940

3/5 Tsai Yuen-pei passed away.

4/16 At the 16th Annual Board Meeting, W.W. Yen and Chiang Monlin were elected to succeed the late Trustee Tsai Yuan-pei and Li Yu-ying, who had resigned. W.W. Yen was elected Chairman. The Chairman of the Educational Enterprises and Programs Special Committee, Wong Wen-hao, presented a report on future preliminary administrative guidelines for the China Foundation. As this was a matter for serious thought, it was decided that instead of making a hasty decision, the report was to be referred to all Trustees for consideration and referred for further discussion at the next Board Meeting.

1941

4/18 At the 17th Annual Board Meeting, emergency measures taken included the establishment of The Emergency Committee in Chunking and approval of the steps to be taken in handling business in the U.S. H.C. Zen's comments on the Draft of the China Foundation's Future Administrative Guidelines were sent to the Board for discussion and decision.

1942

1/13 A Special Committee in America was established. The composition of the Committee included: Hu Shih, Alfred Sao-ke Sze, Paul Monroe, Roger S. Greene and Charles Bennett. The main business for the committee was to handle the Foundation's business in the U.S.

1/18 The 1st Meeting of The Emergency Committee in Chunking was held in Chunking, with Wong Wen-hao as Chairman; Y.T. Tsur as Secretary; H.C. Zen and C.Y. Young as Treasurers; H.C. Zen as Director; Sun Fo and Chiang Monlin as executive members.

3/6 The Special Committee in America held its 2nd Meeting.

6/6 The Committee for the Extraordinary Period (formerly known as the Emergency Committee in Chunking) held its 2nd Meeting.

10/12 The Special Committee in America held its 3rd Meeting.

12/9 A Special Meeting of the Board was held in the U.S. According to the emergency measures, the tenure of trustees and officers of the Foundation was extended according to the needs of wartime financial management.

1943

January The Sino-American New Treaty was signed and the remission of the Boxer Indemnity officially ended. As a result of this new development, some Government officials proposed closing all Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission.

1/18 At the 3rd Meeting of the Committee for the Extraordinary Period, the future of the Foundation was discussed. The Board reemphasized the raison d' etre of the Foundation and the profound significance of the continuing existence of the Foundation for Sino-American long-term friendship. The Board steeled its resolve to fight the Government and ensure the Foundation's survival. The fiscal year of the Foundation was changed in line with the Government's fiscal year, that is, from January 1 to December 31.

3/6 The Special Committee in America held its 5th meeting.

6/30 The Committee for the Extraordinary Period held its

4th meeting.

12/3 The Special Committee in America held its 6th meeting.

1944

1/16 At the 5th Meeting of the Committee for the Extraordinary Period, attending Trustees and proxies from Trustees residing in the U.S. voted to accept the resignation of Trustee Paul Monroe and elected Donald M. Brodie to succeed him.

6/21 The Special Committee in America held its 7th meeting.

August The Supreme National Defense Committee of the Government decided to abolish all Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission.

September The Secretariat of the Executive Yuan notified all Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission to disband at the end of that year. The activities of the China Foundation were to be taken over by the Ministry of Education.

9/11 The Special Committee in America held its 8th meeting.

9/30 The Special Committee in America held its 9th meeting

12/28 The Special Committee in America held its 10th meeting.

December The Secretary General of the Executive Yuan notified all Institutions Receiving the Boxer Indemnity Remission to maintain the status quo until further notice.

1945

3/1 The Special Committee in America held its 11th meeting.

6/2 At the 12th Meeting of the Special Committee in America, according to the by-laws, Trustees in China who could not attend the meeting gave proxies to Trustees in the U.S. to act for them. T.F. Tsiang, Arthur N. Young, Fan Zue and Fu Ssu-nien were elected to replace W. W. Yen, John Leighton Stuart, King Sao-ke and H.F. Sun who were trapped in the Japanese occupied region and therefore could not perform their duties.

8/14 Japan announced their unconditional surrender and the Sino-Japanese War ended.

10/19 The newly elected Trustee, Fan Zue passed away.

12/1 At the 18th Annual Board Meeting, the late Trustee Fan Zue was replaced by Bay Chiu-yi. The Board accepted the proposal by the Director for the next year's recovery budget. The Committee for the Extraordinary Period and the Special Committee in American were abolished. The Board returned to its usual functions.

1946

2/13 The 143rd Meeting of the Executive Committee was held in Chunking. Newly elected Trustee, Chiu-Yu Bay resigned due to illness with his vacancy to be filled at the next Annual Board Meeting.

3/14 The 19th Annual Board was held in Nanking. Li Ming was elected Trustee to succeed Bay Chiu-yi. Trustees Charles Bennett, James Baker and Arthur N. Young resigned, John Leighton Stuart, Claude B. Hutchison and J. T. S. Reed were elected. Chiang Monlin was elected Chairman; Wong Wen-hao and John Leighton Stuart, Vice Chairmen of the Board; Li Ming and Donald Brodie, Treasurers; H.C. Zen, Director. It was decided that the accumulated interest for the period from 3/1/42 to 12/31/46 amounting to US$500,000 be paid to Tsing Hua University for post-war reconstruction expenditures.

July The Foundation re-established its office in Shanghai. The Director's Office and the Department of Funds shared the same office building at Chiu Chiang Road to centralize management and to minimize expenses.

1947

3/27 Roger S. Greene passed away.

4/19 At the 144th Meeting of the Executive Committee, John Leighton Stuart was elected Vice Chairman to replace the late Roger S. Greene and Greene's vacancy as member of the Finance Committee was filled by Charles Bennett. Y.T. Tsur, H.C. Zen and T.F. Tsiang were appointed to form a special committee to discuss revision of the constitution and by-laws. The Committee considered H.C. Zen's memorandum concerning the guidelines for supporting the Program of Faculty Fellowships for Research Abroad. The Committee determined which fields of science would be approved.

7/26 At the 145th Meeting of the Executive Committee, it was decided that all assets of the Ting Ven Kiang Endowment Fund under the custody of the Foundation should be returned to the Geological Society of China.

12/12 At the 20th Annual Board Meeting held in Nanking, Paul S. Hopkins and P. H. Ho were elected Trustees to succeed the late Roger S. Greene and Alfred Sao-ke Sze, who had resigned. The revised constitution and by-laws drafted by T.F. Tsiang, Y.T. Tsur and H.C. Zen were approved. It was also decided to lend a sum not exceeding US$250,000 from the foreign assets of the Foundation to a small number of universities (not more than four) to purchase laboratory instruments the following year.

1948

4//26 At the 146th Meeting of the Executive Committee, a resolution made at the January 20th meeting of

the Executive Yuan was reported. The six principles drafted by the Ministry of Finance relating to abolishing, combining or continuing subsidiaries and joint-ventures of the Institutions Receiving Boxer Indemnity Remission was also appended to the minutes.

7/15 At the 147th Meeting of the Executive Committee, the U.S. dollar loans to four universities (Peking, Central, Chekiang and Wu-Han) was reported. The result of the negotiation with the Ministry of Education to have the Government take over the payment of salary to Fan Memorial Institute of Biology staff from July of that year was also reported.

9/18 At the 21st Annual Board Meeting, it was reported that the total assets of the Foundation were US$1,350,000 and C$3,070,000 at book value. In July, US$250,000 was loaned to four national universities. Pre-war bank deposits were repaid according to the payment regulations of the Government. As a result the Foundation's foreign currency assets decreased, while national currency assets increased.

1949

1/5 At the 148th Meeting of the Executive Committee held in Shanghai, due to the unstable political situation, it was decided that during the emergency period, the head office be moved to Shanghai,

treasury functions be moved to the U.S. and a special committee in America should be formed.

April Communist armed forces occupied Nanking and the Foundation stopped operation.

1950

3/7 Chiang Monlin flew from Taiwan to Washington D.C. and along with another six Trustees went to Bethesda Navy Hospital to meet John Leighton Stuart who was being treated for illness there. The quorum for the meeting was reached and I.C. Mei was then elected Trustee to replace Fu Ssu-nien. With the stipulated quorum, the special meeting continued that afternoon in the Chinese Embassy. James A. Mackay was elected Trustee to replace J.T.S. Reed. In the meantime Paul Hopkins and P.H. Ho were appointed Treasurers; I.C. Mei, Secretary; Hu Shih, Acting Director. Thereafter, the operations of the Foundation returned to normalcy. The first business was the approval of the China Foundation Fellowships Program to the National Taiwan University for a period of two years.

1951

9/29 At the 22nd Annual Board Meeting held in Washington D.C., the Rules on Fellowships Program were approved and it was decided to continue the

Foundation's support for National Taiwan University. Wellington Koo and Lee Kan were elected Trustees to replace Wong Wen-hao and H. C. Zen. T.F. Tsiang was elected Vice Chairman. The Special Committee on the China Foundation Research Grants was formed.

1952

9/27 At the 23rd Annual Board Meeting, the Rules on Fellowships Program were revised. Acting Director Hu was authorized to survey the current circumstances and demands of higher education and research in Taiwan during his trip there. He was also directed to report to the Board on the possibility of expanding the Foundation's project to other educational institutions than National Taiwan University. Chien Shih-liang was elected Trustee to replace Y.T. Tsur.

1953

9/26 At the 24th Annual Board Meeting, Trustee Stuart resigned and was replaced by Kenneth L. Isaacs. Claude B. Hutchison was elected Vice Chairman. Hu Shih reported the joint efforts by the Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation to provide a grant to assist the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica in preserving invaluable treasures

excavated from the An-yang Yin ruins and a subsidy for construction of buildings and equipment.

1954

10/2 At the 25th Annual Board Meeting, it was decided to subsidize the National Palace Museum and the Central Museum for installation of dehumidifying systems for the treasures evacuated to Taiwan. Discussion was undertaken regarding the possibility of restarting the program for research professorships.

1955

10/1 At the 26th Annual Board Meeting, it was decided to establish visiting professorships at National Taiwan University. Hu Shih reported the reactivation of the Foundation's activities in the U.S. He also made a review of the Foundation's efforts over the past five years.

1956

10/6 At the 27th Annual Board Meeting, Hu Shih was formally appointed Director. Partial repayments of the loan made to the National Central University were accepted. The Board terminated Graduate Scholarships for National Taiwan University. Several educational and cultural subsidies were approved, such as support for the remodeling and purchase

of books by the National Central Library and subsidies for the China House Association, Berkeley, California. The Board discussed the request of a loan from the Tsing Hua University Fund by Tsing Hua University.

1957

10/5 At the 28th Annual Meeting, it was agreed to lend Tsing Hua University US$350,000 and to increase the level of the Foundation's support to the China Foundation Fellowships Program. Grants to the following institutions were approved: the Chinese Association for the Advancement of Science, the Chinese Association for the Advance of Natural Science, the Chinese Association of Engineers and the China Institute in America. Paul Hopkins resigned and K.C. Li succeeded him as Trustee. Donald Brodie was appointed Treasurer.

1958

April Hu Shih and Wu Ta-you returned to Taiwan to draft guidelines for the National Science Development Project.

9/5 At the 29th Annual Board Meeting, the Board discussed the extension of a loan to Tsing Hua University and other grant matters. It was decided from the following year, up to 75% of the

Foundation's surplus could be used with the rest be ploughed back to the principal.

1959

9/4 At the 30th Annual Board Meeting, the Trustees in Taiwan proposed that in order to fully support the National Council on Science Development (established in January 1959), and grant for Fellowships Program be diverted to support National Research Professorships sponsored by the Council.

1960

9/2 At the 31st Annual Board Meeting, at the request of the President of National Taiwan University, it was decided to provide a grant to support the program of Emergency Aid to Scholars, National Taiwan University.

1961

6/14 At the 158th Meeting of the Executive Committee in New York, various grants and appropriations were approved. The committee also decided on the guidelines for the Tsing Hua University loan.

1962

4/18 At the joint 159th Meeting of the Executive Committee and 75th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, Vice Chairman T.F. Tsiang was appointed concurrently as interim Acting Director to replace the late Hu Shih. It was also decided to authorize the Financial Secretary to sign documents on behalf of the Acting Director. Various grants and appropriations were approved. Principles to provide emergency aid to the faculty of various universities in Taiwan were approved. Chiang Monlin, T.F. Tsiang, Chien Shih-liang, Lee Kan and Yip Luen-tsai were appointed to form a five-man screening committee to review the applications for this project.

9/14 At the 32nd Annual Board Meeting in Washington D. C., a memorial service was held for the late Hu Shih, Y.C. Mei and K.C. Li. New Trustees, Wu Ta-you, L.T. Yip and Everett F. Drumright were elected to succeed them. It was decided to set up Hu Shih Memorial Chairs. Upon the suggestion of T.F. Tsiang, Lee Kan was appointed Associate Director to assist with activities in Taiwan. The feasibility of holding the next Annual Board Meeting in Taipei was taken into consideration. The Board also discussed the proposal by the Minister of Education, Chi-Lu Huang to use the income from the Chinese Social and Political Science Association Library Endowment Fund.

1963

5/22 At the joint 160th Meeting of the Executive Committee and 76th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, budget and grants were appropriated. The Committees agreed with the proposal by the Chairman of the National Council on Science Development that the unused grant for the National Research Professorships Program accumulated over the years be used partially to subsidize the council's staff salaries and the rest of fund to be used to set up a Dr. Hu Shih Memorial Fund.

1964

4/6 At the 33rd Annual Board Meeting in Taipei, the late Trustee P.H. Ho was replaced by Chang Tse-kai. T.F. Tsiang was elected Director, Li Ming and James A. Mackay, Treasurers. It was decided that part of the revenue of the Chinese Social Political Science Association Library Endowment Fund be used to subsidize the research and publishing costs of the Institute of International Relations. It also approved a special grant to the Ancient History of China Project undertaken by the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica. The proposal of the Ministry of Education to increase the budget to Tsing Hua University was also taken into consideration.

9/17 At the joint 161st Meeting of the Executive Committee and 77th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, grants were approved. A sum of US$100,000 as special subsidy to Tsing Hua University annually for the next 3 years was approved.

1965

4/15 At the joint 162nd Meeting of the Executive Committee and 78th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, grants and appropriations were approved. Investment analysis was reported.

9/24 At the 34th Meeting of the Board in Washington D.C., Trustee Isaacs resigned, and Trustee Chiang Monlin passed away; J. Reed Hummer and Chen Ko-chung were elected to succeed them. T.F. Tsiang was elected Chairman and Director, Chien Shih-liang, Vice Chairman. It was discussed whether the Foundation should discontinue small grants in order to make funds available for large project grants. It was decided that the support to the Institute of Botany, Academia Sinica be derived from the surplus income of the Fan Memorial Institute of Biology Endowment Fund. It was decided to continue support for programs of National Research Professorships and Special Chairs of the National Council on Science Development.

1966

4/8 At the joint 163rd Meeting of the Executive Committee and 79th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, budgets and grants were approved. Wu Ta-you was elected Secretary and Lee Kan, Acting Director. Investment results were reported.

9/19 At the 35th Annual Board Meeting in Washington D. C., Liu Chieh, Raymond A. Kathe and Joseph B. Platt were elected Trustees to replace T.F. Tsiang, J. Reed Hummer and Donald Brodie. Sun Fo was elected Chairman of the Board.

1967

6/5 At the joint 164th Meeting of the Executive Committee and 80th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, grants and appropriations were approved. Based on the Acting Director's proposal, staff pensions were established. Investment results were discussed.

1968

2/29 The joint 165th Meeting of Executive Committee and 81st Meeting of Finance Committee were held in New York. The National Council on Science Development was authorized to use the surplus balance in the Foundation's grant for Hu Shih Memorial

Professorships and National Research Professorships and Special Chairs. Liu Chieh and Raymund A. Kathe were appointed Treasurers to fill the vacancies left by the late Li Ming and James A. Mackay, who had resigned.

4/8 Trustee Li Ming passed away on 1966 and in the 36th Annual Board Meeting in Taipei Yu Kuo-hwa was elected to replace him. The National Council on Science Development was reorganized into the National Science Council. Wu Ta-you made a request to the Foundation to continue support for the National Research Professorships and Special Chairs programs of the National Science Council.

5/31 The joint 166th Meeting of the Executive Committee and 82nd Meeting of the Finance Committee were held in Taipei. Grants and appropriations were approved. Views were exchanged on the investment policy.

1969

1/6 At the joint 167th Meeting of the Executive Committee and 83rd Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, grants to the Hu Shih Memorial Scholarship Fund and Emergency Aid to Scholars were approved. Yang Shu-jen was appointed Associate Director.

5/26 At the joint 168th Meeting of the Executive Committee and 85th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, grants and appropriations were approved.

9/26 At the 37th Annual Board Meeting, Trustee K.C. Chen resigned and Yen Chen-hsing was elected to replace him. Various grants and appropriations were approved.

1970

5/27 At the joint 169th Meeting of the Executive Committee and the 85th Meeting of the Finance Committee in New York, grants and appropriations were approved. It was decided to contact the U.S. Treasury Department to clarify the Foundation's tax-exempt status in the U.S.

6/5 The U.S. Treasury Department reaffirmed the Foundation's tax-exempt status.

6/8 The Canadian tax authorities also affirmed the Foundation's tax-exempt status in Canada.

1971

4/5 – 6 At the 38th Annual Board Meeting held in Taipei, grants were approved and officers appointed. To revise the constitution and by-laws and also to protect the safety of the Foundation's assets, a special Board Meeting was convened in the afternoon on April 5th and it resolved to direct Liu Chieh, V.K. Wellington Koo, Chien Shih-liang, Everett F. Drumright and

Chen-hsing, Secretary. Wang Chi-wu was appointed as Acting Director. By-laws were amended. It was decided to close accounts at Citibank, New York and open accounts at Citibank, Taipei. From then on all the meetings of the Foundation would be held in Taipei.

September The Foundation's head office in Taipei was established.

9/15 The Uniform Tax Identification Number for the Foundation was obtained.

9/30 Accounts at Citibank, New York were closed, while accounts at Citibank, Taipei were established.

10/2 Taipei Head Office opened an NT Dollar account at the Postal Savings Administration.

12/19 At the joint 176th Meeting of the Executive Committee and the 90th Meeting of the Finance Committee, the proposal that the Executive Committee would be authorized to make interim appointments for the Finance Committee was approved. Citibank, Taipei was appointed to be the Foundation's investment advisor. The meeting reconfirmed the Acting Director's report presented at the October 25th luncheon meeting.

1973

6/16 At the joint 177th Meeting of the Executive Committee and 91st Meeting of the Finance Committee, grants and appropriations were approved.

It was decided to have all the records and files of the Foundation transferred from New York to Taipei in due course.

1974

1/3 – 7 At the 40th Annual Board Meeting, Yang Shu-jen and Wei Huo-yao were elected to succeed Sun Fo and V.K. Wellington Koo. Chien Shih-liang was elected Chairman; Wu Ta-you, Vice Chairman; and Yen Chen-hsing, Secretary. Robert F. Chandler, Chang Tse-kai and Yen Chen-hsing were appointed to form a special committee to study the grant policy of the Foundation. Grants and appropriations were approved. The Foundation would from then on hold two Annual Board Meetings in three years to minimize expenses. The loan proposal made by the National Tsing Hua University for the purpose of augmenting and strengthening the newly launched engineering and technology program was conditionally approved.